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ABSTRACT
DYNAMICS OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
IN SMALL STATES.
CASE STUDY OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN
FEBRUARY, 1991
DONALD C. PETERS, B.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, BOSTON
M.A., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, BOSTON
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Eric Einhorn
This study examines the governing structure and systems of the small
independent states of the Eastern Caribbean which are all former British colonies. The
states which are the subject of this study are: Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, St. Kitts/Nevis and the dependent colony of Montserrat.
The political model that has emerged in that region since independence is one
characterized by a fairly clear and relatively high degree of functional specificity of
structure. Legislation is vested in the hands of a freely elected parliament, policy
development and decision-making is the function of the Prime Minister and the
executive cabinet.
On the surface, the model appears to be structured along western democratic
standards, but in reality it is distinctly unique. This study will examine the major
differences that exist between the Eastern Caribbean model and other western models.
The absence of a historical traditional society in the region, it's small size, and
a history of British domination has resulted in a system which manifests a strong level
of stability, but nonetheless has an equally strong authoritarian governance structure.
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The existing theories on development and modernization do not adequately
explain the idiosyncrasies of the Eastern Caribbean model. Although geographically
located in the larger Caribbean area, these small states of the Eastern Caribbean have
developed a system of government that differ from the larger territories. This study is
meant to examine and analyze the components and characteristics of that model.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
This study of the existing political system in the newly independent region of the
Eastern Caribbean grew out of a general interest in the area of political development
and modernization in developing and underdeveloped countries. A concern for finding
an adequate and relevant qualitative comparative model for examination of the structure
and system of government in that particular region, and the need to present a deeper
analysis of the peculiarity of the political model that exists within the Eastern Caribbean,
has led me to undertake this work.
This area (more recently described as the Caribbean Basin) comprises twenty-six
independent states and sixteen dependent territories which are characterized by
significant ethnic, racial and linguistic diversity. There are also major differences in size,
resources, economic development and types of government. However, the islands within
the Caribbean Basin that we have chosen to study are extremely similar in terms of their
size, resources, language, ethnicity and a common history of colonization by the British
Government. They are the former British colonies of the Eastern Caribbean, today
referred to in the region as the (OECS) Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. This
acronym is used to describe the states geographically, although the OECS itself
represents the region's first attempt at economic integration. The countries which
comprise the OECS and which shall be the focus of this study are:
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts/Nevis and the
dependent colony of Montserrat. (Figure 1)
Initially, we intended to include Barbados in this study; however, while geographically
located in the Eastern Caribbean, it is not a member of the OECS and its political
model does not fit within the paradigm of the other Eastern Caribbean islands.
1
1For further reading about Barbados see - F.A. Hoyos, Barbados: A History from the Amerindians
to Independence, (London: Macmillan Press, England 1972)
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FIGURE 1
Map of the Caribbean. Featuring the states of the Eastern Caribbean.
3We have been very specific about the particular countries for which this study was
undertaken, because many scholars seem to have a difficult time defining the region.
Anthony Payne notes, "the Caribbean poses genuine problems of identification and
demarcation. It displays such an enormous variety of historical connections, social
patterns and cultural traditions that it can easily seem as if no common characteristics
can possibly attach to the region as a whole".2 Notwithstanding this observation, the
Eastern Caribbean countries described above do share a great deal of commonality -- the
most significant being their political model of Government.
The political system that exists within that region today is defined as a democracy.
Scott B. MacDonald, a leading scholar on the Caribbean says, "Outside of the Caribbean,
there are few areas in the third world that may be regarded as having a preponderance
of open political systems where electoral competition is strong, a loyal opposition exists
and change of government is peaceful and regular...". He further describes the Eastern
Caribbean as "a region where the norm is democratic in the political realm and capitalist
in the economic".3 Like other scholars, Scott's description of the system is essentially
accurate. However, what we want to present in this study is the other side of this
political model. We suggest that in spite of the existence of open regular elections,
opposition parties and other institutional aspects of a modern democracy, the
governmental system of the Eastern Caribbean does not function like a democracy. In
those small states, the system does manifest fundamental aspects of democracy; but this
democracy is not the same as western democracy. The system is extremely paternalistic
2Anthony Payne, The International Crisis in the Caribbean, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,
MD 1980) Page 1.
3Scott B. MacDonald, Trinidad & Tobago Democracy in the Caribbean, (New York: Praeger
Books, NY 1986) Page 1.
4and very limited. Gordon K. Lewis, a prominent West Indian Scholar supports our
hypothesis when he wrote, over two decades ago, "Caribbean society is one based
primarily on class oppression and paternalism in all of the strategic aetas: government,
education, the police system, social bullying and economic intimidation are pretty much
the order of the day in the life of the masses."4
Both these scholars have described aspects of the Eastern Caribbean political system
which may seem conflicting to the reader. But it is this apparent conflict in the system
which is central to this study. How can a society with such an open and free democratic
electoral system be simultaneously oppressive and paternalistic.
This study may not necessarily answer the question of what system is good for the
Caribbean. But it will seek to present a conceptual framework for understanding how
the system maintains its stability in spite of what may seem a major conflict in terms of
its philosophical and operational approach towards democracy. The description
presented in the following pages is an effort to describe the paradox inherent in the
Eastern Caribbean political model.
Increasingly, people and states in the Third World are demanding greater social and
political equity. The Caribbean is no different. The revolution in Grenada 1979, the
coup attempt in Dominica 1980, and the dcstabilization of government in St. Lucia from
1983-86 are clear indications that there are rumblings in the region. The image of a
tranquil, stable democratic Caribbean island is no longer the norm. On the other hand,
the kind of violent upheaval in countries like the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Liberia, etc. are
absent in the Caribbean in spite of their great diversity. This study presents a clear
4Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (New York: Monthly Review Press,
NY 1969) Page 44.
5insight of how the decision makers within the political system have been able to
manipulate the system in order to avoid those kinds of uprisings. Throughout this study
it will also be shown that while the islands manifest some of the characteristics of other
developing countries, their social and political systems differ significantly.
In this study of the democratic model of government in the Eastern Caribbean, we
examine some aspects of the process of modernization in order to assess its impact on
political development, and to determine, whether this modernizing process has had any
influence on the Eastern Caribbean political developmental model.
A crucial variable in the study will be the size of these nation states. The
idiosyncracies of that model suggest that the political model which emerged out of the
former colonial system is one characterized uniquely by the size and population. Arthur
Lewis, one of the Caribbean's most prominent economists, in a passage from his
publication, the Agony of the Eight
,
suggests that, "In a small island of 50,000 - 100,000
people, dominated by a single political party, it is very difficult to prevent political
abuse."5
Courtney N. Blackman, former Governor of the Central Bank of Barbados goes
further by suggesting that in addition to size, the Caribbean's history of slavery becomes
a major influence on the kind of political systems that currently prevail in the Caribbean.
Blackman writes, "the small size of Caribbean states provide a fertile soil for the seeds of
authoritarianism which arc planted in our colonial past".6 Against this conflicting
sArthur Lewis, The Agony of the Eight, (Bridgetown: Advocate Printery, Barbados 1965) Page
14.
6Blackman Courtney, "Agony of the Eight Re-visited", Caribbean Affairs Vol.2 No.3, July-
September 1989 Edition, Page 65.
6background of the Eastern Caribbean Political System, we begin our study by examining
the whole concept of democracy and its application in the Caribbean.
The term democracy as it relates to Western states, means "power by the people"
and signifies to most people a system of popular participation in government. This
definition is basic, it does not adequately define the complexities of what can be
described as the most dynamic and complicated political system of our times. It is a
system that most nations would like to be identified with. The Eastern Caribbean falls
into that category. It was George Orwell who claimed that "In the case of a word like
democracy not only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make one is
resisted from all sides... The defenders of any kind of regime claim that it is a democracy
and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one
meaning."7
Because of the broad interpretation and definitions of democratic systems, a number
of modern sovereign states have adapted some aspects of democracy and declared their
states as "democracies". The Caribbean is no exception. Since independence from
Britain, the Eastern Caribbean islands have all declared themselves as political
democracies. Based on conversations with Eastern Caribbean leaders, they seemed
satisfied that they had maintained an open, democratic society in which citizens were
free to choose their leadership. On the other hand, the opposition parties in those
states point to abuse of power which they claim is distinctively characteristic of
traditional dictatorship and authoritarian societies. Yet, the entire population are
vehemently opposed to communism. These various conflicts within the system can be
7George Orwell, Politics and the English Language in Selected Essays, (Baltimore: 1957) Page
149.
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7fully explained. We intend to do that by utilizing analysis which will consider particular
characteristics of those small sovereign states with limited resources. These states seem
to stay away from a strict, authentic form of authoritarianism - intent to adhere very
closely to the ideals of modern democracy. But, they are also prone to utilizing methods
of coercion which can best be described as abuse of power. How they govern and what
constitutes their ideological goals will become clear as we take an in depth look at
Democracy in those small states.
In the first chapter, we will review the literature on which this study is based. We
will analyze some of the theories on political development and modernization, as they
pertain to underdeveloped states. Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing
Societies
,
Seymour Upset's Political Man
. John Kautsky's Political Consequences of
Modernization will be reviewed. Almond and Verba's analysis of political culture is used,
as is David Apter's examination of boundaries of government; political parties as
modernizing investment; and ideology. We review Rupert Emerson's Empire to Nation
,
where he addresses self determination; national movements; rejection of colonialism; and
the erosion of democracy in new nations, a number of West Indian scholars work --
Gordon K. Lewis, Growth of the Modern West Indies
,
Henry & Stone's, The Newer
Caribbean and others.
In the second chapter, we analyze the historical progression of the political
development in the region. Our focus being on the colonial heritage and the British
influence on the social and political fabric of Caribbean Society.
Modern westerners think of the Caribbean region as a magnificent collection of
tropical islands, blessed with many beaches, comfortable weather, the perfect place for a
vacation. While these characteristics are accurate, the West Indies did not always stand
8out as a tourist haven. At one time, it played a major role in the great trade and
economic development of western Europe. The geographical location of these islands
made them vital to early Dutch, British or Spanish traders and adventurers.
By mid 17th century, the British had come to realize that the vast wealth and
"mountains of gold" reported to exist in the Caribbean, were basically exaggerated tales.
There was, however, tremendous wealth to be made from the cultivation of its vast areas
of fertile soil and good climate. The early settlers embarked on the cultivation of sugar
cane and the subsequent production of molasses, rum, and sugar. The cultivation of
sugar in the Caribbean produced perhaps the most significant historical impact in that
region of the world. Sugar cane created vast wealth for English landowners who owned
property in the Caribbean but more significant is that it created the demand for slave
labor from Africa.
Unlike the mainland of the United States (where African slaves were also imported),
slavery in the Caribbean produced a society in which the majority of inhabitants were
not white landowners, but African slaves. By 1800, there were approximately 60,000
whites and 500,000 slaves in the Caribbean.8
The decline of the sugar industry, coupled with emancipation, established a society in
which the majority of the inhabitants were black. Thus, the Caribbean of today is one in
which the descendants of former slaves are now governing themselves and are
responsible for charting their own political and ideological direction.
8Cyril Hamshere, The British in the Caribbean (Cambridge:
1972)
Page 126.
Harvard University Press, MA
9The most significant aspect of the islands historical development is the extreme
influence that the British domination has had. The Caribbean people have been
educated by the British, their constitutions developed by the British and their values
governed and shaped by British values.
In spite of this influence, the Caribbean Islands have seen their share of rebellion,
strikes, and coups. Occasionally the tranquil and tropical calm of the islands can turn to
sporadic and violent confrontations as manifested by the Grenada revolution in 1979.
Chapter three concentrates on examining the political institutions of the Eastern
Caribbean Society. We do so against the background of the existing theories on
modernization and democracy.
Through interviews with former and current leaders, we are able to understand the
political philosophies and ideology that governed their decisions, their understanding of
democracy, the role of the people in government and their own concept of foreign
relations.
It will become apparent that in the West Indies, political parties which traditionally
emerged out of trade unions are nonetheless elitist. Most leaders appear to welcome
mass participation in the electoral process in order to get elected to government, but
seem to discourage participation in the actual governing of the state. Criticism of
government is not tolerated. Government in most cases controls and owns the mass
media. In spite of the existence of an opposition in parliament, these states, for all
practical purposes, function as "one party states."
We will also examine the West Indian people, how they perceive their role in
government, and analyze what we term the "West Indian identity" issue. This identity
10
issue has had significant socio-political implications for the islands singularly and has
impacted negatively on efforts toward Caribbean integration.
The remainder of chapter three will be used to establish the framework for analyzing
the dynamics of the political system. It will clearly identify the various groups and actors
within the system, and will begin to chronicle the mechanism involved in the process of
governing in the Caribbean.
The "class" question is addressed and will support Samuel Huntington's theory that
political change can only occur when the middle class decides to assume leadership and
become advocates for that change. In the Caribbean, the middle class remains the major
political force. It has been able, where necessary, to influence state representatives to
work exclusively with a middle class agenda while effectively abandoning their own
agricultural constituencies.
In chapter four, we continue to examine and analyze the existing system from a
historical perspective; and begin to identify emergent changing forces in the Caribbean -
- changes which resulted in the empowerment of hitherto passive groups; also the social
and political implication of those changes in the fabric of West Indian Society.
Within this framework, we will examine the Grenada Revolution; while analyzing for
instance why the prime minister of Dominica (though extremely conservative) commands
overwhelming support of the people, relative to the opposition party which has a marxist
ideological philosophy. We will also consider the impact of the Grenada Revolution on
the other islands. For instance, since the revolution both St. Lucia and St. Vincent,
have returned power to former conservative leaders. In Antigua, the traditional labor
party was swept back into power, led again by a former prime minister Vere Bird and
his sons.
11
To determine how the economic condition of these states impacts both the ideology
of political parties, and the process of government itself, it will be necessary in this
chapter to briefly examine the economies of these countries For instance, in the 1960's
Antigua was struggling with a dying agricultural economy because of problems with the
price of sugar in the world market. Their attitude toward the United States at the time
was extremely hostile. Today Antigua has turned its economy around, they arc now
totally dependent on tourism. Consequently the Progressive Labor Movement (which is
the more radical party) had been put out of power. The more moderate party has been
reinstated in order to maintain good relations with the United States and Canada. It
will be shown that while the new pro United States posture has some opposition, it is
overwhelmingly supported by the majority of working class Antiguans who have
benefitted economically from those new relations.
Thus, in general the chapter will focus on the problems that confront governments in
the area, and how they move to address those problems. It will be interesting to note
the role of democracy as we follow the decision making process among government
leaders in the region.
What is peculiar about the Eastern Caribbean political system is the absolute
authority that government somehow inherits. Government officials are able to
circumvent laws that they have enacted. They are able to use public resources for their
personal gain. While partisan politics is a normal phenomena in modern democracies,
Caribbean governments have taken the concept to its zenith. As a result, when a party
is elected to power, they virtually eliminate the opposition through patronage, control of
the media and legislative action where necessary. These actions are in part responsible
for the domination of one party for decades in most of these islands.
12
In chapter five the focus is on movements for change in the Caribhean. We look at
the need for political integration, the attempts at integration and the failures of such
attempts: West Indies Federation 1958-62; the 1967 secession of the island of Anguilla
from St. Kills; new efforts at a Caribbean Economic Market (CARICOM) and more
recently the establishment of the (OECS) Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
We examine closely the opposition towards integration - where it has come from
and how powerful it is. Within this context we will analyze the alternative to the
current form of government as advocated by the alternative political parties in these
islands. These parties include the (MBPM) Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement of
Grenada, the (ACLM) Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement and the more
traditional opposition parties like the (SLP) St. Lucia Labor Party.
These positions can differ significantly from group to group. In Dominica, the
formal opposition (led by the Michael and Rosie Douglas) claim to be Marxist and
continue to advocate programs such as land reform and the redistribution of wealth. In
Antigua, the opposition party -- (UNDP) United National Democratic Party --pushes a
platform emphasizing diversification of the economy. Migration to and from the United
States mainland, and exposure to major television programs originating from the United
States has had significant impact on the current and future direction of West Indian
politics.
Thus, a significant portion of the chapter will document the overwhelming opposition
to the values of Socialism and Marxism by both government and people of those islands,
the role of the church in politics of the region, and the reason for the enthusiastic
embrace of western democratic values in spite of the absence of real freedoms in those
societies.
13
In summary, we explain why the current Caribbean political system is both functional
and successful. This explanation is presented within the context of the corporatist
model.
My argument will conclusively demonstrate that because of the peculiar nature of
those islands
- their size, heritage, historical experience, the influence of western
democracies and the church, any attempt to evaluate that system of government based
on the parameters set forth within the traditional political models would be impractical.
The conclusion of this work will therefore, put the Caribbean political, economic and
social systems into a comprehensive "West Indian developmental model", which is
empirical and will help the reader understand the dynamics of the islands' peculiar
system of democracy.
Hopefully, it will be able to provide some of the reasons for the islands' failure to
integrate politically. It will also highlight the region's quasi "balance of power" doctrine
which was responsible for Dominica's and Barbados' role in supporting the United States
invasion of Grenada.
Finally, based on our analysis (including conversations with Caribbean people) we
will attempt to summarize the current attitude of the Eastern Caribbean people and
what lies ahead politically for that region.
one
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
A. Unique Model
Political theorists ranging from Samuel Huntington and Seymour Lipset on the
hand to the dependencia theorists on the other, have advanced a number of conditions
and variable factors which either enhance or retard the transformation of traditional
third world political systems into modernization. The literature on development seems
to fall into two categories namely economic development on one hand and political
development on the other. The main body of this dissertation will focus on political
development since I intend to establish a correlation between political and economic
development in that region of the Caribbean.
The English speaking Eastern Caribbean states have at some time experienced most
of the development stages involved in the transformation of traditional system into
modernity. Yet there are indeed some inherent factors in the historical development of
that territory which render it unique, and which prevent us from fitting it within one of
the established developmental models as we could parts of Central or Latin America. It
is precisely because of these differences that I have chosen to concentrate this thesis on
that specific geographical area which is representative of most independent small states
in that hemisphere.
Amongst the many characteristics that differentiate the Eastern Caribbean nations
from other developing countries is the relative size of these nation states in terms of
geographical land mass area and population. The peculiar customs and systems work
relatively well in the region precisely because the states are small. The issue of size as a
significant characteristic of the model is emphasized throughout this work because I
15
believe that size in effect represents a key variable of the idiosyncratic model of
democracy that has emerged in the Eastern Caribbean.
The issue of size and it's relevance to democracy has been a subject of political
theory throughout history. Aristotle, Plato, Hobbes and Montesquieu have all discussed
the virtues and correlation of size to democracy. The Greek philosophers, in particular
Aristotle and Plato, felt strongly that a democracy had to be small in order to be
functional. The concept of the autonomous city state which emerged in early Greece
appeared to have influenced this hypothesis.
However, much later in history, Rousseau dealt with the very same issues in his
writings including the "social contract". His thoughts on the subject are scattered
throughout his works and represent probably the most in-depth analysis of the subject.
Dahl and Tufte in their writings on size and democracy comment on Rouseau's
thoughts. They argue it was Rouseau's belief that a "democratic polity must have so few
citizens that all of them could meet frequently in the popular assembly to listen, to
create, perhaps even to speak." 1 The Eastern Caribbean's small size may not meet the
ideals of Rousseau's thoughts on democracy, but it does provide for active citizen
participation in government.
Rouseau felt that "smallness made it possible for every citizen to know every other,
to estimate like qualities, to understand his problems, to develop friendly feelings toward
him, to analyze and discuss with comprehension the problems facing the polity."2 This
1Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, CA 1973) Page 5.
2Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy, Page 5.
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concept is derived from the ancient Greek city states and reflects the kind of ideal
democracy that philosophers like Rouseau envisaged.
The small Caribbean states in the post-independence era function like a city state.
All governmental activities are processed in the capitals, where most of the population
are concentrated. The people know their leaders very well and have constant easy
access to them, which is a remarkable component of the Caribbean model. The
smallness also has it's down side. For instance, citizens who do not support the popular
governments are easily identified and invariably victimized. The states are also unable to
attract large industries because of a small labor force which results in a negative
economic impact.
Overall, however, this system appears to have built-in components which seem to
neutralize extreme behavior both on the part of government officials and citizens. The
model is small and unique, but politically stable.
In the introduction to this dissertation, the islands of the Eastern Caribbean which
are the subject of this study were identified as Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat,
St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. However, it seems appropriate to give the
reader a more general description of each independent nation, state and the colony of
Montserrat in order to put the text of this work in a more meaningful conceptual
framework. It should be recognized that although the Eastern Caribbean shares a
common history of colonization, both the people and leaders of the region believe that
each state has its own unique quality. In the next few pages, a summary of each
countries main geographical, historical and political characteristics will be presented.
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B. Political Geography of thp QECS
Antigua
Population: 80,093
Size: 108 Square Miles
Economy: Tourism
Per Capita Income (U.S.): $3,058
was
The Island was discovered in 1493 during one of Columbus' expeditions and
colonized by Spain. In 1529, the French made an abortive attempt to take the island
and failed. But in 1623, the British (under the leadership of Sir Thomas Warner) took
the island from the Spanish. The first export crop produced by the British was tobacco,
but by 1674 Sir Christopher Codington, a wealthy British colonist, established the islands
first sugar plantation and shortly following that, Antigua became a major sugar producing
island for Britain. The sugar cane industry required a significant amount of labor. To
resolve that problem the colonist turned to Africa and by the latter half of the 17th
century, 38,000 negro slaves were on the island.
Antigua also played a major role in Britain's defense policy. In 1720, the British
decided to develop one of Antigua's natural harbors into a Navy base for the Royal
Navy. The base was completed in 1780 and was used to maintain a fort in a permanent
state of readiness for war. Today, the facility called Nelson Dockyards at English
Harbors serves as a marina and tourist resort.
Antigua and the two smaller neighboring islands of Barbuda and Redonda obtained
political independence from Britain in November 1981. Those two smaller islands
became dependencies of Antigua under the new constitution.
The political party currently in power is the Antigua Labor Party (ALP). There are
two opposition parties, the United National Democratic Party (UNDP) and the Antigua
Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM). The country abolished personal income tax
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in 1976. Consequently, most of the country's revenue is generated by the tourist trade
which accounts for up to 60% of the gross domestic product.
The population of Antigua is made up predominantly by the descendants of African
slaves. The national language is English and the educational system is patterned after
the British model.
The government owns and operates the main radio and television stations ABS while
the only other radio station ZDK is owned and operated privately.
Dominica
Population: 81,185
Size: 289.8 Square Miles
Economy: Agriculture (bananas chief export crop)
Per Capita Income (U.S.): $1,283
Political Status: Independent
Dominica was also colonized for Spain by Columbus in November 1493 on his
second voyage. At that time, the island was inhabited by the indigenous natives known
as Caribs. All attempts by the various colonists to subdue that group failed. Although
Dominica was not one of the major sugar producing islands, the European powers spent
a great deal of time fighting over the island. As a result, the island spent various
periods of its history as a colony of either France or Britain. So numerous were the
battles fought for possession of Dominica, that the Caribs named it "Waitiukubuli"
meaning "land of many battles". In 1805, the French burned down the capital town of
Roseau. The British then offered the French a payoff of £20,000 or $57,000 U.S. to
leave the island. They did, but returned later to continue the skirmishes. From 1895,
Dominica remained a British possession until November, 1978 when they were granted
independence. The constitution of Dominica provides for a unicameral legislature which
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is presided over by the Prime Minister who is also the Chief Executive Officer.
Dominica also obtained sovereign republic status within the British commonwealth which
means that the Queen's representative on the island has the title of President while that
same position on the other islands is called Governor General.
Dominica has personal income taxes and the bulk of the country's revenue is derived
from its agricultural trade and a battery of import taxes. Banana export accounts for
40% of the GDP. Ninety-eight percent (98%) of the population are descendants of
African slaves while 2% comprise the Caribs who live on the north east of the Island.
English is the official language; however, because of the prolonged French domination,
the population also speaks a French dialect known as Patois. There is one radio station
in the country owned and operated by the government. There is no local television
station, but citizens have access to U.S. channels via pay cable television network.
Grenada
Population: 120,000
Size: 133 Square Miles
Economy: Agriculture
Per Capita Income (U.S.) $1,208
Grenada was colonized for Spain by Columbus on his third voyage in August, 1498.
In 1762, the British seized the islands from Spain but lost it to France in 1779. Britain
and France continued to wage battles for possession and in 1783 Britain won the island
as part of the settlement in the Treaty of Versailles. Grenada remained a British colony
until February 1974 when it became independent.
Among the islands of the Eastern Caribbean, Grenada has had the highest level of
political instability which eventually culminated in the 1979 overthrow of Prime Minister
Eric Gairy's Government by the New Jewel Movement. From 1979 to 1983, the New
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Jewel Movement governed the country with a political model based on the principles of
socialism and moved away from the Westminster system. By 1983, political turmoil
within the ranks of the NJM led to the assassination of the party leader Maurice Bishop
and in August of the same year, the United States invaded the island and restored the
democratic political system.
After 1983, the island returned to the former system of government with a
unicameral legislature headed by a prime minister. There are currently five political
parties in Grenada: The National Democratic Congress (NDC), New National Party
(NNP), Grenada United Labor Party (GULP), the New Party (TNP) and the Maurice
Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM). The TNP holds a slim margin in Parliament.
Agriculture represents the main source of revenue for Grenada. The agricultural
sector contributes at least 30-40% of the GDP. Nutmeg, mace and bananas are the
chief export crops. Before the Revolution, tourism played a significant part in the
country's economy -- but declined between 1979-83. Like Antigua, Grenada is
responsible for the governing of two neighboring islands, Cariacou and Petite Martinique
which are excellent tourist resorts.
The majority of the population is of African descent with a small percentage of East
Indians. English is the main language spoken.
There is one radio station and one television station - both owned and operated by
the government.
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Moiitserrat
Population: 12,000
Si/c: 29 Square Miles
Economy: Tourism, Agriculture
Per Capita Income (U.S.) $3,598
Montscrrat was discovered by Columbus in 1493, but the Spaniards never colonized
the island. The French occupied it from 1664 to 1668 and again in 1782. In 1783, the
British colonized the island which has remained a British colony up to this day. The
current structure of Government is the crown colony system in which the Queen's
representative, the Governor, controls the executive council and the chief minister heads
the legislature council. All legislation, however, must be approved by the Governor
before enacted into law. Election for the selection of a chief minister and member of
the legislative council is held every five years. The Executive Council serves at the
pleasure of her Majesty and members are nominated to that committee by her
representative, the Governor.
The Island depends on a diversified economy for its revenue plus various grants from
Britain. There is one government owned radio station on the island and one privately
owned station. A television relay station provides T.V. programming via neighboring
Antigua cable television.
In 1989, the Island of Montscrrat was devastated by Hurricane Hugo. Damages
were estimated at $30 million. The country is in the process of rebuilding. The
population is of predominately African origin, with a small percentage of Europeans.
English is the official language spoken by the citizens.
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St. Kitts/Nevis
Population: 44,000
Size: 103 Square Miles
Economy: Agriculture
Per Capita Income (U.S.): $1,994
St. Kitts/Nevis are two separate islands but since 1983 when they achieved
independence they have integrated their government and are now recognized as a
political unit. The state capital is located in the main city of Bassetere in St. Kitts.
The two islands were discovered in 1493 by Columbus, but the Spaniards eventually
relinquished the island to the French who were then quickly challenged for possession by
the expansionist British colonizers. Between 1663 and 1713, the islands were used as
trading blocks by both the British and French as they battled for control of the
territories. During that period the islands changed hands six times - but from 1713 until
independence in 1983, the British remained in control.
Since independence, the island has remained politically stable. There are two
political parties in the state, St. Kitts Labor Party (SKLP) and the Peoples Action
Movement (PAM) which currently holds power.
The economy of St. Kitts/Nevis is predominantly dependent on sugar which accounts
for 57% of its export revenue. Other light manufacturing industry and some tourism
also contributes to the gross domestic product (GDP). Sugar had long been the main
export crop for St. Kitts/Nevis. During the 18th century, they represented a major
economic possession of Britain. Fortunately, unlike Antigua, which was also a major
sugar producing island, the people of St. Kitts have continued to put their resources into
the production of sugar while simultaneously developing their tourist industry.
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The population of St. Kitts/Nevis is relatively small at 48,000. English is the only
language spoken. The large majority of citizens are of African descent with a literacy
rate of 90%.
St. Lucia ~
1
Population: 142,000
Size: 138 Square Miles
Economy: Agriculture
Per Capita Income (U.S.) $1,222
St. Lucia was not discovered by Columbus. In 1624 and again in 1639, the British
attempted to colonize the island, but their landing party was attacked and routed by the
indigenous Caribs. In 1651, the French (led by Governor De LaRiviere) also attempted
to settle the island, but their settlements were also relentlessly attacked by the Caribs.
The French remained on the island fighting Caribs until 1664 when the British
adventurer Sir Thomas Warner attacked and defeated the French and took the island in
the name of Britain. The island was, however, officially ceded to the British in 1804 and
remained a British colony until 1979 when St. Lucia finally obtained its independence.
The current St. Lucia constitution provides for the representation of the British
monarchy in the person of a Governor General and for a parliament consisting of a
senate and a house of assembly. Senators are generally appointed by the Prime Minister
while members of the house of assembly must be elected. There are two main political
parties in St. Lucia, the St. Lucia Labor Party (SLP) and the United Workers party
(UWP) which is currently in power.
The St. Lucian economy is fairly diversified, yet agriculture remains the major export
for foreign exchange. The population of St. Lucia is the highest among the OECs at
24
142,000
- the majority being of African descent. It also has a high rate of
unemployment.
There is one government owned radio station, one privately owned radio station; St.
Lucia television is also government owned and brings local and foreign programs to the
viewers.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Population: 113,000
Size: 150 Square Miles
Economy: Agriculture
Per Capita Income (U.S.) $1,014
The political state of St. Vincent comprises St. Vincent and the small neighboring
islands of Bequia, Mustique, Mayreau, Canovon and Union Islands. The main island wa
taken for Spain by Columbus in 1498, but as was the trend during those expansionist
years, both the British and French battled the Caribs in an effort to settle the colony.
By 1783 when Britain and France signed the treaty of Versailles in which St. Vincent
was ceded to Britain, the Caribs were still fighting the British settlers. In 1797, the
British rounded up all the Caribs that they had not killed and transported them to
Ratton Island where they eventually perished. The Island was granted independence
from Britain in 1979.
The island is governed by the executive body of Government which comprises the
Prime Minister who is also the Chief Executive Officer and the various ministers of
Government. The constitution calls for the Queen's representative, the Governor, to
appoint the ministers for the Prime Ministers' Cabinet. But in actuality, the Prime
Minister selects his ministers out of the slate elected and the Governor simply confirms
them. There are three main political parties: the St. Vincent Grenadines Labor party
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(SVGLP), the United Peoples Movement (UPM) and the National Democratic Party
(NDP) currently in power.
The economy is centered around agricultural production with bananas being the
largest export crop. The production of arrowroot which is a starchy food product
derived from the arrowroot plant, contributed a significant percent to the GDP in the
early 1950s and 1960s, but declined in the 1970s and 1980s. Today the government has
committed resources to revitalizing that sector of the economy. St. Vincent has one of
the highest literacy rales in the Caribbean which is the result of government's
commitment to education. Fourteen percent (14%) of the GNP is spent on education.
The people of St. Vincent are predominately of African origin although there arc
small pockets of East Indians and Europeans. There is only one radio station in St.
Vincent and the Grenadines and it is owned and operated by the government. A
private cable company provides access to U.S. cable network.
This summary of the small nations of the Eastern Caribbean is intended to
demonstrate the distinctiveness of each island. But more important, (he demographic
data presented is meant to allow the reader to conceptualize the relative size and
population of these countries in order to better understand the dynamics of government
and the structure of the political model that exist within each state.
C. Characteristics of the l^iskrn Caribbean Model
The main body of this work will focus on those peculiar characteristics of the
Eastern Caribbean Political model that differ markedly from other third world regions.
In the introduction, we established that these nation slates were politically stable, and
thai there was a tremendous love of freedom amongst the people of the region. In
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effect, the system had all the fundamental characteristics of a democracy, but it did not
function in the same manner that more advanced western democracies did.
Politics in the Eastern Caribbean is an animated process. Caribbean people feel very
strongly about their right to vote. Over the past three decades they have exercised
those rights with constitutional regularity and with a strong commitment to open
elections. "Democracy" in the Eastern Caribbean state means "the freedom to elect
political representatives". This appears to be the sum total of the peoples involvement
in government. The election process generally takes on a carnival atmosphere. The
entire voting population of those islands get involved in the electoral process.
Candidates for office spend months campaigning in their particular constituency. They
repeatedly make promises to the electorate that are not always kept.
The voters on the other hand respond enthusiastically to the speeches, though they
never seem to take those promises seriously. They choose their party affiliation, based
on the charisma of the leader of that party. When they have chosen a party, they
remain extremely loyal to that party and will support any candidate that the party
presents. The candidate's campaign strategy is to remain visible until election day. If
the candidate is successful, he will take office and will represent the constituency without
ever holding another meeting until the next election.
Most leaders appear to support mass participation in the electoral process in order
to get elected to government, but when elected tend to discourage participation in the
actual governing of the state. Cecil Mcintosh, a columnist from St. Vincent describes
the process as follows,
"At General Elections time, each candidate for parliament holds meetings in the
open and in halls and in groups, and visits homes to present to the electorate the
arguments why he should be elected by them as their representative.
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Unfortunately, in St Vincent and the Grenadines, after a candidate has been
elected and installed in his seat in Parliament, there arc no more meetings of anykind and no more visiting of homes. He is now in full control, the master of allhe surveys, and docs as he pleases. Even in the case of major issues, there is
consultation at all between him and the people of his constituency "3
< no
D. The Authoritarian Character
The system of government that emerges out of that process is one characterized by
some aspects of democracy but tightly controlled in the tradition of a quasi- authoritarian
system. The countries therefore are recognized as democracies, but the government
apparatus and the decision making process at the national level are not democratic, and
cannot be capsulized within any of the broad political models that dominate the third
world. Therefore, for purposes of this paper I will refer to that form of government as
the "Eastern Caribbean Model".
David Aptcr suggests that "... what we are witnessing in the world today is a range of
accommodated political systems. Even the toughest of them is weak. Even the most
monolithic in form tends to be divided in its practices and diluted in its ideas. Few are
totalitarian. Almost all are populist mainly prc-dcmocratic rather than anti-democratic. 4
Though Apter was largely referring to developing or modernizing countries such as
India, the focus of his argument is that democratic representative government as we
know it in the West, docs not and in most cases cannot be applied in its totality to
underdeveloped countries. In countries like the Eastern Caribbean they have tinkered
with the democratic system, and created a system which is similar to the western model
3Cecil D. Mcintosh, "Parliament Representative" (Star Newspaper, October 17th, 1989 Edition,
St. Vincent) Page 6.
4David A. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, IL 1965)
Page 2.
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yet significantly different. There are major differences between the two. in the Eastern
Caribbean critic ism of the government is not tolerated. Government critics will not
generally be physically harmed, but their social, economic and political survival will be
severely threatened. In every nation slate of the Eastern Caribbean, the government
owns and controls the radio. In countries where the radio is the most important means
of communication, one can well imagine the power of incumbency in the Eastern
Caribbean. Unlike some other Central American Governments, where there is only one
political party, the constitution of the Eastern Caribbean countries provides for an
opposition parly in Parliament. In reality those opposition parlies normally function as a
"token" and simply bid their lime in Parliament until the electorate decide to give them
the opportunity to govern, at which lime the former ruling elites become the official
opposition. This process seems to take an average of fifteen years which means that the
ruling parlies generally stay in power for al least three terms. (See Table 3)
The Eastern Caribbean model and the pattern of government which are defined as a
democracy, manifest characteristics which are peculiar only to that system and differ
markedly from other systems. The model however, has been extremely successful in
terms of maintaining political stability. The literature on development suggests that
countries which are economically underdeveloped relative to western societies are
correspondingly politically underdeveloped. This is not the case in the Eastern
Caribbean. The political syslems have been largely successful in spile of its peculiarity.
Based on per capita income, the area may be trailing the advanced countries
economically, but politically they have maintained a relatively stable society, socially they
have also managed to maintain a fair standard of living.
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If these countries were to be measured based on internationally accepted parameters
-
such as rale of illiteracy, infant mortality, urban unrest and crime - they would in
most cases measure up to the politically stable western advanced industrial countries.
The existing political model may not be orthodox democracy, but it is effective. K.H.
Silvert once wrote about Latin Americans that "...if the normal way of rotating executives
in a given country is by revolution and there have been a hundred such changes in a
country, then it is not facetious to remark that revolutions are a sign of stability - that
events are marching along as they always have."5 So it is within the Eastern Caribbean,
the political system that has emerged may not be totally democratic, but it has proved
extremely stable.
Another fascinating aspect of the Eastern Caribbean Model is what Seymour M.
Lipset terms "political legitimacy". Lipsel argues that without political legitimacy,
governments are destined to be weak and are easily taken down through coups or
countcrcoups6 as is the case in Latin America. In the Eastern Caribbean, political
legitimacy is an integral part of the system and is guaranteed through the constitutions of
those stales.
In the Eastern Caribbean Model there is a legacy of absolute adherence to British
policies, tradition and systems. As a result, the political leaders have had strong support
in maintaining stability in the society. The ruling parties have been careful to operate
within the constitution, creating laws that may be repressive in context but legal in its
developmental process and application. Legitimacy according to Lipset "involves the
sKalman H. Silver!, The Conflict Society Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (Los
Angeles: Hauser Press, CA 1961) Page 20.
6Seymour H. Lipset, Political Man (Anchor Books, NY /06.?) Pages 64-79.
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capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society".' Eastern Carihhean leaders
and the general population helicve fervently that their system is appropriate and
functional. There has heen a scries of historical challenges to legitimate governments
over the last 30 years, culminating with the Grenada Revolution. In spite of those
attacks, the systems have successfully withstood the challenges.
This belief in the legitimacy of their system can be further recognized when we
consider the swift return to the Eastern Caribbean democratic model by Grenadians,
following the U.S. invasion of the island, which brought down the so-called socialist
government.
Writing on the subject of colonialism as a school for democracy, Rupert Emerson
observes that immediately after independence "Colonial people" embraced democratic
institutions as the basis for the achievement of independence and self government. "In
the West Indies, democratic institutions were adopted, the franchise was widely extended,
political parties sprang into being and general elections determined the fate of
Governments".8 Those fundamental features that Emerson describes -- namely, the
emergence of political parlies and the establishment of Government through elections --
remain the symbolic cornerstone of democracy in the Eastern Caribbean.
In addition to Emerson, most western scholars believe that the existence of political
institutions such as political elections within a society, guarantees the existence of a
functional and liberal democratic society. In modern western society, that is certainly the
7Lipset, Political Man, Page 64.
8Rupert Emerson, From Empire lo Nation (Beacon Press, MA 1970) Page 227.
31
case, particularly when we consider the modernizing of countries such as India, Uruguay,
United Kingdom, U.S.A. and Japan. In the case of the Eastern Carihbean the
correlation is not so clear. It can be argued that the existing process of electing
government is certainly democratic. There are well organized political parties, there is a
party system, and elections are held regularly according to the state's constitution. But
the Eastern Caribbean democratic model is significantly flawed. It lacks the openness of
the Western Model, which is necessary to raise the level of political development.
If we were to judge the democratic governments in the Caribbean based solely on
those two fundamental features of democracy - namely "elections" and "political parties",
we would fail to recognize the cultural influence and unique aspect of the workings of
that particular democratic system. A system which has successfully utilized the
Jeffersonian approach to establish governments which are democratically elected, but
which essentially function as political authoritarianism, with power concentrated
exclusively in the hands of the Prime Minister. In Dominica, Edison James, the leader
of the new opposition party (UWP) United Workers Party, describes that model as a
"constitutional dictatorship".
When we describe the governments as functionally authoritarian, it is not by any
means contradictory. An objective analysis of West Indian society will reveal that the
minute size and culture of those territories required some modification of the
governance structure that would not be possible in larger countries. To that extent,
ministers I spoke with like V.C. Bird of Antigua felt that the current political model was
the only pragmatic system of government that could work within the region. Seymour
Lipset writing on the subject of "making of an authoritarian", describes the kind of
apathy that exist amongst lower classes of society and suggests that there will generally
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be a prevalence of authoritarian governments amongst countries with a high level of
poverty.9
In talking with Caribbean leaders on the issue of real democratic freedom, it seems
clear that they consider the mandate to govern as a "divine right." They fervently
believe that after the elections, the masses do not and in some cases should not have
any influence. In St. Lucia, the minister of Youth, Stephenson King indicated that the
population is not interested in political issues. He claimed that after elections, people
become preoccupied with their own lives and remain apolitical until the next election.™
All governments of the Eastern Caribbean essentially practice a form of authoritarian
rule based on a kind of paternalistic top down approach. Thus, when western scholars
describe the Caribbean as a democracy, it is important that we recognize that the
democracy of the Eastern Caribbean is not the same as that of the United States, West
Germany or Great Britain. The islands of the Caribbean are poor, and some of the
apathy that Lipset describes does exist. But this factor is also misleading within the
Caribbean context, because the masses do take active part in the election process.
There are no military institutions in the region and elections are relatively free and
open.
Authoritarianism, however remains a significant factor, and it is not new to the West
Indies Colonial heritage. The system of slavery which represented the ultimate
manifestation of authoritarianism -- governed the Caribbean islands for over two
centuries. During that period the "colonies" as they were then called, were ruled by a
9Seymour H. Lipset, Political Man (Anchor Books, NY 1963) Pages 87-96.
10Discussion with the Minister in Castries, St. Lucia - October 1989.
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governor whose range of powers was almost absolute. He ruled with supreme authority
backed of course by the ultimate power of the absent British monarchy. The governing
structure that dominated those islands from occupation by the British until their
independence was one in which one man was always the decision maker, irrelevant of
the existence of any parliamentary body. He could override legislation and impose
decrees at will, all in the interest of the imperial majesty.
When suffrage was finally granted to those territories, in 1951 this same
governmental apparatus and structure was transferred to the local political leaders in
toto, leaders are typified by men like Ebenezer Joshua of St. Vincent an unemployed
former police officer; Edward Leblanc of Dominica, a returning immigrant who had
sought employment in the Dutch Antilles; Eric Gairy of Grenada, a former laborer;
Vere Bird of Antigua, a trade union organizer and former laborer. Men like those
inherited a political and governmental system that was essentially structured for colonial
rule. The fundamental character of this colonial rule was a "top down" system in which
the colonial imperial representative, the governor maintained a level of superiority over
the inhabitants of the islands.
In the transition, the local leaders quickly adjusted to this new power. They used it
to reward their friends and punish their enemies. They personalized the position and
relied on their charisma and patronage to remain in power. Their governments function
essentially like caretaker governments, they simply maintain the status quo, keep the
peace and allow market forces to determine the economy. There are no innovative
programs. National issues are narrowly defined, and generally the leaders in office spend
their time campaigning for the next term.
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The countries were granted universal adult suffrage in 1951. Since that time, the
people have had control of the internal governing of their country. In 1974, they began
the move toward full independence. That status not only increased their control of the
internal and domestic affairs, but also granted them total responsibility for their foreign
relations. Independence, however, did not bring about major political change.
Caribbean leaders have not sought to make any changes in the governmental or political
systems that would reflect the pluralism of the society. They understand the social and
psychological behavior of the masses a great deal better than their colonial masters and
use that knowledge to essentially cajole them into accepting a false sense of democracy
which for all practical purposes effectively ends at the voting booth. What they have
done is essentially replace the "European Colonialist" with "Local Colonialist" - only the
pigmentation of those individual leaders has changed. Paternalism and oppression
remain the same. Gordon K. Lewis describes that society as one based primarily on
class oppression and paternalism... "Especially in the smaller islands, life is divided
between a tiny blase' middle class and a broken docile indigenous majority of peasants
and workers. Nor does the political fact of independence change the social system. It
merely transfers its control from the metropolitan masters to the local ruling class group.
And because those groups understand the majority better than did the expatriate officials
they might be able indeed to tighten up the psychological screws that hold the majority
in their prison". 11 Gordon K. Lewis made those observations in 1968 at which time only
Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados had achieved independence. By 1989, all the Eastern
Caribbean islands except Montserrat had attained political independence. It would seem
11Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (Monthly Review Press, NY 1968)
Page 44.
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that two decades of political independence would bring some change regarding the
relationship that exists between the citizens and the political leaders. But that is not the
case. These smaller nations have taken their cue from the larger ones and have also
"tightened the psychological screws". The end result is essentially the same. Leaders
stay in power for long periods of time, but socio-economic growth of the country is
minimal. The concept of national sovereignty is new for those small nation states. Forty
years of self government is not a long time to change or improve a system which has
dominated a society for over two and one half centuries. The process of political
development in the region will be slow.
E. Individual Freedom
The paradox of the Eastern Caribbean Model is that while it manifests aspects of
authoritarianism, it allows for individual freedom. There are questions that still remain
unanswered. Questions that deal with whether these new micro states will be able to
survive as independent states within the international system. To date, the Eastern
Caribbean has managed to limp along, but Western powers like the U.S. are not so sure.
Sally Shelton Colby, a former U.S. attache at the U.S. Embassy in Barbados, who
became a resident Eastern Caribbean expert for the State Department in the 1980's,
made the following observation:
"Self government is a recent phenomenon in the Winwards and Leewards dating
from the 1980's. London maintained control over defense and external affairs
until formal independence. With most of the islands independent, the legal
responsibilities of the United Kingdom for defense of existing democratic system
has vanished. In its wake, questions are being raised about the strength and
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appropriateness to small island nations of the inherited system and of its ability
to deal with challenges to its survival".12
The people of the Caribbean are not overly concerned about the survivability of
democracy. Most Caribbean heads of state that I spoke with, except Charles of
Dominica, did not perceive either an internal or external threat to their democratic way
of life. In St. Vincent, the (NDP) National Democratic Party won all 21 seats in the
1988 elections, virtually creating a one party state without any opposition (this is possible
under the St. Vincent constitution). I asked the Deputy Prime Minister (the Honorable
Allen Cruickshank) what could prevent his party from eliminating the democratic process
and instituting a constitutional one party state. He replied, "the people would not allow
it". He further pointed out that while the citizens may manifest some level of apathy,
they value their political freedom strongly and will aggressively defend their democratic
freedom. 13 While his response can be discounted as political rhetoric, a review of the
Eastern Caribbean history will support his statement. Individual freedom is deeply
treasured by the people of the Eastern Caribbean. Their tolerance level of incompetent
legitimate government is phenomenal, but they have shown great intolerance for
governments who attempt to subvert their sociopolitical freedom. Patrick John of
Dominica and Eric Gairy of Grenada were both casualties of the people's resolve to
bring down governments that are repressive. In all my interviews with political leaders,
they each seem to be very aware of the peoples' love of freedom, consequently, while
12Salfy Shelton Colby, An Introduction to the Eastern Caribbean in McDonald, Sandstrom &
Goodwin (Editors) The Caribbean After Grenada (Praeger Press, NY 1988) Page 9.
13Interview and discussion with the Deputy Prime Minister of St. Vincent in Kingstown, St.
Vincent - October 1989.
Ihcir decision making process may be exiremely authorhative, ihey are careful no, to
infringe on individual freedom.
Conversations with people in the Caribbean indicate that they have very little
confidence in their elected officials, and most citizens tend to seek non-governmental
solutions to their socioeconomic situation. One of these solutions that citizens
frequently utilize in resolving problems of unemployment and economic stagnation is
emigration. On the average, as many as 12% of the Eastern Caribbean youth have
migrated to western countries over the past two decades, creating what amounts to a
"brain drain" in the region. On the other hand, this migration has contributed
extensively to the economic stabilization of those countries. It is estimated that in some
states like Montserrat and Dominica, 33% of the GDP is comprised of dollars received
by relatives of people who have migrated to the countries like the United States.
Caribbean governments have historically been able to hang on to power, and avoid
accountability mainly because the population has not turned to them for resolving issues.
This factor stands out as another major characteristic of the Eastern Caribbean Model
and one which we will explore further in another chapter.
This migration phenomena, which is criticized by dependencia theorists and by radical
nationalists as an obstacle to economic growth, is strongly defended both by the people
of the Caribbean and their leaders. 90% of the young people I spoke with in the
Caribbean ranging in age from 18-30 years, indicated to me that their goal was to
migrate to Canada or the United States. This sample comprised primarily of young
people in the work force. When I discussed the numbers with the Minister of Youth
Affairs in St. Lucia, the Honorable Stephenson King, he indicated that migration had
been an integral aspect of Caribbean development. While his government was
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committed to the establishment of educational programs geared to train young people
for jobs in the community, he conceded that even amongst the youths who were
employed, the lure of the U.S. was extremely strong. Philosophically, he felt that there
was positive economic sides to this equation. Migration reduced unemployment and
improved foreign exchange.
It seemed extremely clear from our conversation with government leaders, that they
did not consider the "brain drain" factor a problem in the Eastern Caribbean. On the
contrary, it appears that emigration has become an inherent aspect of economic policy
amongst Eastern Caribbean states. High level government officials often choose to send
their children to colleges in North America instead of the University of the West Indies.
The experience amongst the Eastern Caribbean countries indicate that only 13% of the
students who have attended college in North America ever return to the Islands, nor are
they encouraged to return. In a 1983 talk with the Washington D.C. based "Dominica
Association of the Metropolitan Community Area" (which is made up of young
Dominicans attending college and working in the D.C. area), Prime Minister Eugenia
Charles of Dominica told the group, she would encourage those planning to return home
to Dominica after their studies, to explore other alternatives, "because the government
does not have the resources to hire you". She was not attempting to prevent students
from returning home, but felt she had to let them know what the employment situation
was.
In most of the Caribbean countries, government is the largest employer. This role as
major employer has drained the country's small economy and new governments of the
area are taking steps to reduce the government's payroll. Charles represents one of the
new modernizers and is a strong advocate of a smaller bureaucracy. Factors like
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emigration do have a major impact on government's policy and cannot be ignored when
studying the stability of the political system of the Eastern Caribbeaian.
F. Emigration
In spite of the Eastern Caribbean tendency to pass laws which border on human
rights violation, our research indicates that the only area that has never been affected by
legislation is emigration. Caribbean governments have never attempted to regulate
migration from their nation states. One would think that in nation states with
populations as small as 40,000 (St. Kitts/Nevis), government would attempt to encourage
their population to remain at home. On the contrary, over the last fifty years the
continuous outward flight of Caribbean citizens to the mainland have become a historical
and cultural characteristic of Caribbean Society, and governments have all but
encouraged the flow of its citizens to other parts of the world.
Emigration seems to be an inherent aspect of Caribbean history. Since
Emancipation in 1834, Caribbean people have been moving to various parts of the globe
in search of work and higher standards of living. As early as 1880, they migrated to
Panama in search of work in building the railroad. This was followed in the 1900's by
another mass exodus of able bodied men back to Panama to build the canal. After
World War I, large numbers of Eastern Caribbean men went to work in the Dutch oil
refineries in Curacao. In fact, two of the first Premiers of the Eastern Caribbean -- Eric
Gairy of Grenada and E.O. Leblanc of Dominica, were former refinery workers in
Curacoa.
The Caribbean people demonstrated their propensity to move and resettle very early
after emancipation. The initial movements were from plantations to urban areas, and
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from larger islands to smaller ones. By 1900, .hey had expanded their movements no,
only to Panama, bnt to the U.S. up un.il ,922. There was, before ,924, no restriction
on immigration to the U.S. In the 19th century, over 20 million immigrants (mainly
from Western Europe) had relocated in the U.S.; amongst these were the first
Caribbean immigrants.
In May 1921, the U.S. established a ceiling on immigration and introduced a quota
system. Western Europe was allowed the largest quota. However, during that period,
immigration from Western Europe had slowed considerably, and in order to increase the
labor pool, the U.S. increased the Mexican and Caribbean quota. The data available for
that period lumps both Mexican and Caribbean immigrants into one category but shows
that from 1899 to 1904, immigration from the Caribbean totaled 1000 per year. From
1904 to 1923 it increased to 3000 per year, and by 1924, it had expanded to an average
of 10,600 per year. Immigration from the Caribbean continued at that level until the
depression when it slowed to a trickle, and in fact saw the return of immigrants from the
U.S. back to the Caribbean. Some of the returning immigrants were later involved in
the famous Caribbean "disturbances" of the 1930's, when Caribbean blacks began to
unionize and clamor for labor reforms. After the war, Caribbean people again began to
emigrate to the U.S. but in 1952, Congress passed the McCarran Walter Act. One of
the provisions of the bill was to limit the quota of immigrants from colonies to 100 per
colony per year. This new law had a devastating effect on the Eastern Caribbean in
particular, since they were all colonies of Britain.
But emigration did not stop. The Caribbean people seemed resilient in their efforts
to move to parts of the globe where there is work. Faced with closed borders in the
U.S., they shifted their movements toward Great Britain. From 1950 to 1965, there was
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a mass exodus of people from the Caribbean to Britain. This author can remember the
carnival like atmosphere that ensued when the large ocean liners would come to the
islands every three months to take people to the United Kingdom. Small farmers sold
their farms; families took loans to send their sons and daughters to England in search of
jobs and a new life. It is estimated that between 1952 and 1964, close to 300,000
Caribbean citizens migrated to the United Kingdom. However, in 1962, the British
Parliament passed the Commonwealth Immigration Act limiting the number of
immigrants that would be allowed into the country. Since 1964, therefore, Caribbean
people have continued to focus on the United States as the desirable place to emigrate.
In spite of a plethora of reductions, quotas and new immigration laws introduced in the
U.S. by Congress over the last 30 years, Caribbean people continue to apply for
residence status in the United States.
Recent data from the Immigration and Naturalization Services department indicates
that from 1985 to 1988, approximately 30,900 Eastern Caribbean immigrants were legally
admitted to the U.S. (Table 1). In addition to that figure, it is estimated that thousands
of Caribbean citizens reside in the U.S. illegally. Some of those cross the border from
Canada, while the majority of "illegals" enter the U.S. with visitors Bl visas (which are
temporary visas issued to visitors). On arrival in the U.S., they move in with relatives or
friends and never return to their homeland until such time when they are able to secure
some kind of permanent legal residence, most commonly through marriage to a U.S.
citizen.
Migration has been such an integral part of the Eastern Caribbean culture, that
almost every Eastern Caribbean citizen has a relative or friend living in a major country.
This factor is significant when analyzing both the political and economic system of the
TABLE 1
immigrants Admitted to the U.S.A. from the Eastern Caribbean
Number of Admissions by Year of Entry
Country 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Ant I gua/ Barbuda 2.023 953 957 812 874 837
Dorni n ica 551 442 540 564 740 611
Grenada 1.163 980 934 1,045 1,098 842
Montserrat 165 30 117 104 104
St. Kltts/Nevis 2,782 1,648 769 573 589 660
St. Lucia 668 484 499 502 496 606
St
.
Vincent &
Grenad i nes 774 695 693 635 746 634
Total by Year 8,126 5,232 4.509 4,131 4,647 4,294
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service 1984 - 1989
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Eastern Caribbean. Economically, emigration accounts for the provision of an extremely
significant percentage of the regions GNP. In Dominica, it is estimated that 35% of the
GNP is derived from revenues sent to relatives by Dominicans living abroad. In
Grenada that figure is 40%, while in tiny Montserrat, funds from relatives abroad and
grants from the U.K. account lor 67% of the GNP. Theses sources of revenue have
been an integral factor in the maintenance of a relatively stable economy by the islands
government, and have been an instrumental variable in the ability of governments to
remain in power for long periods of lime.
How does emigration help politicians? Elected officials are able to derive a
consistent pool of revenue into the island from those who migrate. As a result of this
continuous inward How of revenue, the economy is stimulated, foreign exchange and
reserves remain adequate and there is no need to raise taxes. It is difficult to
understand how stales in which the unemployment rate hewers between 20 and 35%,
with no social welfare policy or programs in place, can averl major socio-political
upheavals. In reality il is no miracle, simply the low expectation that people have of
their governments. Caribbean citizens have, historically, had to depend on their own
resourcefulness for survival and emigration has led lo the establishment of an informal
system in which the unemployed and underemployed in the Caribbean are subsidized by
their relatives and friends in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. In
addition, a program of continuous emigration reduces the burden on governments lo
provide jobs for young graduates.
The criticism thai emigration resulls in "brain drain" and retards development in
underdeveloped countries, seems to be unfounded in the case of the Eastern Caribbean.
Our research and conversations with leaders of the region revealed that the Eastern
Caribbean community considers emigration as a viable factor in their development
process, and emigration as a policy is openly endorsed by the governments of the region.
In addition, the data available on emigration indicates clearly that the occnpational level
of people moving to the mainlands are centered in the retail, trade, support services and
production and repair services. In Table 2, the numbers reflected in the executive,
administrative and managerial group are relatively small compared to those in the
category of student/children unemployed. This pattern of emigration has not hurt the
Eastern Caribbean in the past and, according to the leaders, will not hurt them in the
future.
The Eastern Caribbean does not have any post secondary educational institution
capable of producing the calibre of modernizing elites, which are an essential ingredient
for national development. The University of the West Indies, with campuses in the
larger territories of Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica, has proven to be ill equipped to
meet the increased number of students that would like to attend, and have also proved
inflexible in developing curriculums that can contribute to the economic development of
the countries. As a result, people from all classes in the Caribbean have opted to
educate their children in the United States and Canada. This factor is clearly indicated
by the statistics in Table 2.
It is safe to summarize that Eastern Caribbean Governments have sanctioned an
unwritten policy which allows open emigration of its citizens to developed countries.
Political leaders seem to consider emigration as an investment with very positive
dividends and as a result have aligned the future of their countries inexorably to that of
the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. Caribbean citizens have a strong
bond with -- and loyalty toward the United States. Leaders like Prime Minister Charles
TABLE 2
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igrants Admitted to the U.S.A. from the Eastern can
by Primary Occupation
Occupation 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Professional & Technical 485 312 262 251 268 248
Sa les 110 99 121 114 135 87
Executlve/Admi nlstrat ive/
Manager i a 1 0 142 90 79 108 62
Adml nl nstrat Ive Support 512 413 381 255 270 286
Service 1.376 828 668 695 771 735
Farm/ Forestry/ F I sh I ng 77 53 41 55 63 66
Product 1 on/ Craft/ Repa I
r
934 537 502 382 462 367
Operations &. Laborer 709 307 274 242 299 227
Unemp 1 oyed/ Ch I Idren 521* 2,608 2.190 1.985 378* 473*
Home Maker 704 ** ** ** 337 281
St udent 2.113 *** *** *** 1.524 1.445
* Tnese numbers represent unemployed only for three years.
** No data available.
*** Kumliers calculated by I.1T.S. -- reflected In "Unemployed/Children" category.
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook of tUe Immigration and Naturalization Service
1984 - 1989
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Of Dominica, Prime Minister Simmons of St. Kitts/Nevis and others are strong supporters
Of the United States foreign policy. Emigration also serves the politicians well, it
contributes to the establishment of Caribbean communities which manifest very little
signs of social or political unrest. Caribbean people seem to realize that governments
are not always going to meet their needs and have historically opted to move on to
other countries rather than involve themselves in civil strife. It is not surprising in those
societies, that political leaders find the time to work on their favorite past time, which is
the art of remaining in power. To do that successfully, they rely on all the resources
available to them including the dynamics of partisan politics.
G. Political Party Dynamics
Political parlies of the Caribbean have generally emerged out of Trade Unions which
were organized around the 1930s to represent agricultural workers against the colonial
land holding gentry. In describing the early role and composition of the union, Morley
Aycarst observes, "It is hardly astonishing therefore to find that most West Indians are
connected in some way with a labor union or a federation of unions. It is also a fact
that the labor unions, another relatively recent West Indian institution, had provided the
African or East Indian workman with his only important mass organization."14
By 1951, when the islands were granted universal adult suffrage. The union leaders
utilized the organizational assets and structure of the unions to form political parties
which then contested national elections and won. Two of the more famous political
14Morky Ayearst,
,
"Characteristics of West Indian Political Parties" in Lowenthal and Comitas
(Editors), Aftermath of Sovereignty (New York: Anchor Books, NY 1973) Page 69.
leaders of the region Eric Gairy of Grenada, who was overthrown hy the N.J.M., and
Vere Bird of Antigua (who is still in power) were products of the Trade Unions.
This empowerment of the lower working class leaders represents one of the factors
that have differentiated the Carihbcan from other modernizing countries where the
middle class and military normally share power. In the Eastern Caribbean, the peasants
and workers maintained political power throughout the transition from colony to
independence.
Some scholars may argue that this lack of intellectual leadership at the top, may in
part be responsible for the failure to develop a more advanced economic and political
system. In conversation with historians and leaders of the Caribbean, we got the
impression that the historical pace of development was precisely the preference of the
Caribbean people. However, the pace of the change process did increase after
independence.
From 1951 to the early 70's the political parties such as the (ALP) Antigua Labor
Party, (GULP) Grenada United Labor Party and (DLP) Dominica Labor Party were all
controlled by former workers and peasants. They represented mass popular movement
with which the majority of the country (who were poor) could easily identify. The
middle class and small upper class had no influence on the political direction of the
country. But beginning in 1974 and certainly by 1978 (when most Islands received
independence), the middle class and business community had begun to infiltrate these
workers parties. In Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua and St. Kitts, we began to see a
distinct move by the intellectuals and professionals within the community to join the
Labor Parties, and by so doing, they were able to eventually control the parties and use
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Government to meet their own narrow interest. In 1989 the St. Lucia Labor Party, for
instance, was led by one of the wealthiest businessmen in the country, Julian Hunte.
The obvious questions to this development would seem to be why did the majority of
workers and peasants allow their party to be infiltrated; and why have they been so
passive when clearly they have the power to remove governments every five years?
There are two fundamental reasons, one of which C.C. North eludes to from a
psychological perspective and Gordon Lewis eludes to from a Caribbean sociological
perspective. The first reason is a result of lower class apathy. The Caribbean lower
class, like most lower classes in the third world, believes in immediate gratification.
Their interest and needs are extremely narrow in perspective and evolve around
economic benefit that will help provide the basic necessities of life for their families. In
such situations, there is little debate on issues. The workers are willing to follow the
direction of the leaders as long as they receive the basics - need of food, clothing and
shelter -- they never consider alternatives. North observes that "all of these
characteristics produce a tendency to view politics and personal relationships in black
and white terms, a desire for immediate action, or impatience with talk and discussion, a
lack of interest in organizations which have a long range perspective, and a readiness to
follow leaders...". 15 Lenin himself described the lower classes as "slumbering, apathetic,
hidebound, inert and dormant". 16
The second reason has to do with the pervasive aspect of the class system in the
Caribbean, a distinct heritage of colonialism. Most workers in the Caribbean aspire at
15C.C. North, Social Differentiation (University of North Carolina Press, NC 1926) Page 247.
16 V.I. Lenin, Left Winz Communism - An Infantile Disorder (New York: International
Publishers, NY 1940) Page 75.
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all times to improve their social status. Their work ethic is not unlike the Protestant
ethic. They believe that if one works hard, one will find success and upward social
mobility. The political parties in the early years were instrumental in providing the
apparatus to close the socio-economic gap between the lower classes who controlled the
votes and the middle and upper classes who needed the votes to share political power.
What emerged was an unholy alliance between the two classes.
In addition, over the last two decades, the middle class has been growing in numbers
because the sons and daughters of the workers, by virtue of their educational
achievement, have been gradually absorbed into that class. As a result, the ruling elite
on the Islands in the post-independence period has changed significantly from the
previous colonial period, when the white colonialist controlled the region politically. The
new ruling elite comprises members of the mercantile community, and the bulk of the
middle class, namely the civil service bureaucrats and young professionals. At the
bottom of this class structure are the majority of workers, peasants and small farmers.
This working class majority have allowed the middle class to assume control of the
party leadership for two reasons. The working class and small farmers have experienced
gradual economic stability in terms of good markets for their crop and the availability of
more jobs. The second reason has to do with the fact alluded to above namely that the
new majority members of the ruling elite are the sons and daughters of the workers and
not the former landed Gentry. Consequently, there is no reason now to distrust that
group.
In Grenada, Keith Mitchell (a mathematician with a PhD from Howard University) is
political leader of the NNP and Minister of Communications & Works. In Dominica,
Eugenia Charles, a prominent attorney is Prime Minister and Political Leader of the
Freedom Party. In St. Kitts, the Prime Minister and Political leader of (PAM) Peoples
Action Movement, is a physician. The leader of the opposition in parliament is also a
physician. This new moderate, intellectual, modernizing leadership have contributed
significantly to the maintenance of extremely stable governments in the region, with its
own rudimentary balance of power. But the major question remains - is it democracy?
Numerous conversations with Caribbean leaders and the middle class all strongly
defend their government as a democracy. However, they agreed with my categorization
that democracy for all practical purposes takes place once every five years. This occurs
during the election campaigns and especially on election day when the citizen has the
opportunity to elect the Government that will govern the country for another five years.
Joseph A. Schumpeter suggests that the philosophy of democracy may be defined "as
that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the
common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of
individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will". 17
Democracy in the Caribbean cannot be so defined. While the people do have the
right to elect a Government every five years, they do not do so based on national
issues
- there seems to be no defined "common good". Political campaigns run by those
who wish to represent the people are not centered around issues, but rather on
personalities and charisma.
As a result of those "campaigns of non-issues", a winning party normally begins office
with no mandate or agenda from the electorate. Consequently, after they have taken
17Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, NY
1975) Page 250.
office, the party usually is free to set its own national agenda. This agenda normally
revolves around programs that are geared to reward constituencies and individuals who
voted for them in the elections and punish or ignore the needs of the minority who did
not. This system is extremely effective in maintaining power and a review of the history
of government in the Caribbean will demonstrate that parties have legally remained in
power for as long as 22 years.** Maintaining political power in the Caribbean is based
on a relatively simple methodology. By rewarding the supporters of the party and
denying services to the opposition, the elected government is able to attract the
dissenters who initially voted against them. This method worked effectively in the 60s.
The DLP, SLP, ALP, SVGLP, GULP and SKLP were all dominated by the poor
working classes. The business and mercantile community were opposed to these workers
governing the country and responded with hostility to the idea. They attempted to
discredit the legitimacy of Government, but that failed. They would literally snub
officials of government whenever they could. In 1961 in Dominica, Chief Minister E.O.
Leblanc was refused entry into a local cinema because he was not wearing a tie. A few
months later, urged on by the young Black Power movement, the Chief Minister, E.O.
Leblanc declared the "shirt jack" the national dress for men, thus abolishing the need for
neck ties. (The shirt is modeled like a safari jacket.)
After the first term of the Labor parties, the business population quickly climbed
onto the Labor Party's band wagon and benefitted economically from their affiliation;
taking advantage of the rewards that normally come to those that support the
government. In the Caribbean, "commitment to ideology" is a fantasy. People quickly
18See Table 3, parties like the DLP (Dominica) remained in power for 18 years and the SKLP
(St. Kitts) for 22 years.
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realize that opposing government for whatever ideological reason is a guaranteed
mechanism for personal ruin. The region is filled with examples of well educated and
traveled intellectuals who opposed government and advocated change but fell victims to
the power of incumbent governments.
What about national issues? In the Caribbean those are determined by what can
bring most votes at the next election. In Antigua, for instance, the agricultural economy
which existed in the 60's has been totally neglected. The whole country is geared to a
new economy
- namely "Tourism". The OECS officials and other well positioned
advisors have attempted to point out the need to diversify the economy because of the
inherent high risk in a tourist economy. The government on the other hand, has made
no effort to revitalize the agricultural economy nor to diversify the economy. The
reason according to government officials are simple. Antigua is enjoying a robust
economy with full employment and one of the highest per capita in the region. With
that kind of record, the ALP is guaranteed to remain in power as long as the tourist
trade holds up. Long term planning to provide a diversified economy at this point is not
a major issue for government.
In Dominica, the Freedom Party, which is currently in power, has traditionally done
poorly in attracting rural peasants to vote for them. However, in the last two general
elections, they have been able to generate enough rural support to maintain power. In
that situation the greatest needs of that group who are mostly farmers, are roads to help
get their crops to market. Consequently, the government has invested a significant
amount of their G.N.P. in road construction, ignoring education which is also a major
problem in the country with potentially devastating long term effects. Over the last ten
years, the government has only been able to build enough high schools to absorb 25% of
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the children graduating from primary schools. Out of an average of 1800 kids graduating
annually, the high schools can only absorb 500. The party decided that their die-hard
supporters who need the schools in the urban areas, where the party is strong, can wait
a few years for new schools. Therefore, they have concentrated their resources where
the party is weak. As for the voters who need the schools, they must calculate what
would happen to their constituencies if they did not support the Freedom Party and it
went on to win another term. Afraid to take a risk, they choose to wait. This waiting
for fear of reprisal by the voters is the main reason why parties are able to remain in
power for multiple terms.
H. Incentive to Serve
The above arc fundamental examples of how national issues are determined by
various political parties. Another important factor that may escape western scholars
when analyzing the Caribbean Model of Government has to do with the motives that
drive individuals to seek elected office. Unlike other western democracies, where
ideology, fame, altruism, greed, etc. all contribute toward the individual's decision to run
for office. In the Caribbean, the decision is largely based on economics. The majority
of politicians in the Caribbean rely on their position as elected officials for their sole
source of income. Again, unlike the U.S. for instance, where individuals may serve in
office and return to their profession, in the Caribbean, the transition is much more
difficult if not downright impossible. The people seem to lose respect for a former
minister of government who must go back to his job in order to make a living, unless
the individual is a professional or owned businesses in the community. As a result,
lower income non-professional individuals elected to government will do anything
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necessary to remain in power as long as possible. During that period, they spend their
entire term in office campaigning for the next term and try to amass as much capital as
they can in order to guarantee their economic survival after they lose power.
The "Economic Motive" for seeking elected office in the region is an extremely
significant factor. There is no literature available to emphasize that aspect of political
activity in the Eastern Caribbean although most West Indian scholars and politicians will
agree that it exists and has strong affects on the kind of government that eventually get
elected in the region. The incentive for low income individuals to seek political power is
very lucrative. Consider that a former Public Works employee grossing $12,000 per year
in Dominica increased his salary to $52,000 per year by running for election with the
Freedom Party. He won his seat in parliament and was appointed Minister of
Communications and works in the new government. One can understand the impact of
the incentive for remaining in government in a job which requires no formal education.
In Grenada in 1989, Senator Albert Forsythe, a parliamentary member of the official
opposition party the National Democratic Congress (NDC) resigned his elected office in
order to capitalize on a pension plan established by the government. In his letter,
Forsythe noted that under the Pension for Members of Parliament Act of 1989, he was
eligible for pension of one half of the highest salary received by him as a member of
parliament for over 15 years. The pension that was due him under this plan would be
far greater than what he was being paid as a senator, so he had to resign. His
resignation significantly weakened an already lame official opposition. However, since
Mr. Forsythe depended solely on his political position for a living, he felt that he had to
make a decision that would be in his own best economic interest.
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The economic incentive for office holders in the Caribbean presents its own "catch
22" for the people. In theory, the model offers the fundamental concept of a true
democracy, that is the freedom for any citizen to run for office regardless of his socio-
economic background. On the other hand, because the countries themselves experience
a culture of persistent poverty, the majority of its citizens are relatively poor and
unemployment is high. The opportunity to serve the people therefore is not seen as
chance to bring ideological, innovative and creative leadership to the country - but
merely a chance to get a good job and to assist those people who helped them get the
job.
Thus in every party one will find individuals who are truly representative of the
lower classes. The only problem is that these representatives are unable to provide the
kind of leadership planning and objectivity that is necessary to develop those islands.
They are themselves fighting desperately throughout their term of office to ensure that
they do not lose their jobs, while the more astute and intellectual representatives are
busy developing systems that will greatly benefit their particular business when they leave
office.
I. Literature Review
The Eastern Caribbean is today and has been throughout the past three centuries a
critical area to western powers. Since Columbus' journey to the new world, the
European imperialist nations have fought each other in an effort to control the islands
which represented profitable economic enclave with major geopolitical leverage. As a
result the literature documenting the political development of the area has been largely
dominated by Europeans and focuses mainly on the role of the Colonialist in the
Caribbean.
Since independence, western scholars and theorists have considered that region of
the Caribbean a relatively stable democracy and assumed that since Britain maintained
responsibility for the islands defense and had considerable influence on their foreign
policy, those islands for all practical purposes were de facto dependents and would
maintain governments modeled after the Westminster's Parliamentary System. The
Grenada revolution of 1979 suddenly changed that concept and got the attention of the
western world. Since that event, a visit to any library will reveal a host of new literature
on the Grenada revolution; but still, very little on the description or analysis of the kind
of Governmental model that existed in the Eastern Caribbean during the pre-revolution
period and continues to function undisturbed in the post revolutionary era.
The people are pro democracy but although their system of Government has similar-
ities with western democracies, the model is distinctly peculiar. Literature on the
Eastern Caribbean governmental and political model has generally presented the islands
as a political unit with very distinct similarities to western democracies. Caribbean
people strongly resist this categorization. A review of the existing political literature on
the Eastern Caribbean reveals a lack of understanding of the Eastern Caribbean Model
amongst both Western Political leaders and scholars. Howard Wiarda recognizes that
fact when he states...
"among the more serious hardships faced by the United States and the western
allies in fashioning coherent, rational, consistent and publicly acceptable foreign
policy strategies is that their peoples -- including many journalists, politicians and
even policymakers themselves, as well as the general population often have only
the most rudimentary and superficial knowledge of the foreign areas with which
•hey must deal. Be lack of sound knowledge, empathy and deep understanding
of cultures other than its own was a crueial problem
... we often assume we know
Central America and the Circum-caribbean better; but it may be submitted that
the same problems of lack of empathy and understanding that afflicted our
pohc.es m those other areas also plague us in dealing with those now turbulent
societies."19
It appears also that not only is the Eastern Caribbean system misunderstood by
westerners but the area has been largely ignored by both U.S. scholars and U.S. foreign
policymakers. Scott B. McDonald, Erik Kopp and Victor J. Bonilla observe:
"The Caribbean's Eastern Tier is a largely understudied region. Although it
occupies a strategic location in the Caribbean, in proximity to North American
communications and supply lines to South America, the Atlantic and the Pacific
through the Panama Canal, it has been forced upon the "movers and shakers" of
United States foreign policy only in a fleeting fashion. Obviously the NJM
revolution of 1979-1983 and the invasion of Grenada in 1983 reflected for the
moment U.S. concern. With the passing of the crisis and the revolution it is
appropriate to surmise if Washington, otherwise distracted will again ignore the
Caribbean's Eastern tier."20
A detailed and in depth analysis of the Eastern Caribbean political model will
indicate clearly that the U.S. and other Western or Eastern bloc powers can safely afford
to ignore the area as a threat within the international system. For geopolitical reasons,
it is important that the U.S. maintain good relations with these new Caribbean States.
However, to consider those islands a potential hot-bed for Communism, is to totally
misunderstand the people and culture of the region.
19Howard Wiarda, "Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin", Changing
Realties and U.S. Policies, edited by J.R. Greene and Brent Snowcraft (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn
& Kain Publishers Inc., MA 1984) Page 55.
20S.B. McDonald; E. Koppe; J.V. Bonilla,
,
"Heading Toward a New Instability in the
Caribbean's Eastern Tier", in McDonald, S.B.; Sandstrom, H.M.; Goodwin, P.B. Jr. (Editors), The
Caribbean After Grenada (New York: Praeger Published, NY 1988) Page 172.
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The Eastern Caribbean as a region has not attracted many scholars to study its
political system. The body of literature that examines these former colonies have
focused largely on Latin America. The dependencia theorist like Cardoso and Faletto
have written extensively on the economic dependency of Latin America, but have not
included the Eastern Caribbean in their model.
Development theorists and the modernizers like David Apter, John Kautsky, Gabriel
Almond, Lucien Pye, Rupert Emerson and Samuel Huntington have written extensively
on the transformation of traditional societies into modernity. This field of study has
essentially either ignored the Eastern Caribbean or encompassed it within a broad and
general theoretical framework.
My own work on the Eastern Caribbean region as a political unit reveals some
idiosyncratic and unique factors inherent within the historical development of that region
that makes it difficult if not impossible to fit the region within the various political
developmental theory that pervades the literature on development and modernization.
For instance, Almond & Powell suggest that there are three types of political systems;
modern, democratic and authoritarian forms. "Democratic political systems in turn can
be divided into three subclasses. The first subclasses were referred to as "a high
subsystem autonomy" (this description was borrowed from Robert Dahl in his "Modern
Political Analysis")21
.
An example of the first subsystem was Britain and the U.S.A
The second subclass was characterized by limited subsystem autonomy and included
France, Italy and Germany at different historical stages. The third group of democratic
political system was one characterized by low subsystem autonomy which were normally
21Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., NY 1963) Page 35.
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dominant systems. Mexico was a vivid example of the latter snbsystem according to
Almond and Powell.22
An attempt to place the Eastern Caribbean Political System within any of the
subsystems defined by Almond and Powell will present significant problems for the
scholar. First, we would have to assume that the subsystem which most approximate the
existing Caribbean political model is that of Mexico, because of similarities in
colonization and socio-cultural experiences. On the other hand, the democratic system
practiced in principle by Caribbean Governments is one modeled after the British
Westminster parliamentary systems and enshrined in Constitutions prepared by the
Colonial Office in Britain. Yet the kind of democratic system that has actually emerged
in the region is one which we have characterized in this chapter as an "electoral or
constitutional dictatorship".
Various other differences exist between Latin America (the area with which the
Eastern Caribbean has been compared) and the Caribbean. For instance, Huntington
correctly points out that political passivity is a characteristic of slum dwellers in Latin
America, "a low level of political consciousness and political information pervades most
urban slums. Politics is not a serious concern".23
In the Eastern Caribbean the urban and rural poor have repeatedly swept moderate
and sometimes right wing parties into power. Political rivalry amongst the poor and
underemployed in the Caribbean is intense. The persistent re-elections of Eric Gary in
Grenada for instance, a man avoided by the middle class who considered him to be
22Gabriel A. Almond and Bingham G. Powell, Comparative Politics (Boston: Little & Brown
Co., MA 1966) Pages 259-260.
23Samuel Huntington, Political Order In Chanww Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press)
Page 279.
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almost illiterate and psychologically unstable is a ca.se in point The urban and rura
poor identified with his anti-establishment approach and voted him into power
repeatedly.
Other political theorists like Upset for instance suggests, "Public opinion data from a
number of countries indicate that lower classes are much less committed to democracy as
a political system than are the urban and middle classes".- ^ ^^lion fc
to behavior exhibited by lower classes in the Caribbean. Democracy and the freedom to
choose is extremely important to the Caribbean citizen. Following a prolonged history
Of slavery and bondage, the Caribbean culture seems to now strongly value political and
personal freedom even at the expense of economic development. In an interview with
the prime minister of Dominica, when asked a question on her country's high rate of
unemployment, she remarked, "In Dominica the rural and urban poor feel strongly that
they must retain their freedom, even the freedom to choose not to work".25
This love of freedom stands in direct contradiction to theories advanced by some
western scholars on the Caribbean's vulnerability for communist influence. At a meeting
Of the International Security Council (a private right wing western think tank) in Paris,
France on February 17, 1985, a number of major international military personnel met to
discuss security and stability in the Caribbean basin.
They essentially concluded that given the prevailing socio economic condition of the
Caribbean that the Soviets would be able to easily influence these islands to become
Marxist. One of the attendees, General Alvora Valencia Tovar of the Colombian Army
24Seymour H. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, NY 1963) Pages 92-93.
25Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, Interview with author in Dominica, November 1979
describes the Soviets grand strategy for the Caribbean as follows, "This is a kind of
struggle which is being fought on the economic restlessness and ethnic conflict of the
world... It is waged as a part of an overall effort to spread communism everywhere. It
is combined with a clever exploitation of each peoples' and country's idiosyncrasy and
internal circumstance within the area."26
On the same issue, Lieutenant General Gordon Sumner Jr. of the U.S.A. concurs
with General Tovar and considers communism encroachment in the region as "perhaps
the most vexing military problem facing the non-communist governments of the world
today. Failure to meet this threat will indeed relegate democracy as we understand i, to
the garbage heap of history".27
These observations by Western Military Strategists regarding the Caribbean basin
represents some very realistic analysis of the region as a whole. Especially when we
consider revolutions in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada within the last decade.
However, this global and broad description of the social, cultural, political and ethnic
behavior of the Caribbean people is severely flawed. There is a significant difference in
the peoples attitude towards revolutionary change amongst Central American people and
that of the Eastern Caribbean. This study seeks to focus on the differences by
highlighting those aspects of the Eastern Caribbean political culture that makes it
difficult if not impossible for communist or socialist ideology to infiltrate Eastern
Caribbean Society. No Caribbean leader that I spoke with except Prime Minister
26General Alvora Valencia-Tovar, "Soviet Strategy In The Caribbean" Report By International
Security Council
- Paris. February 1985 (Published by CAUSA International, NY) Page 14.
27Lieutenant General Gordon Sumner Jr., "Strategic Military Issues For The Free World", Report
By International Security Council
- Paris, February 1985 (Published by CAUSA International, NY)
Page 9.
Char.es of Domi„ica share ,hc U.S. Government's coneern cha. mmmmist ideology „ .
major threat ,o pohtica, stab-inty in the Eastern Caribbean. The pe<)ple of the Eastern
Caribbean are the very ones who celebrated when President Kennedy confronted
Khrushchev daring the Cnban Missile Crisis and won in the confrontation. They also
celebrated enthusiastically when the U.S. defeated the U.S.S.R. in the ,980 Olympic
Hockey Competition. In Dominica, they cheered when the U.S. attacked Libya.
Eastern Caribbean people have been schooled in western values and there exists a
strong identification with the U.S. and Great Britain amongst Caribbean politicians.
Documents captured by the U.S. Army and conversation with Grenadans demonstrate
clearly that Maurice Bishop's assassination was due in part to his various attempts to
meet with the U.S. president (Jimmy Carter) to assure him that the Grenada Revolution
was not a Communist revolution but a movement by the people of Grenada to get rid of
the right wing dictator Eric Gairy, and to introduce a new political order in Grenada.
This system would be more effective in the process of nation building. We will
elaborate on this issue in a later chapter, but use this opportunity to establish the need
to consider the Eastern Caribbean as separate from other regions of the Caribbean
basin.
There is however, a school of thought which considers the whole region as one
socio-political unit. The U.S. State Department and their western military strategists feel
very strongly that the region must be studied as a whole. General Tover again at the
International Security Council Meeting stated emphatically,
"There is a tendency to consider the Caribbean Basin in a fragmented manner for
academic purposes, that is separating its three major components. This diminishes
the global significance of the geopolitical point. A distorted perception will be the
result of focusing one's attention on the particular circumstances of Central America,
the Antilles or the South American Countries aligned on the Caribbean Seashore.
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In .his s.udy, wc disagree with the Internal Security Council's analysis of the
region. Howard Wiarda and other corporatis. theorists have already advanced the
argument that the United Sta.es inability ,„ establish a coherent and consistent foreign
policy towards that region is precisely because of their lack of knowledge about the
culture of these new nations. Broad categorization of the region as suggested by
Western Military Strategists will inevitably result in a bankrupt U.S. foreign policy; for
<hcy will have Tailed to understand (he fundamental differences that exist in the region.
This study will consistently adhere to .he Wiarda hypo.hcsis and hopefully will succeed
in convincing
.he reader that .he Eas.ern Caribbean political sys.em and political culture
cannot be neatly Etted into .he "wes.ern democratic" model; bul on .he other hand i, is
also not Ihc same as lha. of Nicaragua or El Salvador.
^General Alvora Valencia Tovar "Soviet Strategy In The Caribbean" in Report by International
Security Council - Paris, February 1985 (Published by CAUSA International, NY) Page ').
CHAPTER II
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE TRANSITION FROM COLONY TO NATION
A. Influential Factors
There are a number of specific historical and social factors within the Eastern
Caribbean Society that have had tremendous influence on both the poiitica, mode, and
political institutions that emerged among these nation, Those factors are no, aiways
apparent to visitors and scholars who have studied the region, but their influence in
shaping the current model are profound.
This chapter will attempt to analyze how the Caribbean historical experiences
have effectively determined the kind of political system that currently prevails in the
region.
Among the factors which impact on the historical political development of the
region the three most influential are:
•
A Political History of Colonial Domination hy the British: The result of
this domination, created values and behavioral patterns among the
Caribbean people which are very different from other people of the
region. The structure and methodology of the slave trade resulted in the
transportation of negroes from Africa to the Caribbean who were then
deprived of every political and social structure which they had practiced in
their native Africa. Slavery therefore became the Africans first exposure
to a structured form of governance. History has recorded that this
particular form of governance was the most oppressive form of
exploitation of man by man. The British intended to subdue the Africans
in order to control them for economic reasons, but in the process the
Africans adopted major aspects of British social and political behavior.
Today the British heritage continues to be a major influence on the
political model which has emerged in the Eastern Caribbean and which is
now maintained by the descendants of Africans.
•
Xh^LEace^n^ Throughout the entire history of the
Caribbean, race and class have played a major role in the sociopolitical
development of that area. During slavery the children born out of
miscegenation to negro women were granted freedom from the plantation
and soon formed themselves into a group of "free coloreds." They too
looked down on slaves and considered themselves almost white After
'
emancipation they continued to dominate the retail trade and succeeded
in ach,ev,ng token representation in the Island governments. The history
of the reg,on clearly demonstrates that one's ability to climb the social
ladder was in the past directly related to the "whiteness" of their skin
color. Within that environment the Africans were considered inferior
persons. But following the attainment of universal franchise, the
descendants of Africans became the new rulers and effectively eliminated
race and class as determinants for individual mobility.
The Insularity Factor
: In spite of the many similarities that exist among
the Caribbean islands including a common colonizer, the islands have had
a difficult time in their attempts at integration. The Caribbean people
take extreme pride in their own nation state and seem to resent any
attempt to group them politically or culturally. As early as 1939, a Royal
Commission cited insularity as an obstacle to self government and
integration. In 1989, insularity and state nationalism were still prevalent
within Caribbean society, and contributed immensely to the molding of
the current political model. The major powers within the international
system have considered the Caribbean as a unitary region, and assume
that there is some level of cohesiveness among Caribbean states, in reality
there is no such thing as Caribbean Nationalism, there is only Antiguan
Nationalism, Dominica Nationalism, etc.
B. The Colonial Heritage
The precolonial systems of the eastern Caribbean was a traditional system. The
indigenous natives of the region were the Arrawaks and Caribs. These people were
seven
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basically hunters and gatherers and their system included a tribal chief and council of
elders who made all sociopolitical decisions for the tribe.
Colonialism in the region began with the visit of Columbus in the 15th century.
Soon after Columbus' voyage, the region experienced a prolonged history of expansionist
wars among the European nations. Driven by tales of abundant gold in the Islands, the
European nations wanted to stake an early claim. By the eighteenth century, the
islands which comprise the subject of this study had become colonies of Britain.
British colonialism, in effect, created the Caribbean society. Most scholars
see British influence as a force that shaped the region's society. The conclusion
accurate. To appreciate the impact of British influence on the Caribbean, the process
must be studied within the context of that particular form of colonization, and not within
a comparative analytical exercise of colonization among other British colonies such as
Africa or Asia. The main reason for this particular deviation from the norm is that the
Eastern Caribbean represents one of the very few situations in the history of
colonization where the "colonizer" had to journey to a third country to bring in the
"colonized." The almost total annihilation of the indigenous people of the Caribbean by
the Europeans, eliminated a potential labor force, and resulted in the importation of
African slaves, to support the economic and industrial development of Europe. In the
18th and 19th century, Europe was developed partly through the sweat of African slaves
in the Caribbean, as they toiled to produce sugar for the lucrative new markets of the
west. I want to emphasize here that the influence of the British on Eastern Caribbean
society is indeed deeper than that of other former colonies. It is deeper because the
Africans who were imported into the region were brought to the islands devoid of their
religious, political and social life. Brought to a strange land in chains and stripped of all
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of the British.
The Eastern Caribbean governmental model therefore, has been largely influenced
by over two centuries of British domination. The process of Ang.ophication began on
the plantations very early during slavery. Slaves on any one particular plantation would
come from a number of different tribes. The ship captain and plantation owners were
careful not to mix the slaves. They developed systems that would ensure that slaves
from the same tribes or geographical area in Africa were not working together on the
same plantation. The primary reason expressed by the British for this practice was that
slaves from the same tribe and background would be able to communicate and
conceptually plan revolts. But it also seemed apparent that a major reason for
separating slaves was to deculturize them and strip them of any traditional behavior or
customs, that they may have brought with them to the Islands. It would then be easy to
impart British values to them. During slavery the values taught to the Africans were all
meant to reinforce the relationship of slave and slavemaster. This early relationship of
slavery may have influenced the kind of "authoritative democracy" that emerged in
modern day Caribbean.
The warm tropical weather of the eastern Caribbean has always attracted people to
the islands, but more than two centuries ago the Europeans were attracted for reasons
other than the weather. The Caribbean was not considered a resort by Britain but in
effect represented a major economic region for British mercantilism. The West Indies
islands provided the British with the geographical location needed to develop the now
famous "triangular trade". The triangular trade represented a profitable trade in which
ships left Britain with manufactured goods and supplies, sailed to the African coast
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where the goods were exchanged for Negroes. The ships would then sail from Africa
the West Indies where the Negroes would be sold to the huge plantations in exchange
for a cargo of West Indian products which included molasses and cotton. These where
taken back to Britain and the Triangle would be repeated. "The West Indian Islands
became the hub of the British empire, of immense importance to the grandeur and
prosperity of England. It was the Negro slaves who made these sugar colonies the most
precious colonies ever recorded in the whole annals of imperialism."!
When the British colonized the Eastern Caribbean, they took particular care of
those islands to ensure that they would continue to provide the labor, produce and trade
needed to generate the capital necessary to finance the industrial revolution in Europe.
To do that effectively, the British brought their entire superstructure to the islands, their
political system, their social and economic system and their overall culture was
transferred from the streets of London to the sugar cane plantations of St. Kitts,
Antigua and the rest of the Islands.
Colonization, therefore, required the British to develop methods for maintaining the
productivity of these islands. The first step in that process was the importation of slaves.
When taken into historical perspective, the importation of slaves represents perhaps the
most significant phenomena in the history of the Caribbean, because it was slavery that
created the Caribbean nation state which is today the home of the descendants of
former slaves. It is further important because unlike the American south where Africans
were the main source of labor, all slaves in the Islands were not Africans. Eric Williams
who wrote extensively on the subject, concludes that "slavery in the Caribbean has been
!Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Capricon Books, NY 1966) Page 52.
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too narrow,, identified with the Negro. A racia, twist has thereby been given to what is
basically an economic phenomenon. Slavery was not born of racism, rather racism was
the consequence of slavery. Unfree labor in the new world was brown, white, black, and
yellow; Catholic, Protestant, and Pagan."2
This historical factor is important in understanding the Caribbean political culture
because it is central to my argument that the Eastern Caribbean has unique
characteristics not only in terms of its political model, but in terms of its ethnic
composition. The Caribbean people are descendants of whites, Negroes, Indians,
Chinese, and indigenous Caribs. This multiethnic environment which was derived from
slavery, has also had significant long term effects on the sociopolitical structure of the
region. This environment, created by a society of mixed ethnic races, provided the ideal
situation for the installment of a dominant culture, particularly in a situation where the
relationship was grossly unequal. In its most simplistic form, it represented an era in
which the majority group
- the colonized people, had no choice but to adopt and absorb
all the British teachings.
Williams points out that the "first instance of slave trading and slave labor
developed in the new world involved racially, not the Negro but the Indian."3
In addition, after emancipation the plantation owners turned again to India, Portugal and
to China to seek workers. Therefore, by the beginning of the 1900's the Negroes were
still in the majority but the ethnic composition of the region was decidedly mixed.
2Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery Page 7.
3Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery Page 7.
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We indicated eariier that ,o control the colonies the British brought their own
social and pohtica, systems to the islands. The center of British activity evolved aronnd
the plantations. The owners and their British staff had the first opportunity ,o teach the
newly imported slaves a new way of life. The slaves, of course, were literally a "captive
audience" and had to absorb the language, religion, values and government of their
masters.
The result of over three centuries of British indoctrination and education into every
aspect of the Eastern Caribbean native's life cannot be overlooked. A visit to the
Caribbean today will clearly manifest a heritage of British colonial domination. The
educational system, sports, the arts, the Anglican church and more important, the
political system are distinctly British influenced. The African population were imported
to support the sugar industry as slaves came from all over West Africa where they lived
under different tribal political systems in a free environment. When they arrived in the
Caribbean, their only real exposure to any organized and structured political system was
the system that controlled and perpetuated slavery. To the descendants of the current
Caribbean leadership the politics of oppression as practiced by the British colonists
represented their introduction to politics. The abolition of slavery in 1834 brought
freedom from chains for the African majority, but the political system remained
unchanged for more than a century. In 1951 after more than a century of political
domination, most of the islands achieved universal adult suffrage, which gave the Black
majority the right to vote.
The sociopolitical dynamics that developed after universal adult suffrage and the
actions of the leaders who were all born during Crown Colony clearly manifested the
scars of a century of authoritative political rule and social oppression that had dominated
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the island, Men like Ebenzer Joshua of St. Vincent, Eric Gairy of Grenada, V.C. Bird
of Antigua assumed power of their states in 1952. At the time that they did, they had
experienced only one model of government, that was the Crown Colony model. These
men had been on the receiving end of a defacto authoritarian politically oppressive
system for over half a century. The British were now asking them to develop and
maintain a democracy that would provide an environment for participatory government
with citizen input, freedom of speech, and all the other aspects of institutional
democracy which was absent during British Crown Colony rule. The Caribbean leaders
went to the task equipped with the limited knowledge and experience gathered from
Crown Colony; and their own indigenous; psychological, cultural and social experiences.
The political model that emerged out of that combination is what prevails in the
Caribbean in the postindependence era.
This model bears the scar of British domination in all aspects of the Caribbean
society. The detribalization and deculturization of the current Caribbean people
ancestors, have produced a people who manifest tendencies towards natural anarchism.
Freedom is an important and cherished value of modern Caribbean people and their
tolerance and observance for repressive laws that curtail that freedom is minimal. This
characteristic of Caribbean people has been linked to the bondage suffered at the hands
of the British both during and after slavery.
But there are other durable tenuous positive legacies of British domination. British
colonialists believe strongly in the rule of law. Even during slavery there would be laws
to govern the treatment of slaves. After emancipation the colonial office maintained
close administrative supervision of the British administrators in the islands. The British
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proved to be committed constitutionalists and as a result Caribbean people have
themselves become devoted constitutionalists.
Those two characteristics, namely a sense of natural anarchism on the one hand,
and a strong emotional attachment to constitution, legitimacy and the rule of law, begins
to give one an idea of the various paradoxes that characterize the Caribbean society, and
which make it different from other former British colonies.
Another major characteristic adopted from the British was the authoritative nature
of its so called "democratic structure." During colonial rule, notwithstanding the
unicameral structure of government, the existence of a parliament, and nominated
representatives, the system was distinctly authoritative. The governor who represented
the British monarch, had absolute authority in government. He controlled both the
legislative and executive body of the House of Parliament and was directly instrumental
in the appointment of the judiciary. Modern Caribbean constitution manifest the very
same structure and in some states have been abused by overzealous and corrupt leaders.
The legacy of British colonialism has affected every aspect of the lives of the
Eastern Caribbean people, including commerce, management systems, sports, etc. David
Apter suggests that colonialism demonstrated the important role of commerce and
bureaucracy in the modernization process and that the British pattern of political
evaluation was useful, to the extent that it encouraged the evaluation of self government
and independence through conciliar government.4 In the Eastern Caribbean British
colonialism has been even more profound. The historical experiences of British
4David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, IL 1965)
Page 50.
domination in .hat region have resulted in a society which is characterized deeply by
British political and socia, values. The African heritage of the people of the region on*
exist within their cultura, practices. The political system and hehavior arc specifically
British.
Since receiving the status of self government from Britain, the islands have been
able to avoid major social and political disaster, mainly because they have adapted the
British system in all its parameters, and have no, attempted to change any component of
the structure left by the British. Caribbean people we spoke to take pride in their
current model. They may criticize the individuals that now manage the structure, but
believe that the British have left them a great legacy, which they appear determined to
protect.
race
C Race and Class Elements
In the post-emancipation period of Eastern Caribbean history the struggle for
political independence went through three distinct phases in which the elements of
and class were major variables. In the first stage, the free colored decided to form
themselves into a political force and spent the period from 1920-32 petitioning the
colonial powers for some kind of limited franchise that would guarantee mulatto middle
class representation in the government. The second stage of the struggle was the riots
and revolt initiated by the disenfranchised black majority who were clamoring for more
social and economic equity. The third stage and perhaps the most important phase in the
political history of the Eastern Caribbean was between 1939-51 when the Caribbean
petty bourgeoisie (middle class) represented by the Creole middle class and assisted by
the masses of black workers, small farmers, and the unemployed, decided to unite in the
fight against co,o„ia,ism
.
They temporarily forgo, their eiass differences and established
an aiiianee to wage an an.i-coioniai struggle, in which universal adul, suffrage, self-
government, and constitutional reform became the battle cries of the colonized
Caribbean people.
The road to political stability and adoption of the current political model which is
described as a democracy did no. come about easily. The history of the islands began in
principle with the domination of a large number of African slaves by a small number of
British colonialists. This became the operational model of government throughout
slavery in the Eastern Caribbean. After emancipation in 1834, the small group of free
coloreds or mulattoes felt that this model should prevail and within that model, they
should be the chosen ones to replace the British. It was also felt that since the African
majority were used to being dominated by a minority, they would logically acquiesce to
this new arrangement.
The large majority of African workers remained passive throughout this transitional
period which took place between 1900 and the 1920s. They spent that period adjusting
to their new freedom. In some of the islands not all the former slaves returned to the
plantation to work in spite of the fact that wages were now being offered for their labor.
They chose instead to find jobs on the waterfront, in shops and public works. Their new
role as free workers in the society was strange. They still worked for the British, only
now they received wages for their work, but were subject to a new concept of cultural
imperialism. With an absence of African culture in this new world the free workers of
the Eastern Caribbean spent the rest of their lives learning to be British, and competing
for political power with the minority mulattoes. By the time they achieved independence
in the ,a.e 1970s, the Eastern Caribbean peop,e had been totally indoctrinated and
schooled into the British political, economic and social system.
The road to political independence, however, was complex. The initial stages of
pohtica, developmen, was initiated no, by the majority of African descent, but by the
colored middle class. All political action and resulting riots seem to have evolved
around them. In effect, the mulatto political objective was simply to replace the British
as the rulers of the island and to continue to dominate the African majority. The
African majority on the other hand had experienced enough oppression a. the hands of
the white colonialist. They did no, appear to be willing to accept the same treatment
from the mulattoes.
By 1920, the small group of "free colored" had staked out a viable position for
themselves within the Caribbean society. They had created a distinct class of "brown
people" and appeared to be the heirs apparent to the British colonialist. They
controlled most of the retail trade on the islands. Some had saved enough to purchase
plantations, others by virtue of their education were given jobs in the civil service to
replace Englishmen who were returning to England. As a group they had enjoyed major
socioeconomic development and a relatively high standard of living, but they had no
political power. The British were still in control. The mulattoes recognized that some
kind of political base was necessary if they were eventually going to take control of the
islands when the British left. In addition, they felt that they needed to have some
influence in governing the islands. Their strategy during that period was to lobby the
British government for change in the political structure, that would allow them the
opportunity to serve in government.
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The colonial government system that prevailed during that period was the Crown
Colony System which has been described in less than flattering terms by West Indian
scholars. In a nutshell it was as Kenneth John describes, "a pocket edition of the British
constitution with a governor, council and assembly standing as miniature version of
Kings, Lords and Commons- There were a number of variations of this basic model.
For instance, in most of the Eastern Caribbean islands, there was no assembly but there
were two councils, the legislative and executive.
The executive council was composed of members of the British plantocracy all
appointed by the governor who was chief executive officer. The entire legislative council
in most of the Eastern Caribbean islands were also appointed by the governor and were
always in the minority. With a majority in the executive council, the governor could
always get his legislation passed. There were no elections (in Barbados there were
elections of a legislature by limited franchise, but the governors council always
outnumbered the elected officials) in the Eastern Caribbean model, the governor had
absolute power and appointed both councils. The councils which were appointed by him
generally never opposed his legislation. This aspect of the Crown Colony System is
significant, because it is central to my argument that the current Eastern Caribbean
model which was derived from the British is not as democratic as it looks. Ayearst
describes the Crown Colony System as "hierarchical: decision and direction at the apex;
5Kenneth John, "St. Vincent: A Political Kaleidoscope", Flambeau Magazine No. 5 (1966) Page
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submission and obedience at the bottom; and with no machine^ whereby the mass could
exert influence upon
- much less control over - the leadership" 6
The Creole middle class did not want to change the system, they did not seem to
have a problem with the authoritarian structure of government. What they wanted was
representation. Those on the island were quietly lobbying for representation but some
of the free colored who had enlisted in the British army during World War I were now
returning home and assumed the leadership in the fight for this representation. These
veterans were more aggressive in their lobbying and kept constant pressure on the
colonial office. Meanwhile, what of the black workers? They generally remained
outside the political periphery with a few extending half hearted support to the
mulattoes. The white ruling class, on the other hand, was totally opposed to any change
in the constitutional order that would allow mulattoes to serve in government. These
whites enjoyed a privileged position in the society and thought that any kind of limited
franchise allowing mulattoes to vote, would severely weaken their own political
superiority. In spite of the whites opposition, the coloreds continued to petition the
colonial office for reform.
In 1921, the British responded to the demand for reform and sent the under
secretary of state for the colonies, E.F.L. Wood, to the Caribbean to analyze the social
and political situation, and to make recommendations for the development and
implementation of new policies where necessary. Jessie Harris Proctor, Jr. summarizes
the Wood report as follows:
6Morley Ayearst, "Characteristics of West Indian Political Parties," in Lowenthal and Comitas
(Editors), The Aftermath of Sovereientv. (New York: Anchor Books, N.Y. 1973) Page 68.
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"Responsible government he regarded as altogether out of the question within the
foreseeable future, not only because there was as yet no demand for it, but also
because West Indian society was of such a nature as to make it too hazardous He
was .mpressed by the sharp divisions in the population along lines of colour and
religion and by the fact that substantial sections were 'backward and politically
undeveloped.' The level of education was so low and interest in politics was so
little diffused that only a small proportion of the electorate could be expected to
exercise the franchise. The absence of a class with sufficient leisure to be
politically active meant that responsible government might well only open the way
to the establishment in power of a 'financial oligarchy' which would proceed to
promote its narrow class interest. There did not yet exist leadership of sufficient
'impartiality or integrity' to which the Crown could in good conscience relinquish its
responsibility. The chief burden of government must therefore continue to be
borne by officials who possessed the necessary detachment. Thus, there did not
seem to be sufficient change in the West Indian social order to render invalid the
classic defense of the Crown Colony System. 7
It seemed obvious that at this time, the British had no intention of advancing these
territories to any form of representative government. The Wood recommendations
included some minor adjustments for some of the islands. He proposed for instance that
in Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago, members could be
chosen by limited franchise elections but the nominated officials who were all from the
white upper class were to remain in the majority. This limited change guaranteed that
the governor would continue to have the vote to override legislation proposed by the
elected officials, and guaranteed that there would be no substantial change in the power
hierarchy of the Eastern Caribbean islands. The governor remained in total control and
exercised absolute authority over the population.
7Jesse Harris Proctor, "British West Indian Society and Government in Transition 1' in Lowenthal
and Comitas, Page 35.
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The demand for reform did not diminish. The middle class mulatto who were
elected as representatives through the limited franchise arrangement, were unhappy and
continued to petition the colonial office for more reform which would give them more
effective representation in government. At that time also, most of the middle class of
the region recognized that based on the text of the Wood report, the only real chance
of achieving more autonomy and greater involvement in the governing of these islands
was to initiate a federation of the islands.
In 1929, the unofficial elected members of the Antigua legislative council again
petitioned the colonial office with a proposal to combine the Windward Islands, the
Leeward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago under one governor and one legislature. The
British Government responded to this new ideological development by appointing Sir
Charles Fergusson and Sir Charles Orr to form a commission to study the proposal of a
federation among the Windward, Leeward Islands and Trinidad and Tobago. In order to
present a united front on the subject of a political union, elected legislators and other
Caribbean leaders met in Dominica in October 1932 to develop a unified policy to
present to the Fergusson Orr Commission. The islands represented were Grenada, St.
Vincent, St. Lucia, Montserrat, Antigua, Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago, and St.
Kitts/Nevis. They met for six days and developed a proposed constitution which would
be presented to the commission. This attempt at federation was the first but certainly
not the last. In a later chapter I will focus on the attempts at political integration in the
Eastern Caribbean, but suffice it to say that the proposal was not acceptable to the
commission; they rejected the concept, but like Wood made some recommendations
aimed at addressing some of the local concerns. Fundamentally the proposed changes
recommended by Fergusson/Orr amounted to the maintenance of a nominated majority
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in the executive council, strengthening the governor s veto and executive powers which
would continue to allow him to override any legislation proposed by the legislative
council. The number of elected officials in the legislative council would remain the
same. However, it was recommended that the number of nominated officials be reduced
to three or four. Once again, in spite of apparent reform, the colonial power remained
firmly in control allowing minimal participation of a few elected local officials.
During that entire period the Black majority of the island remained outside the
political arena. They had no political representation and remained at the bottom of the
socioeconomic ladder. They would take some comfort in the fact that the main reason
for the British refusal to allow more local representation and participation in government
was because of their perception of the deep cleavages that existed among the
population. The Fergusson/Orr commission recognized that the middle class were not
really interested in a Federation nor were they interested in empowerment of the
majority on the islands. It was obvious to the commission they were interested in
pushing their own narrow agenda for representation.
Proctor points out that at the Dominica conference, A.A. Cipriani, a representative
of the Trinidad Workingmans Association, "urged the conference to go on record in
favor of universal suffrage, but the moderate middle class orientation of the others was
reflected in their opposition to the idea... What they seemed to want was essentially
more middle class representation in the legislature".8
By the time the Dominica Conference was convened (1932), the Black majority on
the islands who had stayed out of the political arena, were beginning to clamor for social
8Jesse Harris Proctor, "Aftermath of Sovereignty" in Lowenthal and Comitas, Page 42.
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and economic change in the society, which wonld improve their overail quality of life.
Institution* theorists like Hunting,™, have written extemivc
,y o„ ^ rf
institutions as a means for providing nonviolent means of social and political change and
as a mechanism for regulating conflict. In every modernizing or developing country,
conflict is inevitable, as the various groups within the society begin to seek power. The
ability to maintain stability within those countries seems to depend to a great extent on
the nature of the political institutions responsible for regulating or ameliorating those
conflicts.
In the Eastern Caribbean the political institutions in place during the 1930's seemed
to have been well structured to maintain political legitimacy and prevent political
uprising amongst the franchised population. On the other hand, there was a large
majority of new citizens who were clamoring for some kind of social mobility and
economic development. The hierarchial structure of Crown Colony System was not
geared to address those issues, resulting in a number of riots by the Black majority.
In 1929, the British Labor Party which was in power at the time encouraged
governors in the island to give legal recognition to trade unions. By 1930 small trade
unions were established to negotiate working conditions with the plantation owners.
These unions were led by leaders from amongst the Black workers. They spent the
early years organizing and negotiating, but in 1934 and until 1938 violent riots erupted
all through the Eastern Caribbean, and Trinidad, Barbados, and Jamaica. The
"disturbances" as British historians have described the events, took the form of sporadic
strikes, riots in the inner cities and looting of the middle class businesses. In St. Kitts,
where sugar production was profitable, there were vigorous violent outbreaks amongst
sugar-workers for better working conditions and more equitable pay. In Antigua the
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scene of strikes and riots were the same, followed by St. Lucia, Grenada, Dominica and
St. Vincent. Although the worst disorders occurred in Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica,
the smaller Eastern Caribbean had caught the attention of the British.
The riots revealed a number of weaknesses of the Crown Colony System. The
most visible, being the lack of representation of the majority citizens in the government
of the Islands. Through the "disturbances" the British governors were hard pressed to
find any member of Government who were colored or Black to talk with the rioters. As
a result, the British colonial office decided that the Eastern Caribbean and the existing
Crown Colony System needed a review. In 1938, they appointed yet another Royal
commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Moyne. His charge was to investigate
social and economic conditions in the British territories and to make recommendations.
Moyne began his inquiry in August 1938, but by the time he was prepared to submit his
report, World War II had begun. As a result his report remained in the Colonial Office
for the entire duration of the war; but the Colonial Office did begin to address some of
his recommendations.
The report was long and comprehensive. The commission examined every aspect
of the social and economic condition of the Caribbean citizens. They determined that
the riots were the result of the distressing social conditions of the former slaves. They
described the society as one plagued by malnutrition, chronic ill health, high infant
mortality, lack of formal education, low wages and unemployment. They urged the
British government to undertake immediate steps to address the social problems. The
main proposal was to create a welfare fund of £1,000,000 per annum ($240,000 U.S.) for
twenty years, which would be administered by the colonial office. They strongly urged
the creation and constitutional support for trade unions because it was their opinion that
slavery had been abolished but the economic and social structure of slavery remained
firmly implanted in the Caribbean society. While they did not recommend immediate self
government or adult suffrage for Caribbean citizens, they recognized that some form of
constitutional change was necessary if social reform was to be undertaken. They felt
strongly on that position and wrote:
".-a substantial body of public opinion in the West Indies is convinced that
far-reaching measures of social reconstruction depend, both for their initiation
and the,r effective administration, upon greater participation of the people in
the business of government... Moreover, we are satisfied that the claim so
often put before us that the people should have a larger voice in the
management of their affairs represents a genuine sentiment and reflects a
growing political consciousness which is sufficiently widespread to make it
doubtful whether any schemes of social reform, however wisely conceived and
efficiently conducted, would be completely successful unless they were
accompanied by the largest measure of constitutional development which is
thought to be judicious in existing circumstances."9
In spite of that analysis the commission did not support the idea of self
government. On the question of federation they also, like the Fergusson/Orr
Commission, did not think the islands were prepared for a federation. It is a significant
irony that as early as 1938, the commission cited "local pride" and insularity as the two
major factors working against a proposed Federation. The observation by Moyne
seemed almost prophetic when we consider that by 1989, those same two factors would
again prevent attempts at Caribbean integration.
9West Indies Royal Commission Report. Great Britain Parliamentary Paper, CMD. 6607 1944-
45, Page 373. Summarized in Proctor, Page 49.
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The Royal commission therefore addressed a great deal of the social ills that
dominated the Caribbean in the 1940s, but apart from some token modification in the
various councils of government to allow for more participation of the middle class in the
decision making process, the majority of the Eastern Caribbean Black citizens remained
disenfranchised, not unlike their counterparts in the United State, Towards the end of
World War II, the political structure that existed in the Caribbean was distinctly the
Crown Colony System with the white colonialists firmly in charge. Supporting the
middle was the Creole middle class, who had been given representation in the legislature
by virtue of a limited franchise, but who were terribly frustrated at their inability to
impact the system. The Black masses still unempowered, but at the bottom were
beginning to flex their cumulative political and numerical muscle.
D
-
Universal Adult Suffrage and Its Aftermnth
The 1938 Riots had one positive result for the black majority. The trade unions
had emerged as a major organizational force during the disturbances and continued to
clamour for better working conditions, equitable wages, and improved social conditions.
They mobilized the workers into a cohesive political unit and began to make demands
both on the government and the all white business community in which they were
employed. Arthur Lewis described the period in the Caribbean political history as a
revolution. The middle class had been virtually upstaged by the sheer numbers and
organizations of the black workers trade unions. Writing in 1939, he stated that "The
major issues discussed today no longer revolve round the aspiration of the middle classes,
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but are sc. by working class demands...™ These demands were ar.icula.ed by a new
group of emerging labor leaders who eame from the ranks of .he Black working class.
By .he early 1940s, however,
.he middle class crcoics had began to infiltrate .he now
well organized trade unions. Proctor observed that "whether because they appreciated
.he great potential political power of the masses or because they were resentful over .he
discrimination which prevented them from securing the higher positions in society for
which they were qualified, the middle class leaders now increasingly identified themselves
with the Black masses rather than with the predominately white 'elite'"." This new
alliance proved to be the formula that would lead the Caribbean people to self
government.
The British colonists found themselves in a precarious position towards the latter
half of the 1940s. They came under verbal attack from all quarters. The Creole,
frustrated with their limited token role in the legislature, began to join the ranks of the
trade unions. The Moync Commission had criticized the Colonial Office and condemned
the policies which relegated the Caribbean Blacks to subhuman conditions. The Blacks
themselves had come to realize that the only opportunity to bring about change was
through constitutional reform. Any reform, however, would first require the granting of
universal adult suffrage, in order to control the government and maintain the autonomy
necessary to bring about the change.
To understand the current political model in the Eastern Caribbean, it is necessary
to recognize that even when the blacks felt most oppressed, humiliated and exploited,
47.
10Arthur W. Lewis, "Labour in the West Indies", Fabian Society Research Series No. 44, Page 33.
11Jesse Harris Proctor, "BWI Society" in Lowenthal and Comitas, Aftermath of Sovereignty. Page
they did no, seek to oust ,he governme nl by vio ,ent means, which lhey were capab ,e Qf
doing based on their numerical superiority on the isiands. But instead the trade union
leaders, beginning in the iarger islands of Trinidad, adopted a p,a„ to pressure the
British to grant adult suffrage and eliminate the Crown Colony System. Through
demonstrations, wild eat strikes, and ietters to the Colonia, Offiee, the masses made their
desires felt. In ,95!, the British could postpone the inevitable no longer. They granted
the islands universal franchise.
The granting of universal franchise marks the starting point of the development of
the Caribbean political model. Kenneth John, a St. Vincent scholar, describes the event
in the following terms: "The flood gates of pent-up frustrations were unlocked and the
people channeled all their released emotions into politico-economic movements.
Everyone had to be a party man and a unionist in a fashion bordering on the fanatic.""
While John's description may sound slightly animated, the masses of the Caribbean
people did embrace universal adult suffrage with a passion that was unparalleled in the
history of the region. They were determined to exercise their new found franchise.
Institutionalist and modernists have advanced various theories regarding the
participation of the poor masses and the role of the new elites in the modernizing
process. George Masannat suggests a number of hypotheses in the developmental
theory. For instance that new leaders or elites are normally civilians, college professor,
lawyers, doctors, engineers, high school students and teachers, and the military. In the
Eastern Caribbean the new political elites were workers not professionals. He states
further that these elites ascension to power will generally alter the socioeconomic system
12Kenneth John, "St. Vincent: A Political Kaleidoscope", Page 85.
litcs in a
by challenging the political supremacy of the landed aristocracy. Modernizing e.i
large number of developing nations are antagonistic to the dominant values of the
society and are more likely to reject traditional elements and accept what is modern and
advanced » Lipset, on the other hand, using data from more advanced developing
countries like West Germany, suggests that workers at the lower base of the class
structure and the rural population were less likely to support a multiparty system
«
These theories have been widely accepted by political scientists and represents a general
body of theory that dominates the field of comparative politics. These broad theories
however, may be applicable to large modernizing states but seem inconsistent when
applied to political development in the Caribbean. That is not to suggest that these
theories are flawed, on the contrary, my argument suggests that the theories do not
apply because of the peculiar history of colonization in the region and the small size of
those states in terms of geography and population.
Even before the Caribbean's political development process can be analyzed it must
be understood that the region did not experience the same process, as larger developing
countries, which achieved both adult suffrage and independence at the same time. The
Caribbean islands went through a number of gradual changes towards eventual political
independence, and that factor helped prepare the masses for the political responsibility
of nationhood. For instance, during the first phase of the independence process, which
was the granting of universal franchise, the modernizing elites were not a powerful
political group because they simply did not have the numbers, consequently they
13George S. Masannat (Editor), The Dynamics of Modernization and Social Chanee. (Goodyear
Publishing Co., CA 1973) Pages 329-330.
l4Lipset, Political Man. Page 93.
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concentrated on developing the economic structure, by opening up businesses, in the
community. A high percentage of them also became the bureaucrats in the civil service,
replacing the outgoing British. During that initial phase, total political power in terms of
electing representatives remained concentrated in the hands of the black masses. "The
illiterate masses were for the first time made political animals.- As a result, any
modernizing process that may have started through the granting of universal franchise
was severely slowed because of the power of the masses to elect their own
representatives from their ranks. These people were not modernizers.
The people elected were from the ranks and files of the union. These elected
officials were made to share power with the British who were still in control of
government. Parliament now had an elected majority with a smaller number of
nominated members. The British assigned these newly elected members of parliament to
manage various areas of government, social welfare, education, public works, etc. and
gave them each a team of British civil servants and British-trained mulattoes to manage
the budget and train them into the various operations of government. It is difficult to
determine whether the overall socioeconomic situation of the masses improved
significantly during that period, but the masses seemed satisfied that they now had some
impact on government. The government leaders were now their own representatives.
They had achieved the first step towards political freedom. Self government and total
independence were still on the horizon.
With the masses in power, the socioeconomic structure remained virtually
unchanged during the early years of the road to independence. The absence of a
lsKenneth John, "St. Vincent: A Political Kaleidoscope", Page 85.
modernizing elite actually helped the white "plantocracy". There was no challenge to the
economic supremacy of the landed gentry. The rich planters and business men still
controlled the economic life of the islands and with that kind of economic power it was
easy to influence these new ministers who were in some cases previous employees of
these large estate owners. As for the theory relating to the rejecting of traditional
values by modernizing elites in developing countries, this did not occur in the Eastern
Caribbean. There were no traditional elements as such in the society. All the values of
the society were basically British. The newly elected lower class ministers were not
prepared to reject a system of values which seemed to them so desirable, when the
British controlled it. Nor were the middle class mulatto elites who themselves aspired to
capture all the trappings of British aristocracy.
As a result of this complacency, the newly elected governments under the tutelage
of the British administrators did not accomplish very much in terms of the expected
economic miracle that they had envisaged. However, they managed to keep their
supporters satisfied enough to get re-elected to office at subsequent elections. The
scope for personal social and economic advancement was now very lucrative for
government officials. A number of new political parties emerged and the middle class
began to seek political leadership in those new parties. Some of the parties like the
Dominica Labor Party whose political leader was a white colonists - Phyllis Shand Alfrey
and the Labor Party of St. Vincent, were actively reaching out to attract middle class
elites into the parties. Party members realized that the labor parties in particular,
consisted primarily of lower class workers, they also recognized that in the future the
parties would be required to negotiate self government and independence for the islands
and would become responsible for their own economic survival. They, therefore, took
-PS to address these issues by encouraging the educmed e]ites busmessmen (o
parties; they moved withln the ranks of the party^^^^ ^
very soon were in leadership positions.
In addition to the political opportunities presented by adu,, suffrage and the
economical ffom Joining the partie, Those who^ ^^^
have a monopoly on the marke, because al. party members on,y patronized member-
owned businesses. Today, the economic benefits are stiff an incentive for joining the
existing parties, but the communities themselves have become more pluralistic.
It is also fair to point ou, that as the parties headed towards the 1960s, the parties
were representative of all various classes on the islands.
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-
Associated Statehood £tnt,.c
By I960, the islands had moved into the next stage of political development.
Through constitutional reform the British had allowed for one of the ministers elected,
to be appointed as leader of his party. This person would assume the position of chief
minister and later Premier. This stage was known as associated Statehood or full
internal self government. In this model, the Premier replaced the Governor as
legislative leader and now presided over a cabinet of elected ministers. The British
administrator represented the executive branch of government and the British still
maintained responsibility for defense and foreign policy.
This new self government arrangement represented a compromise to the Eastern
Caribbean Government who had consented to join an ill fated federation of the British
colonial islands in 1958. The British were always convinced (and remain so today) that
the islands could only survive economically and politically through some form of political
integration. Caribbean population on the other hand were never convinced of that
argument but appeared willing to try any system that would result in political
independence.
In 1958, the British managed to coerce the islands into a federation. The West
Indies Federation as it was called, was made up of the large territories of Jamaica,
Trinidad and Tobago, and the smaller islands of Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, St.
Vincent, Grenada, St. Lucia and the Leeward islands of Antigua, St. Kitts, Nevis,
Monserrat. The Federal capital was located in Trinidad. In a later chapter we will
examine in more detail the demise of the federation. Yet it should be noted that in
1961, three years after it was inaugurated, the West Indies Federation was dissolved.
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' Overcominp Racial and r.i«.«« R?rrim
The revolutionary change which witnessed the transition of the Eastern Caribbean
Government from one dominated by British colonialists and local mulattoes, to one
totally comprised of local working Cass leaders was expected to result in major social
conflict. Taken against a history of bitter conflict, the fears of violence was well
founded but it did not occur. Historically the "coloreds" or "Creole" group who were
normally given their freedom from the plantation had considered themselves better and
superior to their African ancestors because of the lighter coloration of their skin relative
to that of the darker Africans.
That group was the first to totally adopt British colonist values, and their attitude
and behaviors throughout the history of the region are marked by a legacy of social
tension between them and the darker descendants of African slaves. As early as 1800
these "free colored" as they were then called, wanted to disassociate themselves from the
African Blacks. They wanted desperately to be recognized by the colonists as whites,
and tried hard to emulate their way of life. To that end many free colored would
purchase and maintain slaves merely as a status symbol. These slaves were used to do
household chores since these free colored did not own plantations. A protestant priest
in a sermon in 1800 remarked "The first thing to which every free person of color
aiming at independence naturally directs his thoughts is the possession of a slave" and he
further observed that "people of color are of all proprietors of slaves by far the most
cruel". 16
16Charles Peters, from Sermon preached in Dominica (April 1800) and officially noticed by his
Majesty's Privy Council Gazette (London 1802) Page 561.
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This early cleavage that existed between those two groups, persisted well after
emancipation and presented major racial and social tension in the region. This conflict
came to a head in the 1960s. Spurred on by the Civil Rights and Black Power
Movement in the United States, Caribbean students and workers succeeded in breaking
down most of the race and class barriers that existed in the Eastern Caribbean
communities. The question of race has not emerged as a major determent factor in the
literature on Caribbean political history. However, for Caribbean people the historical
hostile relationship that existed between the non-white population of the islands have
left some major scars on the society. This is particularly evident in countries like
Trinidad and Guyana where there are a large Indian and African population. In the
smaller nations of the Eastern Caribbean, the effects are not always visible but the
tensions have definitely influenced the development of the particular political and social
structures that emerged in the region in the post 1960 era.
I have described the Eastern Caribbean model as very authoritarian and
hierarchical, and have reviewed the work of West Indian scholars such as Lewis who
supports that characterization. The issue of authoritarianism was discussed with political
leaders. The response varied, but the bitterness was evident particularly among the
older political leaders like V.C. Bird of Antigua, who talked passionately about the
exploitation of workers by the white colonialists. He seemed even more animated when
he mentioned the oppressive and snobbish attitude of the colored merchants and
businessmen of Antigua, who had initially found him unfit to lead the country.
V.C. Bird and other Caribbean political leaders have over the years developed
policies that have virtually eliminated the coloreds as an influential group. Patrick John
and E.O. Leblanc of Dominica 1964-79, Eric Gairy of Grenada 1951-79, Ebenzer Joshua
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of St. Vincent 1960-69, and Southwell and Bradshaw of St. Kim, were all instrument in
breaking the stronghold tha, the "coloreds" had on the society. These ieaders came to
power after universa, adult suffrage and with the support of the working Cass utilized
the very same method introduced by the British to humiliate and disempower the
coloreds.
When the various working class parties of African descent took power in the region
a number of social changes occurred. The powerful colored families who controlled
most of the business and retail trade in the 50s, now had to negotiate with the African
descendants for concessions on taxes and import duties which affected their livelihood.
This was painful for that group who formally shared power with the white colonialist and
had a monopoly on the mercantile trade of the Islands. To further exacerbate the
situation, these new governments supported and encouraged the working class to
establish businesses which could compete with the coloreds. By the 1980s the coloreds
as a powerful business and elite group was significantly weakened and replaced by a new
class of African descent merchants.
It is important to note the difference in the approach used by the working class to
disempower the oppressive economic ruling class in the Eastern Caribbean, relative to
that used by other areas of the Third World, such as Central America. In analyzing the
various methodology used by these governments, the influence of the British is
paramount. Throughout the Crown Colony System the British were always careful to go
through the motion of introducing legislation with all the necessary pomp and tradition.
No matter how repressive the law or policy was, they were always careful to establish its
legitimacy. Their motives at that time was simply to confuse the African descendants by
intimidating them with a language and custom which they did not totally understand.
The irony of that action is that centuries later the descendants of Africans would use the
same process not to confuse people but to achieve their meaningful political goals.
In dealing with the coloreds, they did not choose to mobilize the masses to attack
or destroy the mulatto property. What they did was use the legislature to pass
legislation aimed at creating competition which albeit was unfavorable to the Mulattoes
but nonetheless empowered a new class of merchants. It is these sociohistorica.
developments we believe that presents a major analytical problem for Western scholars.
It is assumed for instance, that when the working class took power they would destroy
the existing ruling class structures and change the political system as was done in Cuba,
Sri Lanka, a former British colony, and Nicaragua for example.
W. Howard Wiggens, who studied politics in Sri Lanka, concluded that many
features of modernization such as their cultural independence from the west, the use of
local languages in their school system, the electoral process and a changing economy all
contributed to heighten rather than eliminate traditional group conflict and antagonism."
The harsh realities of this kind of antagonism that developed in Sri Lanka was not
felt in the Eastern Caribbean. There certainly was antagonism among the traditional
elites who were the mulattoes and the new elites who were the former laborers.
However, the Caribbean reaction to the conflict was played out not through
violence, but through the processes of constitutional rule that the British had left to the
natives. Later we will see how the colored and middle class elite managed to work their
way back into a powerful position in the new Eastern Caribbean model. In 1989, the
new typical Caribbean ruling class was made up of an unholy alliance of former members
17Howard W. Wiggens, "Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Call of Ceylon", American
Political Science Review No 45. (June 1961) Pages 313-320.
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of .he working classes and members of the middle ela* which have expanded ,„ include
•he descends of .he "mulatto" plus . ncw group of young^ ^
civil servants who moved into .ha. group by vir.ue of .heir educa.ion. The structure
differs sifinifican.lv from
.he earlier days of self governmen, when the working class were
able to neutralize
.he middle class and domina.e
.he government of the region. The
development of poli.ical parties which represented a more pluralistic approach to
governmen. was a con.ribu.ive factor to the stability of .he Caribbean political model.
By 1989, the class and race factors were no longer a major aspec. in Caribbean politics.
It is also safe to conclude thai the future of race as a factor in Eastern Caribbean
politics has been totally eliminated.
(;
-
Independence and the New Model
All of the former British colonies of the Eastern Caribbean except Montserrat were
granted independence from Britain between 1974 and 1983. Grenada was the first to be
granted independence in 1974, followed by Dominica 1978, St. Lucia - February 1979, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines - October 1979, Antigua and Barbuda 1981 and St.
Kitts/Nevis in 1983. A comparative analysis of the Caribbean independence process
relative to former colonial states of Asia and Africa will reveal a significant factor which
lends a different dimension to both the attitude of the Caribbean people and the kind of
political model that prevailed within that society. In the Eastern Caribbean there were
no wars of liberation from colonialist domination as was the case in African states like
Mozambique, Guineau Besau, and Angola from Portuguese domination or Algeria from
France and Kenya from the British. The independence of those African countries was
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followed by bloody clashes among rival political groups as they attempted to fill the
power vacuum left by the colonialist.
Even in other states where the masses did not engage in military struggles for
independence such as (Ceylon) Sri Lanka, ethnic, religious, and regional differences
became major obstacles in the attempt to unify this country... Howard Wiggins observes
that "Many people of Asia and Africa have discovered that independence from Western
rule is only the first and perhaps the easiest step. Once the foreigner has gone, the
larger problem looms of creating a visible political society. Divisions and competitive
strings held in check when outsiders controlled affairs are suddenly released.™ In the
case of the Caribbean, the orderly movement from internal self government into
independence is the result of a controlled process by the British, but more important it
is the absence of major social and political cleavages within those societies. In countries
where the total population varies from 40,000 - 120,000, the opportunity for violent
upheavals among groups are minimized. But in addition to size, the role of the British
in the colonization process cannot be overlooked. Huntington claims that "violence and
instability in developing countries is a result of rapid social change and the rapid
mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political
institutions." 19
Throughout the period after emancipation the British controlled the Caribbean, but
also engaged in a gradual process of empowering the colonized people. Two
commissions looked at unrest in the Caribbean and determined they were not ready for
18Howard W. Wiggins, "Impediments to Unity in New Nations", Pages 313-320
19Huntington, Political Order in a Changing Society, Page 4.
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self government. While it would be naive to think that those decisions by the British
were made for reasons other than prolonging the economic exploitation of the region,
the prolonged process did lead to the development of a relatively stable political mode,
among the new nations of the Caribbean. By the same token, this prolonged
colonization process, converted an extremely diverse cultural and ethnic society into one
dominated by a single set of British values.
Of course, it can be argued that the Eastern Caribbean islands are no worse off for
their experience at the hand of British imperialism. Also, compared with the violence
and strife that plague other developing countries it can be further argued that the
current political model have worked in the interest of the people of the Caribbean.
This study is not prepared to compare the colonization and independent, process of
other former colonies in Africa or Asia. The primary focus is precisely the opposite. It
argues that the Caribbean islands represent a unique situation in the history of
colonization and consequently, the political model that emerged out of that process is
inherently different from any other model.
Why is it different from other Central American or other African states? Well, in
addition to size, we must recognize that the Caribbean process represents the only
period in modern history where the colonizer actually went out to another country to
bring in a population to be colonized. In the generally accepted colonization model, a
stronger power would invade a weaker country, and colonize or enslave the population.
In the Caribbean, the colonialist invaded and eventually destroyed the indigenous
inhabitants of the islands. When they decided to colonize those states for economic
purposes, they realized that there was no population to work or convert. They turned
to Africa, and imported a whole race. This is perhaps the most significant historical
difference in the process of British imperialism, and contributes to an understanding of
the uniqueness of the Caribbean political model.
Depending on who one talks to in the Eastern Caribbean the political model can
be perceived as probably the most stable pluralistic mode, in the free wor.d or the most
restrictive and authoritarian system in the region. Objectively however, the model
appears to have what I would consider a preponderance of democratic principles and
institutions interlocked with a sprinkling of paternalistic and authoritarian dogma.
Independence in the Caribbean have brought about a political model characterized
by the existence of a multiparty system. There are free and regular elections in which
the population get to elect representatives from among their own ranks. The class issues
which was so prevalent throughout the colonial period have been effectively eliminated.
The church is now a major player in the political process and the majority of the ruling
classes are no longer mulattoes but descendants of Africans. The Caribbean nations
have also gained the independence to determine their own foreign policy, a factor which
has allowed political leaders more autonomy in determining both the domestic and
international affairs of their government. Prior to independence, the British
Government had some leverage in influencing domestic policy and in most cases were
able to prevent abuse in government by using the power of the purse string through
their aid programs as a carrot, to ensure that the local government remained within the
parameters of the perceived democratic principles.
As sovereign states the small Caribbean islands are now able in theory to determine
their domestic policies without international interference. The reality of the situation,
however, indicates clearly that the super powers within the international community are
not prepared to allow that kind of autonomy. Domestic policies are closely monitored
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by Britain and the United States and any policy which they believe may threaten the
politic*! stabihty of the region are quickly nipped in the bud, particularly if there are
foreign poiiey implication* associated with the local policy. invasion of Grenada in
1983, was a manifestation of the role of the super powers in both domestic and foreign
policy of the Eastern Caribbean.
The issue of foreign power interference was discussed with Caribbean leaders,
specifically with Prime Minister Charles of Dominica, Vere Bird of Antigua, and Deputy
Prime Minister Cruickshank of St. Vincent They all felt that the super powers would
like to have some influence in their domestic policies. However, they indicated that they
had resisted any approach of that nature. On the other hand, they were ambiguous
about their foreign policy position. For instance, Prime Minister Charles told this author
that she had written to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee about her concern
regarding the allegations made in that committee about the prime minister of Bahamas
connection with drugs. She felt that if Prime Minister Pindling was involved in the drug
trade in the Bahamas, the government of the Bahamas would be the proper authority to
bring charges against the prime minister, not the United States Congress. On the other
hand, she felt that the United States intervention in Grenada was necessary. She said
the situation in Grenada between 1979-83 presented a serious political threat to the
political stability of the region "there were pockets of communism developing in the
islands which were being influenced by the Cuban Government".21 Consequently, it was
a collective decision by the other states to appeal to the United States for military
20Interview conducted between October and November, 1989 at government headquarters in the
various states listed.
21Interview with Prime Minister Charles (Dominica, November 1989).
e*e„, tha, other gover„raenls could very easj|y invhe^^ ^ ^
domestic affairs , they felt tha , . parljcu|ar s[aie_ ^ conforming to ^
norms
.
It was the ge„era, consensus among the headers that such an even, wou.d no,
occur. They felt that they had (o be practica
, ^ determjning (heir forejgn^ ^
by hostde sta.es or by d ,ssident doraestic groups
. ^^^ ^ ^
on the United States for foreign poiicy direction. The heads of state define their
foreign pohcy as a
-nonahgned po,icy, ,„ effect what this means is that in spi ,e of the
nonahgned posture adopted in principie by a„ these new states, the •nonalignmenf is a
verba, commitment only. For all practica, purposes the Caribbean states are a„ Western
aligned states and the governments of the area are particularly friendly with the U.S. and
Britain whom they expect to ca„ upon at any time to he,p put down attacks against their
government.
The interesting phenomenon about this policy is that the attacks that the political
leaders are anticipating are not expected to come from foreign troops but from within
their own states. Thus, the leaders find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They do
not have the military resources to take care of domestic violence and therefore want to
have the option to call for international assistance, but at the same time do not want
interference in their domestic policy. It is obvious that they cannot have both. In
summary therefore, we have to conclude that post independence Eastern Caribbean
states have some autonomy in the development of their domestic policy, but the other
side of that equation suggests that their foreign policy is in the hands of the 101st
Airborne Division and the U.S. State Department.
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This latter suggestion is by no means meant to be facetious. The continuous
reliance by Caribbean Governments on Britain and more recently the U.S. for direction
and control of their foreign policy is a fundamental characteristic of the Eastern
Caribbean Political mode,. These characteristics are no, typical or similar to any other
political model within the ,egions of new independent nations in Africa, or for that
matter Latin America with which the Eastern Caribbean has been grouped politically.
The reason for the reliance on foreign power for determination of its foreign policy is
not only related to lack of resources for defense, but more importantly it is the fact that
Caribbean people have demonstrated no need to flex their small independent muscles.
Throughout their history they have been associated with imperialist powers. Imperialism
created the Caribbean states and it appears that Caribbean people have decided
collectively that the freedom to elect their own government and govern their country
internally, is more important than making an impact within the international system.
Third world nationalists have criticized the Eastern Caribbean as being puppets of the
super powers. Caribbean leaders on the other hand point out that they represent some
of the most stable governments in the Third World.
H. Foreign Policy
Because the Caribbean's foreign policy is inherently tied to their domestic policy,
I've included an analysis of the regions foreign policy within this chapter. In addition,
scholars have suggested that there is an inherent relation between aid donor countries
like the United States and the smaller nation states whose economy depends on that aid.
Since independence, it can be safely predicted that on any international issue the region
of the Eastern Caribbean will generally vote with the United Stales, Canada and the
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United &EJ„, These three countries represems th£ m .or dQnors rf economic ^
the region.
The Eastern Caribbean bistorica, dependence on Britain for economic and poUtica,
d.rection has resuhed in the formu ,a tio„ of a conservative foreign policy perspective by
Caribbean leaders. The Eastern Caribbean leaders bave taken an isolationist and narrow
vew of their role as sovereign states within the international system. Their policy is
determined based on the leadership of Western democracies, particuiarly by the three
mentioned above.
,„ the ^independence era, the Caribbean governments have
become ,ess dependent on Britain but in the process have become dependent on the
United States no, only for economic aid, but also for their social and politica. security.
Eastern Caribbean governments appear to be comfortable with the threat of United
States intervention looming in the background. Their narrow self-interes, have led to
policies which in effect accepts the Monroe Doctrine as a concerted action by the
United States Government 160 years ago to ensure and protect the freedom of the
people of the region.* As a result of this reliance on the United States, the OECS
heads of state had no problem in asking the United States to invade Grenada in 1979.
An hysterical fear of communism is another major determinant force in the Eastern
Caribbean foreign policy formulation process. In justifying her role and that of other
leaders of the OECS in supporting the United States invasion of Grenada, Prime
Minister Charles claims that the region was threatened by socialist movements. "The
truth was foreign countries through their representations inside Grenada were
^Eugenia Charles,
-Isolation Versus One's Need", Caribbean Affairs Vol. 1, No 2 (April-June
1988) Pages 152-53.
•,
.
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mampulatmg acts of aggression which could no, be tolerated. Our islands were
threatened with indirect acts of aggression. It was as simp,e as that.«
I do not intend to oversimplify the regions foreign policy but based on the
The Eastern Caribbean maintains diplomatic and friend, regions only with countries
associate with countries which are hostiie to the United States, no, even the African
Nationa, Congress (ANC) is weicomed in ,he region. Eastern Caribbean governments
maintain no relations with the liberation movement of the African Nationa, Congress.
Since the region's foreign policy is in effect managed by the United Slates, le, us
briefly examine the United States historical role in the Caribbean. The Eastern
Caribbean geographically have only been invaded once by the United States, that is
Grenada in 1983. But the reason for the United States absence from the region is
simply because in the prcindependence era, the United Kingdom was responsible for
the regions foreign policy. Statistically one cannol overlook the fact that the Eastern
Caribbean states have been independent from Britain for just over twelve years, and the
United States have already landed its troops in the region. At this rate, given the
Grenada precedent, it is conceivable that the United States will retain its role as police
for the area. There is of course a domestic political problem with that role because it is
possible that the United States will be called regularly by local leaders whenever there
seems to be a strong political challenge from within those microstates. This relationship
^Eugenia Charles, "Isolation Versus One-ness", Page 153.
have now established good relations with the Uni(ed^ ^ ^^^^ ^
confident it wi„ conle to asslsl them upon^ ^^^ ^ ^
probiem is coraing frora [he ,cft
. ^ opposi(ion^^^ ^ _
politically dangerous.
The United States' pohcy Cowards lhe Eastern Caribbean however, has „ot changed
The poliey is one of assertiveness in ,he hemisphere, a tradition Mowed by Theodore
Rooseveit in the eariy 1900s and throughout the 20th centuty by various adm,,, (ra ,ions
The Monroe Doctrine seems to empower the United States with the authority to be the
international police of the region, m the 1980s a number of smal, pohtica, groups in the
region, frustrated by the lack of government leadership and vision, began a movement to
bring about change. These new groups led by the example of Michael Manley of
Jamaica, began to discuss the positive aspects of the Cuban political model. During the
same period the Cuban Government began to offer scholarships and aid to the region.
Only Grenada accepted the aid. Some of the small groups accepted educational
scholarships from Cuba. Among those groups was the Movement for New Dominica.
(MND) and the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM). Cuba's interest in
the region created two reactions. The Caribbean governments used the issue to fortify
their political position. They accused the groups and the opposition of attempting to
bring communism to the region, a prospect that is totally unacceptable to Caribbean
people. Secondly, the activity had the effect of renewing United States interest in the
region. With the events in Nicaragua (1979) fresh on their minds, they were determined
to ensure that the Eastern Caribbean region remained in line. To accomplish this
objective, first the United States gave them the carrot in the form of (CBI) Caribbean
carro, was quickly fo„owed by the "big stick", the invasion of Grenada.
Caribbean leaders do not seem to recosnize that lis ,•g U.S. policy towards the Caribbean
and Centra, America is one established around the security and geopolitical interests of
•he United State, Historical,, the United States has considered the region as being
North American mai„,and, the United States considers geopolitical and strategic interest
critica,, not on.y in Centra, America, but a,so in the Caribbean exemplified by Grenada.
The geopolitical and strategic importance and interest of the area to the United
States, has resulted in the political and economic domination of the region by both the
United States Government and the multinational corporations. The realpolitik pursuit of
that security through domination has led to the refusal of every United States
administration to respect the sovereignty of these small nation states. Consequently, the
United States has not hesitated in yielding the "big stick" by landing Marines on the
shores of these islands whenever there is any activity which the United States deem a
threat to their security. In all, American forces have intervened 26 times in Latin
America and the Caribbean during the last cen.uiy. Some interventions have been
political, but the majority have been through use of military force:
The chronological listing of United States intervention (Pg. 107) in the internal
affairs of the Caribbean states is by no means exhaustive and does not include covert
action carried out to destabilize governments or parties which did not meet with United
States approval. However, it does manifest vividly and dramatically the United States
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1899
1899
1902
1906
1915
1916
1961
1965
1983
ttyTp'-rr,oRico,otheuni 'eds'--'^
United States liberated Cuba and remained there until
United States intervenes in Cuba a second time
following Cuba's declaration as a republic and occupiesthe island until 1909.
"".
R^c
U
i!i
ited StalCS inV3deS and OCCUPies Haiti until 1934
Reason. Monroe Doctrine to protect United States lives and
United States invades and occupies the Dominican
Republic until 1924.
Abortive United States backed invasion of Cuba - Bay
or rigs. 3
United States invades Dominican Republic with
Organization of American States troops.
United States invades Grenada.
"With the experience of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and
Nicaragua, the United States had established military intervention as a
standard political procedure in its neighboring states. In all cases the modus
operandi and the rationale were the same."24
^Franklin W. Knight, The Caribbean, (New York: Oxford University Press, NY 1978) Page 182.
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practical purposes elected to revise the practice.
TT* Eastern Caribbean reiative siience on the invasion of Panama, and other
United States agression against other third worid countries, indicate that the regions
foreign policy goals are based on economic and poiitica, security. Ideologically thcy
support the idea, of democracy and as a resuh have no, seen i, prude„t to question
United States actions in states like Panama. Other regional scholars take a less
flattering analysis of their policy and conclude that given the size and resource
limitations of these states, and their dependence on the United States for economic aid,
•hey have no choice bu, to support any action that the United States may take against
other state, This argument, of course, can be applied to a large number of developing
states who need United States assistance.
In the Eastern Caribbean region, political leaders foreign policy objectives are not
inconsistent with their domestic policies. We have established that the underlying goal
for every ruling political party in the Eastern Caribbean is to remain in power. To
accomplish that goal within the context of a foreign policy, would require that the
relations established with other nations, be able to provide military security for
maintaining power, and economic assistance for distributing patronage. The United
States is capable of providing both of those objectives. Therefore, as far as the Eastern
Caribbean is concerned the policy seems to be "what is good for the United States is
good for the Eastern Caribbean".
In addU.cn to the United States, Caribbean foreign policy bas been directed
Soutb Korea, the Peoples' Republic of China, Venezueia, and other Latin American
countries have over the ,as. five years estabiished good workmg relafions with the
region. Most of these states have estabiished embassies in the Eastern Caribbean The
on,y Eastern Caribbean states to estabiish dipiomatic reiations with an Eastern bioc state
was Grenada. Since
,983, however, Grenada, has been back within the United States
sphere of influence and relations with the Soviets have been broken.
Caribbean foreign policy choices have been circumscribed. The extent of the
regions dependence on Western powers for their economic survival basically dictates
.heir foreign policies. Bu, fa simplifying those relationships, one may tend to overlook
the regions hard anticommunist ideological positions. The entire region is strongly
anticommunist. For example, in the mid eighties, Eastern Caribbean governments
refused to hire returning students from Cuba, who had been trained, in much needed
areas related to health, agriculture, sports and education. These students had initially
accepted Cuban Governments educational scholarship to train in the various educational
disciplines. Students from Antigua, Grenada, Dominica and St. Vincent in particular
went to Cuba without much protest from their governments. However, after graduation,
the students returned to a hostile environment. Government and the private sector
refused to employ these graduates. The consensus among the political and economic
elites was that these graduates represented a threat to the stability of the community. It
was felt that these graduates would somehow coerce their colleagues and other workers
to become "communist". The government of St. Vincent appeared to be the only
government willing to employ those graduates.
TU- . 1101*-
-communist hysteria „ pemsive caribbean sodety ^ sQme^
of .he region, anticommunist semimem „ as h . h ^^ much comparaWe to ^^
states of the United States.
In the Caribbean the popular understanding of socialism and command is
and is based primari, on information provided by ,be United States and the
total ,ack of understanding and thus a deep seated fear of the sociaiis, ideology.
, as.ed
suceessfully adopted in their state. In every state the answer was in the negative.
The Caribbean peopie have over the years since World War II equated communism
with slavery. Western propaganda have convinced them that communism is repressive
and the psychoiogical scars left on the population by a brutal histoty of slavery and
colonialism have no, heiped the socialist cause. The result is the development of a
people whose resoive is to remain free, by any means necessary. To them communism is
not freedom, Caribbean democracy is.
The United States represents to the Caribbean people the citadel of freedom.
Real or imagined, they believe, for instance, that the Soviets are the "evil empire" and
that the United States is not. As a result, Caribbean governments tend to support
United States actions around the globe, under any circumstances. For instance, they
supported the mining of Nicaragua's harbor, the invasion of Grenada, the bombing of
Libya, and during the Reagan administration some of the Eastern Caribbean
governments supported most of his right wing positions in foreign policy.
™ere is no complcx dimemion (o ,hc Eas[ern carjbbcan ,s forejgn^ ^
»- are pro-United^ lhey funclion as j[s satemtes ^ h responsiWe fw
secure In lhe process of
,^ ^^^
leaders various co„sidera tions of foreign policy alternatives. J* ge„era , response from
had any interest In toms of exploring econoraic Nations with other developing s(a(es
Caribbean ieaders felt that the United States could provide everything that other
developing states cou,d, including markets for products and technical assistance. Given
.hat kind of thinking among the ieadership of the region, I beiieve tha, the region's
foreign policy will continue to be closely linked with United States foreign policy
initiatives.
L Parliament and the Constitution
What impact these Caribbean states may lack within the international system they
more than make up for in the governance of their own states. Armed with a
constitution which distinguishes them from one party oligarchies, the new Caribbean
leaders have been able to use that constitution efficiently to achieve their political goal,
In most states government goals are not at all complicated. The overriding objective
seems to be centered on remaining in power. Under Crown Colony, the colonialist,
seemed to remain in power indefinitely. The new Caribbean leaders have been equally
astute at doing the same. A review of the political history of the Caribbean since
universal franchise will indicate that the governments have used every legal strategy to
remain in power as long as they legally and possibly can. The various national
constitutions have provided them with the legal apparatus to maximize these objectives.
allow
-O-e cons,u[ion of the sovere . „ stai£s Qf^ Eas(ern carjbbean^ ^^
* - Bri tish Oovernmen, and handed down tQ (he loca , govemmems i( Ms ho_r
<o strong* address issues concerning „uman rights
, separaljon Qf^ ^ ^«„ of cnurcH and state
. Secions concerning those fu„damen[al rights and
f-Conrs are vague and ambiguous
,„ the ^^^^
00) of .he S, Vincen, Cons t itutio„ of 1979
, under the cap(ion ^ ^
Expression, the following is stated:
10
'
0) ES? .With ? °Wn C°nSent ' 3 Person« not behindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expressionncludmg freedom to hold opinions without interfereTefreedom to receive ideas and information without
Tene aflv
n
or to^^ ^ C°mmunication be to the publicg erally o any person or class of persons) andfreedom from interference with his correspondence.
But in the same chapter, the following is also stated:
(2)
s
N
ha!l be uT!
n
t "
°r d°ne UndCr the aUth°rity of »y lawl held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this
section to the extent that the law in question makes proton -
(a) that is reasonable required in the interests of defense
public safety, public safety, public order, public
morality or public health;
(b) that is reasonable required for the purpose for the
protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of
other persons or the private lives of persons
concerned in legal proceedings, preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence,
maintaining the authority and independence of the
courts or regulating the technical administration or
the technical operation of telephone, telegraphy,
posts, wireless broadcasting or television; or...
Notwithstanding, the fact that subsection (1) of the above guarantees constitutional
protection. Governments of the Eastern Caribbean (including that of St. Vincent) own
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censor
and control the broadcasting apparatus and the radjo^ ^ ^
Domi„ica, the radio static functions as anB of^^^ ^
news, programs
,
songs and any mher form Qf expressjon (ha( theif^^
government) in an unfavorable light.
To dose an opposition newspaper or deny permission for the opposition to ho,d
pubiie meetings,
,hey simply i„voke that subsection of the constitution which allows them
to do that. Normally, when they shut down a paper or sanction an article, it is
to governments power and process in the constitution denotes a preoccupation by the
British with the question of legitimacy of government rather ,han constitutional
guarantees of freedom for people. As a result, governments and politicians in many of
.he islands have been able to utilize the document to pass laws which frequently violate
basic human rights, are vindictive and would be considered barbaric if enacted in the
United Kingdom. Capital punishment for instance is currently banned in England, but in
the Eastern Caribbean criminals are routinely hanged by government.
In Chapter I, Section (1) of the constitution of St. Vincent it reads:
1. "No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally saving execution
of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offense under any
law of which he has been convicted."25
It would seem that as long as the process of enacting the law is legitimate, the
constitutionality of the law is met. As a result, any outrageous bill introduced in
parliament will become law. The intent of the law seems to be irrelevant in the whole
^mcm?w8°
P
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& ^" C<!"' Cons'in"ion fPrinled % <*« Government Primer,, St.
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scheme of thlng, h November 1974 (he governmem rf DQminica^ a ^
he
-Prohibited and Uniawfu, Societies and Association Act.- Section (9) of this Act
which deals with the protection of dwelling houses states:
9. "No proceedings, either criminal or civil shall be brought and
mamtatned against any person who kills or injures any member of an
assoctatton or society designated unlawful who shall be found a. any
time of day or night inside a dwelling house."**
This law was aimed at eradicating a group called "Dreads" or "Rasta" who were
characterized by the length and style of their hair. They were also young people who
essentially advocated a misdirected ideology - combining socialist teaching with a
Utopian philosophy, but at the same time were involved in petty crimes. The
government reacted promptly. The law essentially gave homeowners the right to shoo,
any of these dreads should they be found near or in a persons home for whatever
reason. In talking with Dominica's Chief Prosecutor Julian N. Johnson about the
constitutionality of the law, he pointed out that the law was constitutional because i, had
been properly enacted.
In all of the Eastern Caribbean Islands, there are laws which violate basic human
rights; laws enacted to benefit specific individuals; laws that in general would not meet
the legal standards of most modern democracies. It appears that in writing the
constitution for the various states, the British Government was concerned with the
question of political stability, and the final version of the constitution reflects that
concern. Following independence, Britain continued to maintain responsibility for the
26Published in Dominica Official Gazette (December 1974).
islands' defenses and was a,so responsib,e in the carry stages for major economic
noU, conps or conntercoups would resuU in major economic expenditure for Britain
On the other hand, a stahie government in the Caribbean meant less poiitica, strife and
a reduction
,„ the need for economic assistance. fc British fe,t that a constitution
which allowed the rulers broad powers was the most appropriate.
The constitution which represents the instrument granting independence from
Britain is so loosely written that i, allows the leaders of the country unbridled authority.
Britain has an unwritten constitution which has worked effectively over the centuries and
which rehes heavily on the ethics, training and culture of British politicians to maintain a
balanced and stable government. In putting together a constitution for the newly
independent state the British also relied heavily on the pas. colonial structure that they
had utilized in governing the region, not understanding that the "Actors" had changed.
The rulers would no longer be career British Civil Servants, but the descendants of
former slaves who had experienced a long history of oppression themselves. A
constitution without adequate checks and balances was most likely to result in abuse.
Caribbean scholars like Blackman have written extensively on the issue.
"The informal conventions of the unwritten British Constitution, which protect
against arbitrary government, did not travel well across the Atlantic. Without
the formal checks and balances of a U.S.A. type constitution, rights of
opposition parties, civil service independence, the electoral process, media
rights etc. are most vulnerable at the hands of charismatic and long serving
prime ministers who become more imperial as their tenure of office
proceeds."27
"Courtney N. Blackman, "Agony of the Little Eight Revisited; Caribbean Affairs No 3 (July
September 1989) Page 64. "
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™ose proposed reform, varied dramatically based on whether the poiitician was an
X
'"''
"'
W 'K'"K'r ™ "*« The opposition party of Antigua
(UNDP), for instance, is advocating
, eons tionai amendment which w d li
Prime minfeter to just two terms in office. This amendment was echoed by Edison
I«es, Political Leader of the United Worker, Party of Dominica; by J, , „„„ lc
,
Leader of Che St Lucia Labor Parry (currently the opposition party). The Dominica
Labor Party did no, indicate any support lor such an amendment, nor did the St. Ki„ s
Labor Party. The leader of the St. Kitts Labor Party however, told me that he would
support such an amendment.
The opposition parties .end to support such a constitutional amendment because it
would allow them to break .he hold thai incumbency plays in national elections; and feel
strongly that they would he able to delea. .he ruling party if i.s leader could only serve
.wo terms. Par.y politics in .he Caribbean evolve around charismatic leaders. Eugenia
diaries of Dominica; V.C Bird of Antigua; and Mitchell of Si. Vincent are all
e xamples of leaders who can galvanize .he population to support (heir parly and vole for
any representatives that .he par.y endorses. The opposition believes .hat if these leaders
were not eligible lor office after two terms, .he ruling parly would become vulnerable
and could be defeated in subsequent elections.
,™ amendment. They did
,
h„, fee| lha( constitmion^ cha^ ^
_
readmgs should be eliminaled
. [( fc my ^^^^ ^
*- minislers
, that the ronstitutional reform th£y^ wouid b£^^
The spirit of the current eo„stitution allows
such^^ ^^ ^
with the ruling parties.
The co„slilu tion of the independent Windward & Leeward Islands is very simiiar
They eover a„ the symbolic apparatus of a democracy, but concentrate power in one
individual
-
the prime minister. The Windward Islands are Grenada, St. Vincent, St.
Lucia and Dominica. They are al, independent countries. The Leeward Islands include
Antigua, St. Kitts/Nevis, Montserrat and Anguilla. Of these only Antigua and St.
Kitts/Nevis are independent. The constitution of those countries establishes a period of
five years as a term of office for any successful political party, which guarantees enough
time to stabilize and consolidate power. I, affords the prime minister broad and
sweeping powers which accounts for the abuse of that power by prime ministers such as
Eric Gairy of Grenada between 1956-1979 and Patrick John of Dominica 1970-1979.
The abuse stems from the fact that the constitution does not provide for any separation
of powers
-
the prime minister functions as chief executive in spite of the presence of a
governor or president. He also controls the legislature since he is responsible for the
appointment of members of the House of Parliament. Those appointees in essence are
his Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries and are extremely loyal to the office.
The sys[em of gover„ment h slructure is^ ^^ ^
The co„stitulio„ provides for [he party wi(h majority of eiec(ed candida(es ta ^
genera, eleci.on to form the government.
minority party (those^ fcwcr^
candies) becomes the oPPositio„ party in governmem a„d ar£^ ^^ _ ^
empowered to appoint ministers frora (he winning candidates ^^ fa ^^
(Figure 2, It a,so gives them the power to oust members from the ,egislature and
reP.ace them with party members who are more supportive of their program,
Consequents it is possible under the current constitution for citizens of the state to be
represented in government by individuals who were not elected. In addition to elected
members of the House of Parliament, the prime minister is empowered to appoint
senators to par.iament. One of these appointed senators must come from the opposition
party and must be recommended by the leader of the opposition.
In any given Parliament within the Eastern Caribbean model, one will find a
"Rubber Stamp" parliament. The proceedings in the House of Parliament have been
described by the voters as entertaining. When the prime minister introduces a bill, the
minority opposition will generally argue against the bill (irrelevant of the scope or
interest of the bill). The opposition will generally be defeated by a majority voice vote
and the bill will become law. Unlike Western democratic models, it is considered political
suicide for members of the ruling party to oppose a bill introduced by the prime minister
or the party. It, therefore, is not uncommon to find members of parliament supporting
legislation that is unfavorable to their constituents. The parties position and that of the
prime minister must be always supported. Since independence, every minister of
governme„t or member of parliament who has voled agajns
, ^^^
Another major deviation from Westem ^ rQie ^^^^
president I„ most of the islands> fa^ rf^^ _
^ a gover„or. (Except in Dominica
, where ^ ^ „^^^
itself a republic). The president, however serve, th. c r •
,
n ver, s the same function as a governor Thi
position „ ,argely symbolic Chapler w Seclion (5g) Qf mmtkuiion ^ ^
execute authority of Dom i nica is vested in (he presidenL Sect ,on (59) Qf Chapicr ]y
the president..." The irony and seemingly puzzling aspec( of the process . ^ fa
Chapter II of the same constitution, Section (18) states, "There shall be a president of
Dominica who sha„ be elected by the House and shall hold office for a term of five
years..." Now since the prime minister is the leader of the House of Parliament and is
able to fire the entire house except the minority opposition; nobody questions his
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S^^S^f^EL (A) DOMINICA
Majority Party is Elected
Leader of that Party Nominated for Prime Minister
Prime Minister
President Appointed (by Prime Minister)
President Confirms the Nominated Member (who appointed him) as Prime Minister
Prime Minister also...
a) appoints his cabinet
b) elects a speaker
c) appoints senators
In all these appointments by the Prime Minister - the constitution allows for theW th™ t0v 3 V°te °n thC nomination ' however, that vote is a simple formality.Since he ru mg party ,s m total control of government and has all the votes necessary to
FIGURE 2
Formation of Government
n0mina,CS
aPPO 'ntS 3
—*-- around according 1o
COnS 'itU,i0n
^ "**— ^~ t The president
—o, this indi,dual „ responsMe for d£daring a „sta(e ^ £mw ^
advce of the prirac minisler
, ^^^^ ^ ^^ ^
loyal.
In Domi„ica model cause. major national problem, In 1979
, the Pa(rick John
Woodless coup. They force. government ministers including the presiden
, ,o^ ^
of the night. The P,an was ,o have this new presiden, declare a state of emergency
enabling Patrick John to utihze his secret private army to reinstate his government. The
attempt failed because a mob attacked the home of the proposed new president and
forced him to turn down Mr. John.
In St. Vincent in 1989. the prime minister fired the governor because he supported
.he opposition party (SVGLP) which had been defeated at the polls 21-0 by agreeing to
appoint a non-elected opposition in Parliament. After their defeat in the national
elections, the SVGLP had asked the governor to appoint an opposition council to
parliament since none had been elected. The winning party (NOP) on the other hand,
argued that the constitution did not provide for the appointment of an opposition to
parliament. The governor appeared to waiver on the issue and indicated that he was
inclined to support the SVGLP position. He was fired and replaced with a governor
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^ t ,me in the history of st. Vmcent
, lhere is no opposhion m parhamcnt^ ^
Nat.ona, Democratic Party (NDP) is . re|atjvc|y^^ ^ ^^^^
But the constitution a,,owS him to govern withou( a„ ^ ^
vagueness of the constitution has nonetheiess aiiowed for a potentially dangerous
trust in e,ected officials. ,„ smaI1 nation sta[es
_
^^^ be
Political events in Grenada from 1979-83 are a vivid reminder of the kind of
development that tota, adherence to the constitution can generate. Eric Gairy had
estabhshed a virtual dictatorship in Grenada, he used his incumbency to manipulate
voters through patronage and violence in order ,o remain in powe, During the emire
period of terror by the Gairy regime, the population of Grenada had no constitutional
help to bring him down. The Grenada constitution, like the others in the Eastern
Caribbean placed total power in the hands of the prime minister. There is always the
risk that the individual who becomes prime minister may be a despot. Eric Gairy proved
to be such an individual and the people of Grenada spent over a decade attempting to
remove him from office through the constitutional and institutional process. It took
mass mobilization of the people and violence in the streets of Grenada to topple him.
Throughout the history of the region, the Caribbean people have demonstrated a
capacity to seek solutions to their political problems through existing political institul
But when all else failed, they have also resorted to mob violence as a mechanism for
bringing about change. The riots of the 1930s and the ouster of both Patrick John in
ions.
been able to work around [he constitution to bring dow„ ^ ^
m some ki„d of constitu(io„a, reform that would resu,, h more checks and ba|anccs
However, poUtica, leaders have demonstrated no moveraent towards
reform. The poHtical institutions that are current,, i„ p ,aCe have generally setved to
maintain a relative,, stable soeiety i„ the region. For a peopie who have endured a
history that included a prolonged period of slavery, and decades of colonia, domination,
the Caribbean people have come to depend on the established political institutions as a
viable mechanism for bringing about change. The institutions themselves within the
context of those micro states have been the guiding force towards modernity. But in the
post independent era these political institutions have become even more important in
maintaining stability in modern day Caribbean. The various political institutions that
were introduced by the British to maintain control over the Africans, have now been
used to establish governments and societies that represent, perhaps one of the most
stable regions of the Third World.
CHAPTER III
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Theones on modernization are so comp|ex ,„„ (q § ^
of d,ffere„ t modernizing societies wou|d requjre a separa(c dissertmion ^
Easter
„
Cancan are generally no, considered to be modernizing sta[es
, , am not sure
whether the theories wou,d be significantly relevant
,Q ^ subject ^ ,^^
that there is room in the theories to allow the Eastern Caribbean micro sta ,es to be
categorized as modernizing s,a tes, within the broad framework advanced by
modernization scholars. The Eastern Caribbean represents a specia, bu, significant
variation on the theory of modernization, and compounds attempts to formulate a
precise definition of what a modernizing country is.
Modernization has been defined as the social and economic transformation that
bring about the breakdown of the traditional society and the emergence of the industrial
society. It has also been defined as that process by which historical,, evolved institutions
are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect unprecedented increase in
man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the
scientific revolution.- Blacks definition focuses on the industrial development aspect of
modernity and represents the school that considers modernization as the change from
feudal traditional society to industrial societies. For these western scholars the United
States and the United Kingdom are the foremost examples of countries that have
modernized.
]G.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (Harper, NY 1966) Page 7.
Samuel Huntington takes a broader perspective on the issue. He tends to combine
modernization and poiiticai development within the same parameter. For him
modernization invoives (a) the rationaiization of authority. lhe repiacemen, of a iarge
number of traditional authorities, by a single secular, nationa! political authority, (b) the
differentia! of new poHtica, functions and the development of specialised structures to
perform these functions and (c) increased participation in politics by social groups
throughout the society* S.N. Eisenstad, takes a more systemic view of modernisation
and focuses on the political component Ho suggests that political modernisation is
characterised by factors such as the continued spread of power ,o various groups in
society, and the corresponding increase in the democratization process*
Given the various existing scholarly perspectives and definition of political
modernisation, it is difficult to categorise accurately the political developmental stage of
the Eastern Caribbean in the 1990s.
On the other hand, a study of the Eastern Caribbean political model would not be
complete unless we examined the level of political development that has occurred in the
region. Since universal adult suffrage was granted, the major questions that seem to
confront scholars describing the Caribbean model is how do we define the system? Is it
a modernizing system or is it traditional? If we accept the view that legitimacy and
political stability are the foundations of modern society, then we must admit that the
Eastern Caribbean can be defined as a non-industrial modernizing society. Some
scholars may disagree with the attempts at simplifying the characteristics of modernity;
2Huntington, Political Order in Chanting Societies. Page 34.
3S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protect and Change (Prentice Hall, CA 1966) Page 4.
•he traditionalist may arguc for jnslancc (hat caribfecan s<Kic|ym manjfest^ ^
primitive behaviors, primi[ive wilhin [hc„ rf_^^
countries.
For i„slance they wo„,d argue tha, there are stMI repressive ,aws in the society
capita, punishment remains the sentence of choice for major crimes. Certainiy i, is
conceivable that if we were to a„a,y2e the Caribbean mode, using the variab,es and
characteristics of the great socia, theorist like Durkheim or Henty Sumner Maine we
may have to define Caribbean society as perhaps u„deve,oped. Bu, such is not the case.
The Caribbean politico, model is a highiy efficient and stabie system which places the
same value on representative government, and maintains the same level of political
stability as Western advanced industrial states. Apter suggests that
-Democratic
representative government is clearly an appropriate means by which highly complex and
advanced industrial societies have solved serious and perplexing social and moral
problems and that it has been... a dramatic achievement in the West to devise suitable
mechanisms of resolving the twin political problems that all governments encounter:
orderly change and peaceful succession in office- Since achieving universal franchise,
the Caribbean people have exercised their right to vote, and used elections as the
preferred mechanism for the peaceful changing of governments. Aptcr's criteria does
make it possible to include the Eastern Caribbean into the ranks of modernizing nations.
To do this, we would have to narrow the definition to include those aspects that focus
on national political stability.
4David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press IL
1965) Page 1
ft may no,, however, be necessary to redefine modernization because
. win ,rgue
tha, ,he various definition, advanced by scholars
,ikc Huntington and Eisenstad. renders
-he theory on modernization convex and hroad enough, to alto* tor the inclusion of
difrerent
.systems and subsystems. For instance, the
.iterature indicates that in advanced
western industrial societies, inventors and indus.ria.ists and their technological inventions,
were the modernising symbois and catalysts tha, moved those societies to modernity. ,„
new modernising nonindustrial societies like the eastern Caribbean, there are no
inventors and industrialists, but the politicians, intellectuals, and social leaders have
become the modernizing symbols.
Apter supports that argument when he suggests that "modernization may be
described in nonindustrial societies as the transposition of certain roles professional,
technical, administrative and the transposition of institutions supporting these roles -
hospitals, schools, universities, bureaucracies.^ He goes on to say that in those societies
also social organizations arc chaotic and that politics becomes the mechanism of
integration.6
Politics is definitely an integrating factor in Eastern Caribbean society, it is the
mechanism by which different subgroups within that society share in the management
and welfare of the state without violence. Two factors contribute to the cohesive,
efficient, and organized method for sharing power among Eastern Caribbean people.
The first is the establishment of effective political institutions and the second is the
absence of major ethnic cleavages within the society.
sDavid E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization. Page 42.
6David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization. Page 52.
The existence of stable poMcal institution in particular „ cenlra| lo oyr
.hat the Eastern Caribbean mus t be recognized as a non-econotnic. „o„,„duslrializcd
modernizing sociely
,
while the ^y^ ^^^ ^
poiitica, stabuity, a high ,eve, of ,i,eracy
, and some econom|, grQW[h compels ^ tQ
categorize and define tbe Eastern Caribbean sta,es as Modernizing" state, To conciude
our argument for defining those states as "modernizing" we may need to look a , the
evidence that have calapu,ted the re,a,ive,y new nations of the Eastern Caribbean into
the ranks of modernizing nations. The evidence, and fundament., mechanisms
responsible for moving the Caribbean states so rapidly towards modernity has to be
British Colonialism. Modernizing theorists have recognized the influence of colonial
powers on the modernizing process. Apter for instance, says that...
"Colonialism at its
best has been one very useful mechanism for modernizing."' Colonialism as an effective
mechanism for modernizing has not been universally successful, as evidenced in the new
states of Africa. But in the Eastern Caribbean the modernizing process has worked
remarkably well. We discussed in Chapter 2 the various stages of political development
that the Caribbean went through on their road to independence. Throughout the entire
process the British were there to guide the African descendants through the stages from
Crown colony to limited self government, to associated statehood, to independence.
As the Caribbean went through those political developmental phases, the value of
political institutions was emphasized by the British. As a result of this "British
indoctrination" the Caribbean have remained stable in their political framework while
they are simultaneously slowly changing their social structure. In the remainder of this
7David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization. Page 52.
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some
chapter we wi„ examine those pohtica. i„stitutions
. In so doing w£
we„ entrenched characteristic of a modernizing society, we will also identify some
traditional and cuhura, values of the society which cumulatively contribute to the
structure of the Eastern Caribbean Pohtica, mode,. The mode, is certain.y a complex
one, ye, i, is a legitimate system, and one which appears to meet the needs of the
Caribbean people. However, it is by no means perfect and like every other system has
potential for abuse.
B. Power and Legitimnry
In January 1989, the United National Democratic Party of Antigua (UNDP)
requested permission from the Antigua Police to hold a political rally in St. Johns on the
evening of January 19. Hours before the meeting was scheduled to begin, police
informed the party that permission had been denied.
When I spoke to the leader of the opposition about the event, Dr. Ivor Heath, he
told me that the police gave no reasons for the denial. Dr. Heath said he was
convinced that the police had acted on instructions from the government which he
claimed, consistently engage in abuse of its power. He charged that the opposition
parties in Antigua were also being denied access to the local broadcast media, namely,
the State owned ABS radio and television.
This event is significant, mainly because it focuses on one of the contradictions
inherent in the Caribbean model of democracy. The majority of scholars agree that one
of the most fundamental aspects of a democracy are its political institutions. In the
Caribbean all the political institutions are present. Political parties, elections, a
legislature, a judiciary are all in place. Yet there is a significant difference between how
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these i„s(itutions function in Wes(ern democrades th£y^ jn ^^
Caribbean. ,n the Antigua case, the leader of .be opposition characterizes the
Government's denia, of permission for his parry to hold a meeting as abuse of
Governmenta, power. However, given the structure and customary operation of
government in the Eastern Caribbean, that characterization is a, best arguabie. In
conversations with the government officials who are members of the Antigua Labor
Party about the even,, they indicated to me tha, they perceived the request to hold a
meeting in the same area in which their own party had planned to meet, to be an
attempt by the opposition UNDP to destabilize their power base. The ALP, therefore,
decided to deny the request. What is important to note here is that legally the
government reserves the right to deny the permit. Tnere is nothing in the Antigua
Constitution nor any existing legislation that prevents the ruling party from exercising
that right.
In Dominica, the ruling Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) voted to eliminate public
broadcast of its parliamentary sessions because the leader of the opposition was using
the available media for campaigning and making speeches that were not favorable to the
government position. In what seemed to be effective political strategy the Government
had the sessions taped and would only air the excerpts that were politically advantageous
to their cause. Abuse of power? From a purely theoretical perspective it can be argued
that such practices amount to some abuse of power, and lack of equal opportunity to
opposition parties. But in small states, such as those Eastern Caribbean islands, the
power of the ruling parties seems limitless and the constitution does not offer adequate
checks or balances to prevent government abuse.
A major variable which impacts the political and governmental system of the
Caribbean is its size. Because of these micro states small population, political leaders
exhibit a capacity to retain minute detail about the country. They are familiar with
every personality in their constituencies. Through their various party networks, they
accumulate a great deal of persona, information on voters. As a resu,t, their decision
making process becomes extremely subjective. Sir Arthur Lewis contends that "In a
small island of 50,000 or 100,000 people, dominated by a single political party, it is very
difficult to prevent political abuse. Everybody depends on the Government for
something, however, small, so most are reluctant to offend it... The civil servants live in
fear: the police avoid unpleasantness, the trade unions are tied to the party; the
newspaper depends on government advertisements; and so on."8
This observation represents one of the most important variables which distinguishes
the Caribbean model of "democracy" from that of the west. Size more than any other
variable has a tremendous impact on the political process. That the Caribbean states
have been able to maintain a relatively stable society over the last 25 years is testimony
not to the system, but to the people of the Caribbean. Citizens of the region exhibit a
high regard for law and the legitimacy of government.
As societies move to modernize, they must by necessity embrace those political
institutions which will guarantee stability and ensure a democratic process of government.
For theorist like Lipset democracy should be the only workable system to achieve
modernity. The Eastern Caribbean islands did not experience a prolonged development
stage to modernism; i.e. they did not move from a traditional tribal or communal system
9
^Arthur Lewis, The Agony of the Eight. (Barbados: Advocate Printer, West Indies 1965) Page
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-o moderni ly
.
The change for Caribbean natives waS sudden, and may even he
ca.egori.ed as revolutionary. After emancipation the Caribhean native continued to be
ruled by the coionialist. Before
,951, they took no active par, in the governing of their
country and acquired no skill or expertise in managing the source of the country.
All political institutions in the Eastern Caribbean were developed and maintained
by the British colonialist. Parliament was composed of the British planter class who
grew sugar cane on the islands and there were no political parties before adult suffrage.
Universal franchise came to islands in February 195! when Barbados firs, received that
honor; then Antigua, December 1, 1951; St. Vincent on May 5, 1951; Grenada June 16,
1951; Dominica, July 16, 1951; St. Lucia 1951; St. Kitts/Nevis, Anguilla May 1952; and
Montserrat on January 30, 1952. Before adult suffrage, interested colonialists who
wanted to be in government would simply put their names on the ballot, together with a
deposit to the government treasury of 20 pounds sterling. Most of the officials would be
elected uncontested by their peers. Interest and participation in government among the
colonialists was generally low. Most colonialists were businessmen and were more
interested in producing sugar than being a member of a small parliament, which was
essentially a rubber stamp for the British representative who was either a governor as in
the case of Barbados, or an administrator for most of the other Eastern Caribbean
Islands.
In describing the Crown Colony System under the British, Morley Ayearst points
out that "it should be noted further that this society was an acquisition one, devoted
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one in
almost exclusively to mnnetn™ „.,;„y o etary gam, unconcerned with local cultural mailers and
which none of its institutions was organized democratically".'
During the Crown Colony period, political institutions were in place. The proh.em
however, was that these institutions did no, function very democratically. As indicated
earlier, power was concentrated in the hands of the Governor who made ,., political
decisions. The Planter class on the other hand were no, overly dis.urhcd hy the mode,
since they had no real interest in governing. The system was informal enough to alio*
them ,o ge, ,heir political needs me, over cocktails a, the Governors house. On the
other hand the system which was democratic in concept only, allowed very few freedoms
for the Africans.
This governmental model persisted unchanged throughout the Crown Colony
period. British historians will argue in retrospect that this selective form of democracy
was a necessary stage in the political evolutionary process of colonialism. And further,
that in a system where the colonists were in the minority, such non-democratic rule was
essential. The lesson learned hy the Africans from this initial period of institutional rule,
however seems to indicate that some abuse is not had. Eastern Caribbean political
leaders believe that as long as the institutions are in place, one may be allowed to bend
the rules a little. In today's Eastern Caribbean model, one will find that politicians and
modernizers adhere very strictly to the processes of the institutions. They are not,
however, beyond using the established systems for personal goals. Generally, they see
no problem in using the power and authority provided by those institutions, to reach
their objective whether it be personal or national.
9Morley Ayearst, Characteristics of West Indian Political Parties. Page 189.
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For Caribbean politicians the power bestowed npon then, by virtue of the eiectora,
proeess is ,egi,imate and they seem unab,e to differentiate their official power and roie
from that of their unofficial and personal life.
But since conflict is ubiquitous, and frustrations are persistent among subgroups in
modernizing societies, the stability and order of the society depends to a significant
extent on both the structure of the political institutions, and the leaders ability to use
those institutions for accommodating and regulating conflicts. In the Eastern Caribbean
model, the Governments have been able to use the existing political institutions to do
just that, they have also used them to extend their term in office. They have been able
occasionally to control the media and eliminate opposing views, but they have also
managed to avoid civil war, coups, or violent acts which can destabilize the society. I,
would seem that Caribbean people have unconsciously or consciously decided that
prolonged political stability is a fair trade off for the occasional unpleasantness of
sporadic use of autocratic and personal power by elected government officials.
Institutionahsts have claimed that in order for modernizing societies to enjoy political
stability, they must establish political parties, and that states with multiparty systems will
more likely be democratic. For western theorists this is of course the preferred system.
In the Eastern Caribbean, political parties began to emerge immediately after adult
suffrage and by 1989, there were 21 active political parties in the seven states of the
Eastern Caribbean. (Table 3)
C. Political Parlies
The Eastern Caribbean represents a region of the Third World where electoral
rivalry and competition among political parties remains viable. Modernizing states in
•heir recen, history in lhe of on£^^ ^^
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TABLE 3
THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES
POLITICAL PARTIES
STATE
Antigua/
Barbuda
POLITICAL PARTIES
Antigua Labor Party (ALP)
United National Democratic Party (UNDP)
Progressive Labor Movement (PLM)
Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM)
TERMS IN
OFFICE
6
1
YEARS IN OFFICE
1951-1971, 1976 to present
1971-1976
Dominica Dominica Labor Party (DLP)
Dominica Freedom Party (DFP)
United Workers Party (UWP)
1961-1979
1980-Present
Grenada Grenada United Labor Party (GULP)
National Democratic Congress (NDC)
New National Party (NNP)
Grenada National Party (GNP)
New Jewel Movement (NJM)
1951-57, 1961-62, 1967-1979
1990
1983-1990
1957, 1961, 1962-67
1979-1983
Montserrat Montserrat Labor Party (MLP)
Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)
People's Liberation Movement (PLM)
1952-1970
1970-1978
1978
St. Kitts/Nevis St. Kitts Labor Party (SKLP)
People's Action Movement (PAM)
1952-1980
1980-Present
St. Lucia St. Lucia Labor Party (SLP)
United Workers Party (UWP)
1951-1964, 1979-1982
1964-1979, 1982
St. Vincent & 8th Army
Grenadines Independents
People's Political Party (PPP)
St. Vincent Labor Party (SVLP)
New Democratic Party (NDP)
1951-1954
1954-1957
1957-1967
1967-1972, 1974-1979
1979-Present
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system. In the Eastern Caribbean however, open e,ec (ora, competition has been the
prevailing mode for airing and transferring pohtica, power, and the poiitica, party has
become the i„s ,itutiona
, vehicle for movjng jndividua|s^^ ^ ^
those states.
Since 1951, national elections have been held according to the constitution in every
state of the Eastern Caribbean. The citizens of Antigua, Grenada, Dominica, St.
Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Montserrat have gone to the polls sixty times to
elect official, In every state more than one political party has contested every national
election. These former British colonies have been strongly influenced by the
British/Western model of democracy and its "party systems". By 1952, each Caribbean
island had adopted the British Party System, as a logical mechanism for contesting the
electoral process. The party system has proved to be an efficient and simple mechanism
for maintaining political stability in the society and has been effective in maintaining
voter interests in the electoral process. Yet these political parties except the now
defunct New Jewel Movement of Grenada, did not emerge out of any deep
philosophical or ideological base. In the early days there was a distinct absence of any
real political ideology among them. The parties were derived from trade unions which
were formed as the result of labor unrest in the region during the 1920s. The trade
unions were patterned after the British, and were fairly successful in getting some of the
worker's demands met. The Moyne Commission report released after the war had
encouraged the British Colonial Office to allow the operation of unions in the colonies,
since union activities were actively being encouraged in the United Kingdom in the
1930s. The Eastern Caribbean leaders took advantage of the opportunity to organize.
The workers were excited about the power of unions and by 1951, most of the unions
tion is
more
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had developed political parties out of their membership base. It is no coincidence that
every state in the Eastern Caribbean has a "labor party". This "labor" categorizati
symbolic of their historical roots. Over the years the labor parties have become
middle class and have alienated a significant percentage of the workers, who were their
initial supporters. Over the last decade, the Dominica Labor Party (DLP), the Grenada
United Labor Party (GULP), the St. Kitts/Nevis Labor Party (SKLP) and the St. Lucia
Labor Party (SLP) have all lost power to more broad based parties.
One of these is the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP), a party with a middle class
base which was able to attract a cross section of the working class constituency from the
labor party. The political ideology is basically moderate, although the leader of the
party, Eugenia Charles, is very conservative and has been likened to Margaret Thatcher
by the local voters. The other party is the People's Action Movement (PAM) of St.
Kitts which was able to break a stronghold on Labor Party domination in 1980. Before
that, the SKLP had been in power from 1952-1980. The PAM is led by a group of
modernizing elites including a physician and attorney. They, too, are a moderate party.
There is no empirical data available in the Eastern Caribbean that could
conclusively support a theory that would explain the decline of the popularity of the
various labor parties, but the decline has been significant. Between 1950 and 1960, the
union based parties won 80% of all elections. Between 1960 and 1970, that number fell
to 68%. Between 1970-80 they had won only 56% of the elections and in the 1980s,
only one party the ALP in Antigua had won consistently, bringing the percentage to a
mere 14% overall.
My research into this decline through interviews with party members and leaders
indicated that the social base of each labor party varies markedly. In Dominica, for
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instance, the labor party began as a purely working Cass party. They had the support of
the Waterfront and Allied Workers Union (WAWU), the most powerfu, union in the
state, and they had the support of the farmers and peasants who were well represented
among the party leadership. Representatives from these groups were within the top
echelons of the party hierarchy. Consequently, from 1961, they were winning every
national and city council election which they contested and the membership remained
relatively constant. In the 1970s, they opened up the party to the middle class elite,
These new elites (as seems typical of modernizers) came into the party and immediately
began to advocate ideological and strategic change. The party supporters seemed
confused. On one hand, the party was advocating land reform, which alienated some of
the farmers with larger plots of land, on the other hand the agro-proletarians and small
farmers, who were not particularly interested in farming small plots of land, were
skeptical about the direction and values of the new class composition of the party, which
did not seem to represent their peasant interests.
For instance, the leadership of the party was now urban based, the leaders included
attorneys and powerful businessmen who had simply joined the party to exploit the
advantages of the party's monopoly on the voters. Mike Douglas, son of the largest
landowner in the north and a shipping and retail magnate in his own right, campaigned
and won the election as a labor candidate. So did R.O.P. Armour, an urban based
attorney, and Eustace Francis, another charismatic urban based attorney. This cadre of
new elites together with Patrick John, a former high school teacher who led the party
from the late sixties until the mid 1970s, were in direct contrast to the former leadership.
The previous leadership of the party included E.O. Leblanc as Premier and leader of the
party. Mr. Leblanc lived in the rural town of Vielle Case on the north east. W.
Stevens, Minister of Education and Health and Deputy Premier, lived in Marigot, a
village on the northern coast of the state. Both Mr. Stevens and Deblanc had influence
among the farmers and peasants of the state. The modernizing elites did not. However,
the final blow to the Dominica Labor Party's monopoly on power, began in 1974 when
Prime Minister John attempted to pass repressive legislation aimed at stopping the
publication of an opposition newspaper. The party eventually was taken out of power in
1980 when the Freedom Party won the national election.
In St. Kitts, the Labor Party appeared to have a monopoly on voters support. It
governed from 1952 to 1980. The party relied heavily on the charisma of its earlier
leaders to attract the voters. Its strategy was to appeal to the bulk of the lower classes
of the society and under the leadership of former Premier Southwell and Prime Minister
Bradshaw was able to successfully convince voters to elect the party. Beginning in the
late seventies, the ranks of the middle classes began to increase due to development in
the economy and improved education of the workers. The lower classes themselves
were anxious for sociopolitical change which would reflect changes in the economic and
social structure of the society. The Labor Party's leadership was not able to move the
party from its traditional working class base and appeal to meet the changing needs of
the society. The Peoples Action Movement Party (PAM) was able to capitalize on these
weaknesses of the Labor Party and won the national election in 1980. They remain in
power in 1990.
In the last two decades the Political parties in the region have become more broad
based. Overall, they have been able to attract a number of intellectuals, businessmen
and professionals to their ranks. However, the structure of the parties remains
hierarchical with the political leader of the party wielding total power over the
institution. Most parties have an exeeutive committee which include, the secretary or
the party, the treasurer, the President, the political
.eader, and deputy politica. leader.
Tnere are also a number of party committees responsible for recruitment, fund raising,
etc. But among this leadership group, the political leader is the defacto power broker.
Tins individual is normally the most charismatic, popular among voters, and a good
orator. Should the party win national election the state constitution provides for the
political leader to become prime minister. As Prime Minister the individual will also
have the power to elect a cabinet of ministers among the successful candidates which
will be endorsed by the party.
Political leaders are very rarely changed. The phenomena is so rare that in 1989,
the New National Party of Grenada (NNP) which was in power at the time, decided to
elect the younger Keith Mitchell to replace the aging Hubert Blaize as political leader.
Mr. Blaize was so angry that he fired Mr. Mitchell from his cabinet post of Minister of
Communications and Works, broke away from the NNP with his remaining cabinet
members and formed a new party called The New Party (TNP), with himself as Political
Leader. By so doing his government actually ended up with a minority representation in
parliament. But he avoided a "vote of no confidence" by refraining from calling a
meeting of parliament until the next election, which was to be held in March 1990. Mr.
Blaize died in December 1989 and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) won the
ensuing national election averting what could potentially have become a major political
disaster in Grenada. In St. Kitts, the popular opinion among the electorate is that the
St. Kitts Labor Party (SKLP) has been unable to win national elections because of some
peoples dissatisfaction with the Political Leader, Mr. Lee Moore, who they described as
"arrogant" and
"confrontational". People we spoke to complained ope„,y about his
behavior, yet he remains as Political Leader. All attempts to remove him have failed."
TT>e kind of loyalty to the political leader that is demonstrated among those parties
are intriguing. The other members of the party executive perform a mere symbolic and
clerical role. All decisions are made by the political leader, who normally will not
tolerate any challenge to their authority. As a result, parties that have good leadership
and are winning elections will continue to win as long as the leader can move the
masses, bu, as soon as the leader stands down or is brought down (normally by scandal),
the party correspondingly falls. Dominica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada
Labor Parties have all experienced this phenomena. Only the Antigua Labor Party led
by Mr. Vere Bird continues to survive. Mainly because Mr. Bird, an octogenarian, has
maintained the leadership of the Antigua Labor Party throughout the entire history of
the party.
This identification with the party's political leader and the blind loyalty that exist
both within the party's rank and among the voters, is directly related to the power of the
prime minister in the government provided for by the constitution. Party officials
recognize that the political leader generally holds all the power and patronage. When
the party wins, they are empowered to appoint ministers, statutory boards, commissions,
directors, etc. Consequently, it is in the best interest of members to remain loyal to the
leader, if they want to enjoy the spoils of election victories. In the case of St. Kitts
where it is perceived that Mr. Moore is a liability to the party's chances of regaining
power, the party leadership does not believe that they will ever muster the vote to
10Discussions with Party members of the St. Kitts Labor Party (SKLP) in St. kitts, November
1979.
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replace him as political leader. I„ addition, he is charismatic and has the ability to
mobilize support. It is conceivable that any challenge to his leadership will be defeated.
In Dominica there is widespread speculation that the current charismatic leader of
the ruling Freedom Party, Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, will retire after the 1990
elections. The perception among local political pundits and the population in general, is
that after her retirement, the party will be vulnerable and will most likely lose the next
general election. This prediction is certainly not far fetched given the history of political
party dynamics in the Eastern Caribbean. In the case of Dominica, Prime Minister
Charles and the Freedom Party are synonymous. People consider her the embodiment
of the party and when they vote for the Freedom Party, they vote for Ms. Charles. The
reverse affect of the identification with the charismatic leader is normally fatal - when
the leader falls, so does the party. The political parties which have been able to avert
this historical political disaster are those who spend the time to groom another leader in
the background as a kind of "shadow leader" while the older leader continues in his or
her position. The old labor party of Dominica was able to transfer leadership in the
1970s from E.O. LeBlanc to the young charismatic Patrick John by using this strategy.
In Antigua, V.C. Bird has been political leader of his Antigua Labor Party for over
a quarter century. As he approaches his anticipated retirement the party has begun to
focus attention on choosing his successor. In that respect they have taken steps to
groom his son and member of parliament, the Deputy Prime Minister Lester Bird as the
future leader of the party. The transition (according to party officials) will be a delicate
move and one which must be carefully calculated, for even as the party attempts to push
the younger Lester Bird as the government spokesman on major national issues, the
population still expect the Prime Minister's endorsement on every decision related to
nanona, policy. Lester Bird is a dynamic and charismatic individual and has a substantia,
following of his own but would be unable to hold on to the party leadership without his
father's endorsement. The UNDP, the opposition party, is hoping that the transition will
-
to V.C. Bird, not Lester Bird, and that when V.C. Bird retires or steps down (Mr.
Bird is close to 80 years old), the UNDP will have an opportunity to win the next
national election." Based on this same concept, the newly formed United Workers
Party (UWP) of Dominica is hoping that their party will also be able to win the national
elections when Prime Minister Charles resigns.
While the traditional hierarchical structure of the Eastern Caribbean political
parties remains firmly in place, the general party membership have not. In the early
fifties the parties were largely supported by the lower income workers who were
numerically in the majority. Ayearest writing on the subject in 1954 observed that "the
middle class is numerically important only in a few towns and cities. Broadly speaking
the only parties that can win an overall majority based upon universal adult suffrage are
those that can appeal to the desires and emotions of the low income voter."^ This
consistent appeal to lower income voters became the basic strategy of the union based
labor parties. By the early 1960s, however, with the addition of new schools and the
creation of more jobs in the society, the islands were beginning to experience a change
in the socioeconomic status of the public at large. More people were moving into the
ranks of the middle class and the old political pitch of "better working conditions," etc.
11Discussion with Dr. Heath, Political Leader of the Opposition Party (UNDP), in Antisua
October 1989. S '
uMorley Ayearst, Characteristics of West Indian Political Parties. Page 188.
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no longer appealed to .her. Upward social mobility had created new needs and
order to bring abou, the changes to meet those needs, the middle class began to
infiltrate the leadership ranks of the parties. Consequently, in ,966, eleven years after
Mr. Ayears, wrote his piece, another St. Vincent scho,ar Kenneth John, commenting on
he class factor of political parties in St. Vincent, wrote: »I, is true that the foundation
membership of the Labor Party was dominated by middle class folk, and though the
party has come a very long way in terms of organizing and winning support a. the grass
root level, it has never been completely absolved of its original sin"." Yet what was
significant about the change in membership and leadership was the timing. TTte change
in focus and the inclusion of the middle class did help the St. Vincent Labor Parly win
the national election in 1967. The party's response to the change in the social and
economic development of the states was necessary, and was instrumental in helping win
the elections. At the same time the strategy was being repeated in most of the
neighboring states except in St. Lucia where the SLP lost in 1964 (See Figure 6). The
Labor Party won almost all elections up to the 1970s. By the mid 1970s, these labor
parties now dominated by (he middle class began to gradually abandon the goals of the
working classes. They took the opportunities provided by their position in the parly to
exploit the situation for their own economic objectives. The result was a major defeat at
the polls in the 1980s. The more moderate broad based parties like Freedom in
Dominica, PAM in St. Kitts and NDP in St. Vincent developed a platform that met the
needs of the new middle class. It is ironic that the change to more moderate parties
"Kenneth John, "St. Vincent: A Political Kaleidoscope", Flambeau Magazine No. 5 (July 1966)
Page 3.
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occurred a, the same time Chat the U.S. etec.ed a right wing presiden, ,o lead the
country.
In summarizing the role of the political parties in the Eastern Caribbean, we
conclude that the party system has contributed to the political stability of the region.
Conflicts associated with the question of legitimacy are almost non-existent within the
Eastern Caribbean political model. The political party as it currently exists within the
Caribbean framework, represents a legitimate political institution. Yet the function of
the parties are slightly different from other modern societies. In Western societies, the
population's support for their political parties are normally based on ideology, or the
party's position on various issues. In the Caribbean the association with party is based
on the appeal of the political leader. People will support a political leader, and by
default the party, because they are able to identify with the message being delivered by
the leader. The political message advocated by political parties is generally soft on
substance and heavy on rhetoric. But if the speech is delivered with emotion and
charisma, the people will generally respond. Apter notes that "in the area of political
modernization, no single role is of greater importance than that of party politician". 14
Nowhere is that observation more vivid than within the Eastern Caribbean political
model. The history of political parties in the region clearly demonstrates the
overwhelming power and attraction of the party politician. That individual is able to
generate tremendous support within the community and is the individual best equipped
to move the society toward modernity. The absence of a military group and a
14David Apter, Politics of Modernization, Page 1 79.
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modernizing intellect, elite within
.hose societies further enhances the power of the
Caribbean politician.
This power has been used to legitimize the party as a viable national political
institution. The parties themselves have throughout the region adhered closely to the
principles and structure of modernizing countries by maintaining all the other
modernizing institutions within the society. The issue with the political parties within the
Caribbean is not the disregard for political institution but rather the abusive utilization
of the existing institutions, in order to further the individuals own interest, and to
establish a monopoly on re-election. However, political parties are only able to use their
incumbency to hurt opposition parties not because the parties are devious, but mainly
because the constitution is flexible enough to allow it. Caribbean politicians like their
British predecessors have demonstrated remarkable shrewdness in maintaining power.
They operate on the very edge of the "grey area" of the constitution, careful not to
overstep the bounds of constitutionality but bold enough to reach their objectives.
Maintaining political power as an incumbent within the Caribbean political model
have proven to be a relatively easy task for the strong ruling parties. The data in Figure
6 indicates that parties like the ALP of Antigua have been in office for over a quarter
century. The constitution provides the ruling party unlimited access to the public media
but conversely also allows them the authority to deny the opposing party those same
privileges.
In spite of this obvious flaw, the political party system has been effective as a
vehicle for political change. Most comparative political scholars have written about the
importance of institutions as means of providing nonviolent methods of social and
political change and for regulating conflict among different interest groups. The Eastern
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Caribbean system seems to have me, aU those theoretical expectations and more.
Historical, the states in the region have effective* maintained the integrity of p„, ilical
parties in .he general elections, there has never been the kind of tampering with the
electoral process as was done routinely in the Philippines during the Marcos period,
Nicaragua during Somoza, and more recently Panama under Noriega.
But while elections are generally fair, incumbency is a distinct political advantage
and one which is used to the maximum by the ruling parties in their campaigns for
national elections.
D
-
Elections and Camjpajgns
It has already been established in Chapter I that being elected to government
presents lucrative position for the average party politician within the Eastern Caribbean.
And because the stakes are so high, elections and campaigns in the region take on a
fervor of urgency and tension. Kenneth John puts the situation in proper perspective in
his critique of the St. Vincent political process. He said that "many political aspirants
regard the capture of the seat of government as the passport for acceptance on the
higher rings of the social ladder as well as by those who saw politics purely in terms of
job opportunity and looked upon election campaigns as a veritable life and death
struggle". 15 While election campaigns in the Caribbean currently may not be as drastic
as life and death, it is certainly responsible for the economic, social and occupational
survival of the majority of elected officials in the various states. Because so much is
riding on the election for those officials the campaigns can be intensive.
15Kenneth John, "St. Vincent: A Political Kaleidoscope", Flambeau Magazine No. 5 (July 1966)
Page 4.
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During campaigns political parties devote tremendous resources to mobilize and
organize supporters to participate to the election process. Although the mass
participation is short lived and virtually ends after the elections, the process is
nonetheless effective in strengthening the legitimacy of the poiitical institutions and
increasing the political participation of the citizens in the democratic process.
Huntington argues that the power of political institutions and the political system itself,
b dependent on the ability to mobilize and organize the increased political participation
in support of the system. Low levels of participation in a modernizing society will likely
weaken the political institutions in relation to other social and economic forces since the
political institutions will he unable to mobilize support. The strongest political
institutions are those that both mobilize and organize high levels of participation."
Political participation hy the citizens of the Eastern Carihbcan is centered around mass
rallies in cities and towns. Highly organized political cells are able to mobilize parly
supporters to attend rallies, campaign door to door, and encourage supporters to initiate
one on one debates at local bars, at work, at dinner, on the playing field or wherever
people congregate. For the duration of any national campaign in the Eastern Caribbean,
the whole country (including those who are too young to vole) is engrossed in the
electoral process.
!£• A Contemporary C;ise
Political rallies take on the atmosphere of a rock concert with the political leaders
providing (he speeches, which we have indicated earlier are largely rhetoric. Having
'"Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Clumrinc Societies: Pages 420-431
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been raised in the Caribbean,
, decided during this research to be as analyticaU,
objective as
,
could possibly be.
.„ order to eliminate any subjective knowledge tha, I
may have bad of the region, and speculating that by
,989, campaigns may bave gotten
more sophisticated, I decided to attend the !989 political convention of the United
Workers Party (UWP), the ruling party of St. Lucia in Gros ,s,c, St. Lucia in November
1989. The day before the convention, I had spoken with the Prime Minister's Press
Secretary, Mr. Bristol, and other UWP officials who indicated to me that the party
intended to locus on the national issues which they lei, were related to unemployment,
education, health and the tourist industry, among others. Attendance a. the convention
was heavy. The school building in which the convention was being held housed about
800 people, while ouiside the building approximately 2,000 to 3,0(1(1 party supporters had
congregated. The almospherc was upbea.. The Prime Minisler, John Complon, in his
Icalurc address proceeded to begin his speech without any suhslan.ivc parly platform or
national agenda, but wilh an allack on (he leader of the opposition, Mr. Julian Ilunle,
Political Leader of the St. Lucia Labor Party (Mr. Hunte is incidentally the
brother-in-law of the Prime Minisler). Complons opening salvo included (he following
statement:
"He who from humble beginning could make his fortune in St. Lucia because
of the progress made in St. Lucia by the UWP now spend his time criticizing
that very party which fed him...". He continued, "The government of St. Lucia
is in the firm grasp of the United Workers Parly and there for the foreseeable
future will it remain because the party which opposes us is without policy
except barrier opposition to everything the government does. No philosophy
except that of envy, haired and division - the policy of Cain. And as Cain,
because of envy raised his hand against his brother Abel and was cursed wilh
the mark of Cain, his descendent in the opposition who for the same reason
of envy raises his hand and his voice against his brother-in-law John, he too is
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cursed and is stamped with the Mark of Cain and like Cain sh.U wander the
earth w,,h no resting plaee, despised by all men of goodwill.-'
The Prime Minister went on to eommen, about the party's programs bu,
consistently
.everted to battering the opposition. To Western scholars, journalist and
politicians, this approach by Compton may seem unusual probably bordering on some
psychological disorder. Bu, within the Caribbean mode, of politics, this approach though
peculiar is not abnormal.
The Caribbean politician spends the entire period in office campaigning for the
next election. To do that effectively, he normally must have an enemy - real or
imagined. In the pre-independence era, the enemy was always the Colonial Office,
which were generally to blame lor any problem that the chief minister or premier
encountered, irrelevant of the true source of the problem. Following independence, the
parly in power would normally designate the opposition party as the enemy and in some
cases like Dominica, young nontradilional groups were labeled as communists; a label
which always evoked the people to rally in support of government against the groups.
Carl Stone, Head of Department of Government at University of the West Indies,
describes Caribbean style party politics as:
"...that which seeks to extend periods of high mass credibility and legitimacy by
heavy reliance on symbolic assurances and manipulation of mass aspirations.
Highly developed organs and channels of political propaganda financed by the
state; promotional buildup of party leaders as messianic, biblical or magical
17John Compton, quoted from address delivered at the United Workers Party (UWP) Convention,
Gros Islet, St. Lucia (November, 1989).
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figures; identification with hostility toward well established symbolic
enemies". 18
Prime Minister Compton's speech in effect was tailored appropriately for his
constituency. Within the Caribbean political process it appears that the fundamental
tools of a ruling party are symbols including (1) . we„ defined enemy - normally the
opposition party and (2) some connection to church and religion. Armed with those two
elements ruling parties are well placed to maintain themselves in power. In doing the
research for this thesis, I was amazed by the role of religion in political parties'
literature. The Grenada Guardian, a pro-Grenada United Labor Party (GULP)
publication carried a full page section entitled "Bible Readings" in all its editions. This
section is devoted entirely to the printing of biblical verses and religious instructions.
The editorials consists of personal attacks on members of the opposition, and appeals to
the piousness of the Grenada electorate to return the Gairy led GULP to power. The
November 24, 1989 election had the following excerpts in its editorial.
"From all evidence we see signs of a bright horizon - boldly piercing through
the morning mist and graphically expressive of some of the blessings Grenada
once enjoyed under the administration of the Grenada United Labor Party.
Soon we shall be enjoying through God's divine blessings
... and hard work of
the GULP to rebuild Grenada's economic structure with peace, prosperity and
goodwill towards each other. Let us give God the Glory, the Honor and the
Peace for Grenada's positive socioeconomic revival."19
18Carl Stone, "Decolonization and the Caribbean State System" in Henry and Stone (Editors),
The Newer Caribbean (Philadelphia: ACE Publications, PA 1983) Page 46.
19Grenada Guardian. November 24, 1989 Edition, Page 3.
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In St. Vincent, the St. Vincent Labor Party's weekly newspaper Jhejfe carries
column called "Meditation," written by Pastor Amos A. Dennis, a party member. On
October 17, 1989, it carried a column entitled "The Padlock on Wedlock" in which he
liberally quoted Matthew 19:6 to make hard political points favorable to his party.
This pious approach to winning elections is not new, and replicates the very same
system used by the colonialist to keep slaves in bondage, and later to withhold voting
rights from freed slaves. The Caribbean peoples' deeply religious belief has been
routinely used by the politicians to appease their anger.
Caribbean politicians are personalis^, highly skilled in the art of winning support,
among voters. In addition to appearing pious, blaming the other party for national
problems, party candidates are required to socialize as much as possible with the voters.
Consequently, during the campaign it is customary that political candidates (particularly
in the rural areas) hold informal meetings with the voters at the local bar in every town.
At these gatherings, the bar is always open and the candidates will pick up the tab for
all the voters who wish to drink with them and listen to their pitch. To emphasize their
humility, some politicians, for effect, will venture into the hut of a poor rural family for
dinner. This move is symbolic and is done to demonstrate their sensitivity and identity
with the common man. This symbolic gesture is similar to the "kissing baby" strategy
employed by Western politicians. The Caribbean strategy however, is very effective.
Political parties structure their campaigns around strong symbols, because of the
relatively high rate of illiteracy among voters. For instance they will support the soccer
team which appears to have the most fans. They will turn up at weddings to dance with
the bride and at funerals to shed a tear on cue. These activities are proven strategies
and in communities where the only access to politicians is during the campaign, symbolic
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appearances go a ,o„g way in gaini„g vo.es and symhols are VCIy imporlam jn
propaganda.
QP Symbols are particularly prevalent in states like Dominica, St. Vincent,
Grenada, and St. Kitts. In fact, symbols are today still used to identify
on the national election ballots. For instance in Dominica, the Freedom Party Symbol is
a hand while the Dominica Labor Party is a shoe ^ . The symbols are
registered with the election commission before the elections. Getting the appropriate
symbol is an important variable in the electoral process. For obvious reasons, one can
be well assured that the Jack Ass would never be a party's symbol. The hammer, the
hat, the bottle have all been used as symbols on voting ballots. Printing posters in the
rural areas can be relatively simple. Most posters would simply read "Vote X for the
^ hand. Figure 3 represents an example of a poster taken from the St. Kitts Labor
Party Manifesto. The party's symbol is the "hand." The party designated symbol is often
times more important than the name of the party or candidate. During the 1980
Dominica elections when two Labor Parties contested the elections, one party used the
hat as a symbol, the other a shoe. The shoe supporters took pride in pointing out that
the shoe was a stronger symbol than a hat since a shoe could kick the hat out of sight.
Hat party supporters responded by stringing a number of dirty worn out sneakers on
their motorcades to symbolize the undignified and non-hygienic appearance of the party.
I am not sure whether the institutionalists had that kind of voter involvement in mind
when they wrote about people participation in the political process but there is no lack
of people participation in the democratic electorial process of the Eastern Caribbean.
Administration of the election process is sophisticated. The elections are
supervised by an election commissioner who is supposed to be an impartial civil servant,
FIGURE 3
Election Poster of the St. Kitts r^bor Party
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with a staff of election officers whose responsibility among many arc to prepare the
voters lists, supervise and monitor .he polling stations> sccurc (he^ ^^ ^
ballots. Both government officials and opposition party candidates are kept out of
contact with the election staff.
Although it is conceivahle that ruling party officials may he able to coerce people
to vote for (heir incumhen. party, they nonetheless have heen unable to directly rig
elections or confiscate ballots. In that respect, the national elections as an institution
have proven to be legitimate and strong.
Caribbean politicians do not get involved in fixing elections; they spend an
inordinate amount of their time campaigning. As mentioned above, one of the other
institutions on which they rely for support and endorsement is the church.
F« The Church in the Eastern Caribbean
The Catholic Church as an institution has demonstrated that it is an astute political
operator within the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean. The church in Lati
America in particular has seemed efficient at maintaining its precarious exalted positi
between the national oligarchies and the masses of poor people. In the Eastern
Caribbean there are no major oligarchies, but there is a strong ruling elite, and there is
a large population of poor people, a perfect environment for Catholicism to work its
political rhetoric of saving souls. Unlike Latin America where the Church is more
visible in the political process, the Catholic Church in the Eastern Caribbean plays an
influential part in the political arena, but does so in a non-confrontational and subtle
tin
tion
manner.
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Writing about political influence in 1954 in the Eastern Caribbean, Morley Ayearst
observed that politicians were always able to influence people to deliver votes for a small
price. "The exception is in those areas where Roman Catholic adherence is widespread.
Here there is no question of corruption but rather of a potentially important influence
upon government policies...- In 1954 the church appeared to Ayearst to have the
potential for influencing government. However, these were the early years of self
government and the church was not adequately prepared to lobby politician, But by
1978, when the Caribbean islands began to achieve independence, the church had
become a major actor in the region's politics. In every Caribbean state the church is
represented at all Government functions. Bishops and priests have easy and direct
access to the political leaders in the state, including the prime minister. In Dominica the
"New Chronicle", which is essentially a pro-Freedom Party newspaper, is owned and
operated by the Catholic Church. In St. Lucia the Archbishop is a close advisor to the
ruling UWP.
In the post-universal suffrage period, the church had to work hard in the past four
decades to attain the kind of power and influence it currently holds in the region.
During the Crown Colony era the British were not very accommodating nor were they
cooperative with the Catholic Church. Consequently, all the inroads made within the
Caribbean society by the Church were done in the post-Crown Colony period.
To gain the people's following and loyalty, the church employed what is certainly
their patented method of organizing. They opened schools, day care centers, and in
some states like Dominica virtually ran the social welfare program which the
20Morlcy Ayearst, "Characteristics of West Indian Political Parties", in Lowenthal and Comitas
(Editors), Aftermath of Sovereiimtv. Page 71.
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Govern, was unable Co do. In some s.aCcs. programs to providc mcals
, shc|ler „„„
medical care for Che poor and indigene was almos. non exisCenC. The church, in che
early period of self government, seized the opporCuni.y Co fill the void in chose areas
where Che masses needed i, most. The programs and insci.u.ions established by .he
church attracted a loya,, captive audience Co whom chey could
.each cheir religion. As
.he church began Co reach more people, Che policicians recognized that if chey were .„
gc. .he vo.es of .hose poor religious people, ,hcy would have to cooperale wi.h the
churches.
By the early 1970s, Governments began to bend over backwards to help the
churches. Budgetary aid was provided for funding the Catholic schools. Tax concession
was given to churches for building low-cost housing. In return the church began to give
subtle support to the ruling party. By 1978, the support was not so subtle, the bishop in
most Eastern Caribbean states would release an annual pastoral letter which was political
in nature and openly endorsed one party over the other.
In Dominica before the 1980 elections the Catholic church openly supported and
campaigned for Eugenia Charles and the Freedom Party. A Catholic priest, Father
Thomas, used to draw hundreds of people both Catholic and non-Catholic to his church
on Sundays to listen to his fiery sermons which were scathing attacks on the then Labor
Party. He was one of Prime Minister Charles' strongest campaigners. In a God-fearing
semi-literate society like Dominica, the word of the priest is recognized with reverence.
Catholics who supported the Labor Party did not dare debate issues with a priest, and
they had to listen to Father Thomas without argument. The Freedom party did win the
election in 1980. History indicates that Prime Minister Patrick John was instrumental in
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self-destructing his Labor Party, bu, people we spoke wich, consider the Church
contribution to the Freedom Party's victory in 1980 as substantia, and pivotal
As indicated earlier, Caribbean political leaders are aware of the power of the
Catholic Church and as a result political parties wiH refrain from attacking the church,
even in situations where the church is clearly aggressive. I spoke with leaders in each
state and asked them whether they though, that the Church had a disproportionate
influence on government policy development. All officials denied that there was direct
influence on their government by the church, but pointed ou, that their states were
predominantly Catholic and that the church had strong following among the
communities. Tire Church's influence, therefore, appeared to be more indirect, but no
less effective.
In the Caribbean, the congregation is a captive audience and any information
coming from the priest is regarded as sacred. The politicians are well aware of that
influence and have developed strategies to neutralize the overwhelming influence of the
church. The first strategy used by Caribbean politicians is to avoid confrontation with
the church. In 1970, in Dominica, the principal of the St. Mary's Academy (SMA), a
Catholic boys high school, expelled a student for refusing to cut his "Afro" hair style
which was symbolic of the U.S. influenced Black Power movement at the time. The
Ministry of Education of the ruling Labor Party during that period failed to initiate any
investigation into the incident, nor did they authorize the reinstatement of the student
for fear that they would suffer a Catholic backlash which could severely affect their
standings in the next national election. The Freedom Party at the time was closely
associated with the Catholic Church and during the previous campaign had accused the
Labor Party of being anti-church. As a result when the student was expelled, the Labor
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the students decide the outcome, even though the Ministry of Education clearly had the
authority and influence to get the school to reinstate the student.
In addition to being labeled as an anti-church party, the Freedom Party had also
accused the Labor Party of supporting the Black Power movement which was very
unpopular among the Mulatto middle class Catholics of the state. The student who was
expelled, incidentally, was also associated with that movement and that factor made it
even more difficult for the Labor Party to express any kind of overt support for the
student's position. Party officials calculated that any move on the part of the
Government to ask for the reinstatement of the student would be construed by the
voting population as support for Black Power principles (for which a large Afro hairstyle
was symbolic) and an attack on the church. The Freedom Party was gaining popularity
during that period, but the Labor Party had the edge in terms of national support and
they therefore made a conscious decision not to take any action that would anger the
Catholic voters and turn the precarious advantage that they held over to the Freedom
Party.
The students marched to Government headquarters and met with the Minister of
Education, H.L. Christian. Christian's response was that the St. Mary's Academy (SMA)
issue was a matter between student and principal and he felt Government should not be
involved. The students, with support from the Black Power Movement and Movement
for New Dominica (MND), organized a national student strike in which students stayed
away for school from more than a week. The church officials and parents eventually
met at the Goodwill Parish Hall for a mass meeting. Following prolonged debate among
the group, the school decided to reinstate the student.
K»l
The St Mar/s Academy issue is perhaps one of the mos t vivid examples of the
church's power in the political process. There are events throughout the Eastern
Caribbean that demonstrate conclusively the influence of the church in politic,
However, the SMA crisis in Dominica was significant because the church was able to
successfully challenge the Government on an issue which invo,ved the entire country and
which related to the major question of race and class in the community.
Influenced by events in the USA in the late 1960s, the young people of the
Eastern Caribbean had begun to attack the race and class question that still prevailed
within those societies. They had made a number of demands from government and the
larger society. Those demands included elimination of a necktie as part of high school
uniforms, the recruitment of more black priests and teachers by the church, and the
education curriculum be structured to reflect more of the African ancestry of the
Caribbean people.
The Dominica government and other Eastern Caribbean governments were
generally supportive of the concept of Black Power, they approved the elimination of
the neckties, and basically gave political lip service to some of the ideas. The church
and the middle class, however, were stubbornly opposed to any changes within the
society. Their position was that the majority of citizens were black, therefore the
community already had black power. They felt that the students demand, for instance,
that the images of church be changed to reflect an African one, was out of hand and
moved to stop the momentum of the movement. They labeled the movement
anti-church and communist, and appealed to parents to prevent their children from
taking part in any Black Power sponsored activity. When that failed, they decided to
confront Government by expelling the student because of his hair style. The expulsion
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was a calculated political gesture which was meant to get the Labor Party Government
This decision proved to be a shrewd one. The party succeeded in maintaining the
support of the voting age youth, because they did not endorse the expulsion. They also
convinced the Catholic voters that they were not anti-church because they did not use
their Governmental power and still managed to avoid alienating the popular Black
Power Movement. But, by 1974, the church had continued its attack on Black Power
and encouraged by the congregations, the Labor Party broke its neutrality and mounted
an aggressive attack on the Movement for New Dominica (MND). They confiscated the
Movement's literature, arrested the leaders and banned their meetings. Through these
repressive measures, the party was able to convince the middle class and poor Catholics
that they were tough on Black Power. In 1975, they again won the national elections.
Politicians in the Eastern Caribbean arc not unlike their counterparts in the west.
They are generally not church-going, devout Christians, but arc willing to take the moral
and conservative position on most issues in order not to offend their constituents. In
the U.S. however, there is separation of church and state, in theory. In the Eastern
Caribbean, there is no well defined separation, therefore the church as an institution is
able to maintain its stronghold on its congregation. It has the ability to both challenge
and influence Government, and in some instances, requires the government to support
its position on matters of state. In 1989, Eastern Caribbean Governments ordered TV
stations not to air the U.S. made film "The Last Temptation" because it offended the
religious sensitivities of this Christian Society.21
21Report in "EC News", November 19, 1989 Edition (Barbados) Page 5.
In every nation state of the Eastern Caribbean, legislation in the state has been
heavily influenced by church values. Abortion is still illegal in the Eastern Caribbean.
Homosexuality is illegal, and both activities are punishable by severe jail terms and
monetary fines. Most politicians we spoke with on the issue of rights indicated that they
had no rea, desire to regulate citizens' private life, but those existing laws represented a
manifestation of the community's Christian values and in the true spirit of democracy
only the people could decide whether to repeal them. It is safe to conclude that those
laws will remain in place as long as the church exists as an institution within the region.
In Chapter I we pointed out some of the contradictions inherent in the Eastern
Caribbean Democratic political model. The role and power of the church within the
model is certainly one of those contradictions. To the extent that governments have
abdicated their responsibilities for protecting the rights of all its people, seems to be a
major contradiction of the democratic principle. But that posture is not inconsistent
with Caribbean politicians perspective of their role in government. Political parties and
politicians have consistently catered only to the interest of the powerful "voting" groups.
The Catholic Church and its congregation represent the most powerful voting group.
Generally their position in the society is even more prominent than it is in Latin
America where the church has a Sunday following. In Latin America, the major
oligarchies can always maintain power by using the military. In the Eastern Caribbean
there arc no armies; therefore, to remain in power, the political parties must depend on
their ability to satisfy the needs of the major electoral group. As a result the Catholic
Church has assumed a position of what I term the "Silent Partners" of Eastern
Caribbean Governments.
Our many effort, a, fmding raaleria| on (he ro|e rf^^ ^ ^^
process of the Eastern Caribbean have been fruits ,„ my discussions wi(h
Govern rae„t officials, it seemed dear that the relationship between government and
Catholic Church was an unwelcome subject, which led me to conclude that regional
scholars may have avoided this issue for fear of offending Government and church.
However, we think i, is fair lo conclude that there is an unwritten alliance between
church and state in the Eastern Caribbean. This alliance also contributes to the level of
stability that exists within the societies of the region. The church in most modernizing
societies has come under attack, in some instances by modernizing aristocrats, mainly
because
.here is conflict in the political direction that the modernizers and the church
want to embark upon. In the Caribbean there is no apparent conflict. The so called
modernizers are the "politicians" and since the politicians have chosen to maintain the
same social, economic and political structure that existed under colonialism, there is no
room for conflict, hence the stability of the region.
Another scholar of the modernizing theory, John Kautsky, observes that "unlike
other aristocratic institutions of the traditional society, religious ones often have strong
popular roots, especially in the peasantry and can therefore resist movements of native
modernizers without the aid of colonialism."^ in the Caribbean, the Catholic Church
has strong support across class lines. Their support is broad based and they enjoy
overwhelming support from the political groups, which for want of genuine modernizers,
represent the modernizing force of the region. As a result, the church has no need to
"John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (John Wilev & Sons Inc NY
1972) Page 105.
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resist the development activities of the Government because those are generally
consistent with the teachings and mora, values of the rehgious institution.
G
-
The New Elites
History has demonstrated that in most cases when modernizers come to power
particularly in Latin America, they were made to share power and compromise with
other modernizing forces such as the aristocratic group, the military and the business
eommunity. In the Eastern Caribbean, while we are no, prepared to call the political
leaders modernizers in the strict sense of the term, they do represent the only agent of
modernity within the society. When ,hese quasi-modernizers came to power, they
initially had to share power with the colonizers, but by 1967, when the islands attained
self government, the political !eaders were virtually solely in control of government.
The advent of the regions new political status brought about the development of a
new elite who have dominated the political, social, and economic life of the various
states.
The new elite are a combination of intellectual, economic and political elites. The
new elites have abandoned all the trappings of decolonization rhetoric and have focused
their collective goal on wealth accumulation. Equipped with the ability to legislate and
the power to grant concessions to their fellow elites, the Government officials have
themselves moved from economic situations of "near poor" to "relatively rich" and have
joined the economic elites in terms of social status and wealth. This new elite group is
very formidable but represents only about 5% of the population. It includes the senior
party officials, ministers of Government, members of the judiciary, senior civil servants,
the medical profession, the owners and operators of the service industry and members of
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ist societies
the old mulatto group who were the initial aristocrats of the old ncocolonial
and the clergy.
Unlike other TWrd World areas, most notably the Bahamas, where the prime
minister have aecumulated millions on a mere civil service salary, the Eastern Caribbean
elites are less corrupt, but are able to maintain a life style that is comparable with
Western affluence.
Among the ruling elite it is difficult to separate Government programs from those
of the personal objectives of the entire group. There appears to be an informal
cohesive network of decision making among that group; which means that the elite as a
unit is a powerful political economic body. During the Labor Party's domination of
Government in Dominica between 1970-1979, the line where Government authority and
that of the other elites began and ended was gray. The leaders of the economic elite
who represented the service economy were able to intimidate junior government officials
who attempted to enforce government policies which were unfavorable to members of
their group. Senior executive partners of Acme Garage (a major car dealership), J.
Astephen & Co. and Julian Giraud Enterprises, were influential in the decision making
process of government. The main function of the new elites other than the
accumulation of wealth, is to ensure that their ruling party remain in power. This is a
peculiar aspect of the Caribbean model, because the ranks of the new elites can
sometimes be altered when there is a change of Government. But as indicated earlier,
parties normally remain in power an average of fifteen years. Yet when a party loses
the election, the political elites disperse and the economic elites remain. They simply
switch alliances to the new party, and the new party brings in a new group of workers
who by the second term in office will join the ranks of the new elites. By the second
term in office the former workers, junior civi, servant and some former unemployed
intel.ec.uals, wOl have accumuiated enough resources to join the ranks of the eii.es.
This opportunity provided by the political system to allow workers and middie class
to move up to status of the new elite is to our mind extreme!, important as a
contributive factor in explaining the absence of civil strife in the region. The middle
classes, which according to Hun.ing.on is .he only group capable of revolution, seem
content to live a relatively comfortable life, because they live with .he expec.a.ion
.ha,
hey,
,00, will soon join the ranks of the new elites. They normally have two options:
join .he parry in power; or, work with .he opposition party and wait for them ,0 be
elected to power.
In summary, it would seem that the existing political institutions are an inherent
component of the Eastern Caribbean political model. The political leaders have been
successful in utilizing those institutions as an effective tool for maintaining a fairly
politically stable region, perhaps unparalleled among other former British colonies within
the international system. That stability, however, cannot be solely ascribed to the
existence of democratic institutions in the region. Democracy in the Caribbean is
basically authoritative. Mass participation in the process is limited to elections, which
effectively retards the political development of the institutions, but maintain parties in
power. Thus, while the region may experience political stability, it is not because the
citizens are "happy campers" but because the authoritative political model is manipulated
to limit the participation of the masses in the political process. Carl Stone summarizes
the relationship between the masses and the managers of the institutions.
"Parties dominant personalities, and elected Government are accredited with
legitimacy, but the institutions of Government still attract profound distrust.
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The proWem is compou„ded by the fact tha. the vast knowledge gap between
the m,ddle class technocracy and bureancracy and their mass clientele
generates suspicion and distrust. Since the people (because of the
backwardness of the education system) fee, vulnerable to manipulation and
lack the knowledge base to confidently verify or assess "authoritative"
information received from the bureaucracy, the end result is a "game" of
mutual suspicion, distrust, manipulation, non-communication and the cunning
d,sgu,se of real intentions and goals. The effort is to limit the mobilization of
the states institution."23
The relationship between the government and citizens in the Eastern Caribbean in
the post independence era, is essentially one of clientelism. There is some distrust in
that relationship but there is also a high level of patronage within the system which is
instrumental in maintenance of a precarious stability in the region. Democracy as an
institution is a delicate and fragile system of government. To be effective all the other
institutions that make up the system must be upheld by the citizens of any states that
embark on the ideological pattern of democracy. The Eastern Caribbean, like many
other small states, has been faced with myriad social and economic problems which tend
to be the symptoms of political destabilization. Instability and all its manifestation has
been the major cause of the inability of modernizing governments to maintain
democracy. Latin America and Africa have many examples of states which attempted to
remain democratic, but had to revert to other political systems.
In the Eastern Caribbean, democracy in its most basic form has survived as a viable
system. The democratic political system that has evolved in the region in the last fifty
23Carl Stone, "Decolonization in the English Speaking Caribbean", in Stone and Henry (Editors),
The Newer Caribbean. Page 47.
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yea. is one characterized by a strong adherence by the peopie to the attributes of the
pohtica. institutions, the pohtica, parties and the eiection process. The church a,so p,ays
a vital ro,e in the maintenance of democracy. There are also a number of other
characteristics of the Eastern Caribbean political mode, in addition to its authoritative
nature which makes i. peculiar to the region. One of those characteristics is the
conservative nature of Caribbean citizens, the others include a rigid economic and socia,
structures which we will explore next.
CHAPTER IV
SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION
A. Passive Society
The establishment of political institutions within the Eastern Caribbean society
occurred very early in the developmental stage. That factor compiled with the prolonged
period of British occupation and colonization is largely responsible for the level of
political stability that has prevailed in the region. Since the granting of self-government
status to the region, however, the local governments have been responsible for the
maintenance of a viable social and economic system. History indicates that leaders of
the region have managed to establish very idiosyncratic, socioeconomic patterns which in
turn have contributed to the regions relative political, social and economic stability,
greatly minimizing civil strife in the region.
The fundamental premise of institutional theorists suggests that the structure of
the political and social institutions in a society have a major impact on the patterns of
behavior manifested in that society's sociopolitical system. Huntington (who is one of
the foremost advocates of the institutional theory) also advances some concepts which,
when applied to the Eastern Caribbean model, help clarify the apparent lack of civil
strife within the society, in spite of the regions' slow economic growth.
Since universal adult suffrage there has also been significant social mobility and
change in the Eastern Caribbean, depending on what measurement is used to measure
the economy, we would have to conclude that there has also been corresponding
economic growth. Such growth as suggested above has been relatively slower. In
addressing the issue of socioeconomic and political change, Huntington argues that if the
social and economic mechanisms in the society are present and sufficient to allow for
upward mobility, then the mobilization development gap is less likely to result in civil
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strife. He further argues tha, if these existing structures within the society do no. allow
for upward mobility, then the dissatisfied groups win increase their political participation
as a vehicle for achieving socioeconomic growth. However, he a,so thinb that
frustration wi„ set in when there is conflict between what individuals and groups in the
society think their status should be and how they actually perceive their status re,a,ive to
other groups. 1
The absence of any significant civil strife within the region would suggest that
institutionalization has succeeded as a stabilizing force, and that the society has
maintained a structure that would allow for socioeconomic mobility. That observation
would largely be accurate, although not empirical. But there are other factors which
have contributed significantly to the regions socioeconomic stability and absence of strife.
The more profound factor is precisely what Huntington has suggested. After receiving
the right to vote, groups which had experienced economic and social stagnation in the
society before adult suffrage, decided to embrace political participation as a means to
social and economic advancement. The other major factor, the value system of the
Caribbean people, one which institutional theorists do not address, mainly because it is
subjective and singular to the Eastern Caribbean.
Caribbean people seem to believe strongly in the social ordering of society, a result
perhaps, of their vivid and torturous experiences within the hierarchical structure of their
traditional past of slavery and crown colony. While the class and race issue has been
significantly de-emphasized in the communities, there are still distinct lines among the
society based on socioeconomic status. In recent years, the society has become more
'Huntington, Political Order in Chanwnz Societies. Pages 39-58.
libera, and people are able ,o cross Cass lines, mainly because the new eH.es were
•bemselves former workers and have weakened Che Cass structure. Wha, is perhaps
-re amazing is that most peop,e seem to accept their suhgroupi„g without dema„di„g
change in the system. Although citizens aspire to a higher quality of ,ife, they
nonethe,ess seem wining to accept the limitations inherent within a society of limited
resources. Because of their devout religious background, they seem even more prone to
accept their socioeconomic condition as one determined by providence rather than by
Che inefficiencies and inequities of the Caribbean political system.
That general attitude is certainly not unique to the Eastern Caribbean. Wha. is
significant is that this attitude (which is one normally exhibited by peasants in traditional
societies) seems to move workers at all levels to acquiesce to the prevailing system.
Kautsky's analysis of traditional societies suggests that "to man in traditional society, the
social, economic and political order appears as natural, inevitable, and unchangeable like
the mountains or the weather. If no change is imaginable, then obviously none can be
demanded".* This observation accurately describes the attitude of the majority of the
Eastern Caribbean people in general and working classes in particular, and raises the
broader issue of the Eastern Caribbean's developmental stage within the international
system. In the introduction to this thesis we indicated that the Eastern Caribbean
political developmental model was different from other modernizing states in that it still
maintained aspects of traditional society, yet had all the institutional structure for
modernization. The traditional and cultural attitudes are two of the characteristics that
support our argument that the model is relatively unique to the region, and may be
'Kaulsky, Polilical Consequences of Modernization. Page 34.
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described as the kind of attitudes normaUy associated with the pre-modernity stage tn
developing countries.
Regardless of the political label used to discuss the region, the people of the
Eastern Caribbean seem to adjust to whatever hardships that result from their
government action or inaction. As we pointed out earlier, democracy to them means the
freedom to elect their leaders, but immediately after the elections their political
participation ceases. They withdraw from the political process totally and assume a
status as subjects of the leaders. They seem to fail to comprehend that Government
officials are actually their elected representatives.
Against this ordered structure, socioeconomic mobility is relative. All citizens have
access, but only a few take advantage of the system. The attitudes can be described as
extremely conservative, people believe in the trickle down theory of economics. An
Eastern Caribbean worker believes that the store owner should have a higher standard
of living than the employees. The employee does not resent the fact that he must take
the bus as his only means of transportation and that because of low wages, he will never
be able to own a car or a home. Yet his employer has all the modern amenities. This
willingness to accept one's socioeconomic condition within the Caribbean society is
perhaps one of the most significant aspects which contributes towards social stability
within the existing model. This does not mean however, that social changes did not
occur within Eastern Caribbean society.
B. Changes in the Social Structure
The advent of universal adult suffrage in the Eastern Caribbean region in 1951 not
only became the catalyst for political change in the islands but brought about
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corresponding social changes in the societv Th,> m« r ^ , .C ty. The process of decolonization and
democratization of chc state, Saw the empowerment of formerly disempowered groups.
Between
,95, and ,967, the momentum for deco.oniza.ion encompassed a giant
movement for change in which all sectors of the native Caribbean/African population
were experiencing some kind of social mobility. Workers began to get better wages for
heir labor, which improved their socioeconomic conditions, more jobs became available
tO the more educated natives as the colonial administrators began to withdraw, and mote
importantly, the local leadets who had emerged from the ranks of the working Cass were
genuinely and sincerely involved in working with the working class towards eventual
decolonization. Page, Henry, a Caribbean scholar writing about Antigua, observes that
during this period "the leaders then in the process of becoming the Government, were
still close to the people they had led. The two were still joined together by a unity that
had been forged in the struggle to expel the colonizer."3
By ,967, the political institutions were firmly in place. The islands had achieved
limited self government and in that period a corresponding decline occurred in both the
democratization process and social mobility. Having elected their representatives, the
citizens seem to have concluded their political participation. Mass social mobilization
seem to be no longer necessary. The colonialists were gone, and the African
descendants were in control of the political machinery.
Throughout this work we have maintained that the authoritarian aspect of colonial
government which prevailed through slavery and the Crown Colony era was adopted
wholly by new Caribbean leaders. This resulted in the establishment of a democratic
'Paget Henry, "Democracy in Antigua', The Newer Caribbean. Page 209.
mode, which was authoritative in structure
. ^ socia , ..^ which^^ ^
mode, was equally authoritative and hierarchical new
.oca! eh.es began to move up the
socia,
.adder, rep,acing the white colonia, masters who had since
.eft tor Britain. By the
time the region finally achieved independence jn ^ ^^ ^
landscape of the area had been significantly altered. Former workers were now in
control of the political, social and economic destiny of the region, but real change was
largely symbolic. The colonia, social structures remained unchanged. Among this old
structure, a new group of native black elites emerged. Caribbean scholar, Trevor Farrell,
describe the sociological changes within the last two decades as follows:
"Around the region, black faces adorn boards of directors, inhabit ministerial
offices, and man all reaches of the civil service. The administrative and
political structures of the region have become almost completely Africanized
and Indianized. New elites have burgeoned..."4
In spite of this localization of the power machinery, Farrell suggests that
particularly in the larger islands the affluence and socioeconomic growth is experienced
only by the new elites. The observation to a lesser extent applies equally to the Eastern
Caribbean economic elites.
"The rise to power and privilege of the local elites has been the most visible
and most flaunted. Huge garish new houses have gone up in exclusive
neighborhoods, testifying to their owner's affluence, if not to their taste.
Mercedes sports and touring cars bump and bounce their way through the
potholes. The materialistic wives and children of the new elite, to whom
social concern is as foreign as their color TV sets, shop in Miami, finger their
'Trevor Farrell, "Decolonization in the English Speaking Caribbean" in Stone & Henry (Editors),
The Newer Caribbean (ACE Publication, Philadelphia 1983) Page 4.
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way through boutiques and display a disdain for thcir less fortunate fellow
cmzcns, of which any ,9th century British aristocrat would have been proud."
TTre changes which transformed the pre-independcncc leaders into a political elite
were gradual.
,„
the early stages ministers of Governments were accessible and lived
within their constituents and among the voters. By the 1980, most were emulating their
white predecessors and had moved to the type of mansion described by Farrell. „ seems
ironic yet symbolic that during colonization the white ruling class generally established
their residence on top of hi.ls and mountains. Today the black ruling elite in the
Caribbean have also gradually left the village and moved to the mountain tops.
This move may be symbolic of the structure of Eastern Caribbean society. The
new elite are well entrenched at the top of the socioeconomic pyramid with a small
aspiring middle class in the middle and the vast majority of workers and peasants at the
bottom. This new structure is almost identical to the slruclure which existed in the
colonial era.
The maintenance of this old social structure of the society would lead one to
reconsider whether any social change had occurred in the region and whether
independence had improved the social conditions of the citizens of the region. The
answer to both these questions would have to be answered in the affirmative, with some
qualifying factors. We discussed this very question with Caribbean leaders.
The leaders I spoke to were sincere and extremely proud of what they considered
to be major changes in the social structure of thcir states. Prime Minister Bird of
Antigua spent a significant amount of time pointing out the successes of local Antiguans
^Trevor Farrell, The Newer Caribbean. Page 4.
who would not have had opportunities under the colonial system. Under his
had provided the kind of clintate in the country that had allowed workers to move up
the social ladder. He identified ministers in his current government including himself
who had come from humble beginnings, but now had the opportunity and the resource,
to improve the conditions of other Antiguan,
, asked Prime Minister Bird, whether the
Antigua Labor Party could be accurately described as a worker's party. He disagreed, he
didn't think that his party was exclusively a workers party. I, was a people's party,
comprised of engineers, physicians and had a broad base composition of Antigua
citizens.6
It was not clear whether all party members benefited from the social advancement
opportunities that the ALP provided, but to the leadership of the party, the social
changes that have occurred in the post colonial era have been of revolutionary
proportion.
This perception and feeling about the extent of social change was echoed by other
Caribbean leaders in Grenada, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, and St. Vincent. They
pointed to the breakdown of the race and class barriers, which had existed within the
societies during colonialism and even after universal franchise. They are quick to remind
the investigator that police commissioners, health commissioners, educators and all the
new leading technocrats are local black "native sons" who have benefited from what they
perceive as social revolutions. There is certainly no doubt that social change has taken
place in the Eastern Caribbean. Up to the early 1960s, the Creole or Mulatto middle
Conversations with Prime Minister Bird, Antigua 1989.
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classes of the Caribbean were holding on to a structure in which the main criteria Tor
entry to the elite group was the lightness of one's skin. Describing the situation in the
1960's, A.W. Singham, a Caribbean scholar wrote that in many Caribbean islands "the
brown middle class maintain their links with the metropolitan power as well as with their
own Creole society... However, the black mass find it difficult if no, impossible, to cross
the class/color barrier, particularly... where the class and color links have remained
virtually frozen".7
It is precisely this thawing of the class/color barriers that the Caribbean leaders
point to and take responsibility for. Many of them echoed the fact that they too were
the very ones frozen outside the class/color barrier in the early years. But in the last
two decades they believe that they have broken down those barriers. Some Caribbean
scholars think that while the barriers may have been breached, the structure still remains,
and in effect what has happened in the region is simply a changing of the old guard.
Farrell argues that independence or decolonization "cannot simply mean the exchange of
the white overseers for black ones. It cannot mean the exchange of white overlords for
black ones; or of white brutality, repression, insensitivity and arrogance for black
brutality, repression, insensitivity and arrogance".8
It is difficult to summarize those two opposing views of the social structure of the
region. On the one hand, there has been a virtual revolution in which the former black
Caribbean natives have replaced the white and Creole mulattoes as the ruling elites of
U W. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity. (New Haven Yale University
Press, 1968) Page 94.
*Trevor Farrell, "Decolonization in the English Speaking Caribbean" in The Newer Caribbean.
Page 6.
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used their newly acquired authority to repress opposition, punish their enemies, and
generally abuse the power. However, in spite of those abuses, the majority of Caribbean
citizens appeared to have benefited from the change, In the absence of other empirical
barometers to judge the extent of those benefits, we have to rely on (1) the results of
the institutional activity of national elections and (2) the absence of mass rebellion or
revolution in the area. In that respect except for the Grenada revolution (1979-83) the
Caribbean people have voluntarily gone to the polls and freely elected governments
which we can only conclude was in their best socioeconomic interest.
Certainly the argument could be made that the people of the Caribbean have no
other choice. They are committed to elect one corrupt party over another similar party;
and they therefore, must elect the best of two evils. This argument has some merit
because it implies that there is a need for real structural change in the social
composition and dynamics of the society. Yet an examination of the internal dynamics
of the New Jewel Movement's (NJM) social and political revolution in Grenada suggests
that their attempts at social change was no more successful than the current model. In
effect, by the time the U.S. invaded Grenada, the internal dichotomy among the factions
had resulted in violence unparalleled in the history of the region.
The current Caribbean leaders have been effective in reminding the masses of the
region, about the various humiliation and discrimination that they suffered at the hands
of the Colonialist and Creole Mulattoes. It would seem, that based on the consistent
level of stability that exist in the region, that they have succeeded for the time being, of
convincing the citizens that social conditions under the new ruling elite, is more tolerable
than under colonialization. The people we spoke to in the Caribbean had mixed
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opinion, Tire majority however fe„ ,hat the situation couid he worse. One man I
spoke with in Dominica who was unemployed and combining ahout partisan polities
told me, "at least we are a lot better off than Haiti-. , ,hink this sentenee generally
summarizes the attitude of the Eastern Caribbean citizen, in evaluating their social
condition. For many Caribbean natives and leaders, the economics of those small states
appeared to be a more important concern than the social structure.
C
-
The Economic Condition
The volatile and dependent nature of the Eastern Caribbean's economy has made
this subject one of the most researched and discussed issues in post independence
Caribbean politics. Sally Shelton Colby, former U.S. Consular in the Caribbean, makes
the following observation regarding the structure of the Caribbean economy.
"For most of the islands in the Eastern Caribbean political independence has
obviously not brought economic independence... island economics remain
highly fragile and dependent on external sources of concessional aid. There
has been only limited success at economic diversification and economics
remain overwhelmingly dependent on tourism, sugar, or banana production.
Consumption absorbs almost all gross domestic product while investment and
much of recurrent expenditure are financed largely from external resources in
the form of grants or concessional development assistance."9
In a nutshell, Colby's summary describes the Caribbean's economic scene. Of
course, at the local level, Government continues to raise revenue, not through the
export of industrial and agricultural goods, but by the imposition of tariffs and import
9
Salty Colby-Shelton, "An Introduction to the Eastern Caribbean" in McDonald, Sandstrom &
Godwin (Editors), The Caribbean After Grenada. Page 11.
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duty taxes, which significant escapes the cost of goods and setvices for the poor
people of the region.
William Demas, a Caribbean Economist and Governor of the Centra, Bank of
Trinidad and Tobago, describes the Caribbean economy as one of dependent
underdevelopment.
-Dependent underdeveiopmen. is manifested today in the lack of
diversification of our structure of production and exports; continuing excessive reliance
on imported foods; heavy geographical concentration in our foreign trade; insufficient
linkages between sectors both within each country and between countries of the region,
...shortages of foreign exchange; and above all unacceptably high levels of unemployment
and underemployment."10
From the preceding description of the region's economy, it seems logical to
conclude that the economic survivability of the region is largely dependent on the
support of the advanced industrial nations. This relationship which has the ability to
adversely affect the independence, and socioeconomic direction of those states, has been
described as "dependency" by Latin American scholars from the dependency school who
have published volumes on the subject. The more radical scholars of the Caribbean,
among them M.A. Farrell, argue that there is a "dependency" relationship between the
Caribbean and larger nations and that economic domination of the Caribbean, is simply
another form of colonization by the major powers. "The economy of the Caribbean then
can hardly be said to have been effectively decolonized. Caribbean resources continue
to be organized in accordance with metropolitan interests." 11 Farrell's observation is
10William G. Demas, "Perspectives on the Future of the Caribbean in the World Economy"
Caribbean Affairs Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1988) Pages 6-7.
n Trevor Farrell, "Decolonization in the English Speaking Caribbean", in The Newer Caribbean.
Jg9
accurate; however, like Cher regional scholars, he provides no realistic or meaningful
solution to the dependency factor.
Demas, on the other hand, does not subscribe to the dependency theory.
"I do not myself fully adhere to the dependency school of thought on
development. I find that while the dependency theory can in some ways
dlummate the past and even much of the present in Latin America and the
Canbbean,
...it fails to provide much of a useful guide to policies and
programs for economic and social change. Other than the revolutionary act of
drast,c dehnking from the world economy, particularly the capitalist par. of
it."
12 K
This view coming from one of the most respected economists in the Caribbean and
certainly an authority on Caribbean economy, clearly demonstrates that the Caribbean
economy is strongly based on the capitalist principles and values and that it is extremely
dependent on western capitalist countries for its survival. Demas clearly thinks that this
relationship should continue with the major nations, and that the free market principles
of capitalism should be pursued in the future.
This point is important for a number of reasons. First, it lends support to our
principal thesis, which asserts that the current ruling elites of the Eastern Caribbean are
strongly pro-capitalist. Secondly, the structure of the regions economy and a history of
prolonged dependence on the capitalist west for survival, strongly suggests that the
Caribbean political model would be hard pressed if not impossible to readjust to another
kind of economic system -- socialist for instance.
Page 10.
nWilliam G. Demas, "Perspectives on the Future of the Caribbean in the World Economy",
Pages 6-7.
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Like the soda, and political structures in the Eastern Caribbean, the economic
system of the region was developed by Britain, implemented by Britain and maintained
by Britain.
,„ fact, it was the development of the United Kingdom's economic expansion
policies which created s,avery and populated the Caribbean with descendant, of Africans.
For over two centuries those descendants of Africans have been exposed to only one
economic system and that is the economic dependence on the United Kingdom and
more recently the United States. The probability of changing the system is extremely
remote.
Caribbean leaders are not predicting any economic revolution, nor do they have any
illusions about their dependency status. However, they are not prepared to even
consider moderate alternatives which they perceive could adversely affect the economic
relationship they now have with Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.
Consequently, any consideration of "dependency theorist" strategies for economic change
would be unacceptable to them. Senator Ossie Walsh of Dominica whom I interviewed,
indicated that based on the size of his country and its total dependence on agriculture,
his governments main goal is to continue to seek favorable markets for their products in
the west, particularly bananas, which is the principal export crop. When reminded that
Geest Industries, the major British importer of bananas, had a virtual monopoly on the
importation of bananas and therefore, determined the price that they would pay
Dominican farmers to grow the crop, he said that his Government recognized the
unequal aspect of this economic relationship. However, the price for bananas on the
European market, had been relatively good for the last two years and his government
was pleased with the positive economic effect which had resulted from what he
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considered a fair market price for the banana Th,* kI mc nanas. The banana industry was responsible for
30% of the GDP of the country. 13
Dominica currently represents the only state in the region which derives a
significant percentage of its G.D.P. from agriculture (Table 4), for countries whose
resources are its fertile soil. The rest of the states seem to have relied less
agriculture and opted instead on other sources of revenue, including tourism and light
manufacturing, which are almost exclusively owned and controlled by what Paget Henry
calls the foreign "economic elites". Those two industries are extremely volatile and
depend almost exclusively on foreign economic activity. For instance, the Eastern
Caribbean tourist industry is greatly affected by independent external conditions in the
major industrial countries. Between 1973 and 74, there was a significant decline in the
tourist trade which seriously affected the economies of the region. The decline was due
to the global escalation of oil prices, which raised the cost of air travel and reduced the
disposable or discretionary income of the average tourist. Because these small countries
have no control over such economic activities in the west, they remain virtual hostages
to the North American economy, where most of the tourists originate.
Yet tourism remains one of the leading and certainly the main industry for most of
these new small states. The ruling political elites therefore, have invested a significant
amount of resource into that industry, at the expense of other industries such as
agriculture. Countries like Antigua, Grenada, St. Kitts, and St. Lucia, have experienced
major growth in the tourist industry over the last decade. This growth has led to a level
of complacency and dependency which can have potentially devastating long term effect
"Conversation with Senator Ossie Walsh - Dominica, November 17, 1989.
on those economies. But tourism represents an easy way out for Caribbean leaders.
The industry provides immediate employment, does not require major government capita,
expenditures, and helps develop the infrastructure of the hotel industry. Agriculture on
the other hand requires major outlay of capital, time to monitor the long term
development process of the industry, marketing of products, and a host of governmental
input, which could lead to higher taxes, an option which can seriously affect a party's
ability to remain in power. Based on those considerations, Caribbean government have
chosen instead to give strong support to the tourist industry.
In addition, some Caribbean economists and other intellectual elites have advanced
a number of proposals which they believe can exploit the full potential of tourism to
make it more profitable and correspondingly increase the regions foreign exchange
capacity. According to Demas, two other Caribbean economists, Alister Mclntyre and
Neville Nichols, have argued that tourism can bring about a more diversified pattern of
development through the promotion of greater linkages with other sectors and activities
in the economy. They suggest that linkages be established with local handicrafts, food
production, local cuisine, building materials, furniture, linens, towels, other soft
furnishings, garments, the building of small pleasure boats...etc. 14
Our research indicates that these are very solid economic concepts. However, in
discussing those options with small hotel owners and other people involved in the tourist
industry, we found no support or incentive for implementation of those linkages. For
instance, on the subject of food production for tourists, the available sociological data on
the behavior and ethnocentric characteristics of United States citizens would reveal that
"William G. Demas, "Perspectives on the Future of the Caribbean in the World Economy",
Pages 6-7.
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United States tourists are more comfortable eating fami.iar foods, than they are with
local foods. As a result, the small restaurant owners we spoke with, felt it was
significantly cheaper and more efficient to import hamburgers from the United States
than to get farmers to produce meat to make hamburger, The same argument relating
to cost and quality was repeated when we suggested another one of the economists
recommendation, namely the bui.ding of small pleasure boat, A young entrepreneur
pointed out that he could fly to Miami, purchase small pleasure boats and have them in
Antigua in a at least two weeks, at a price which could yield a profit. It would take
builders in the Caribbean Cose to at least six months to produce one of the same boats,
and it would cost at least four times as much.
What all those varied perceptions from the Caribbean people indicate, is that the
current economic structure that currently exist in the Caribbean, and have existed for
decades, is the only viable economic alternative available to the region. Radical
"dependency" theorist, including Caribbean scholars have advocated bold new economic
initiatives which calls for such action as industrialization of agriculture, and control of
the means of production of the region. Jamaica and Guyana have both tried to
restructure their economy in order to neutralize what the left considers as "foreign
control." Guyana took the lead in the attempt to control their economy and failed.
Courtney Blackman, former Governor of the Central Bank of Barbados, summarizes the
Guyana experience as follows:
"Between 1971 and 1977, the Bauxite, sugar, oil, telecommunications and most
of the distributive and banking sectors were nationalized. The state now
controls 80% of the formal economy. The state sector has failed so
comprehensively that Black Market operations are now estimated by some
economists to be about the same size as the formal cconomy...Guyana has
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provided living verification of the downward spiral hypothesi,..by recording an
l^fJT TgatiVe ^ inC°me §rOWth °f -23% °ver the Pe*d of1973-1985. In the process this largest and most richly endowed CARICOM
state has become the poorest community in the CARICOM Caribbean and
second only to Haiti in the entire region."
Against the background of severe economic failure in the larger state of Guyana
and Jamaica, the Eastern Caribbean leaders have decided to maintain the prevailing free
enterprise economic structure. They recognize the conservative nature of that position
and understand clearly that they must depend on foreign activity to stimulate their
economies. But my conversations with leaders in all the states indicate that they are
committed to their current economic relationship with foreign countries. Most of the
leaders do not consider dependence on foreign markets and tourism the same as
international control of their economies. The political elites of the region express a
level of comfort in their ability and authority to make economic decisions without having
to clear those decisions with the United Kingdom. Consequently, they consider the
continuation of the economic relationship with their former colonizers and other western
foreign interest, as a voluntary economic decision and one which they believe is based on
the recognition of the particular need of their various territories.
There are no easy answers to solving the Eastern Caribbean dependence on foreign
interests. The larger states have tried and failed. There has also been some integrated
regional approach to addressing the economic situation of the region. In 1973, the
Caribbean islands established a Caribbean Common Market known in the region as
"Courtney N. Blackman, "Debt, Development and Decline in the CARICOM Caribbean" in
Caribbean Affairs Vol. 1, No. 3 (July-September 1988) Page 14.
"CARICOM". This market c„mmu„ ily comprised all the largc, q[^^
British Caribbean and the OECS. The principal objective of CAR.COM was to provide
a common market for Caribbean produced goods and service,, and increase the overall
interregional trade. InitiaUy, there was some growth in the importation by member
states of Caribbean produced goods, which according to the terms of the market would
get preferential
.status over other foreign produced goods. However, by ,988,
CARICOM was in serious trouble and area governments had decided to take a second
look at the value of the organization.
There are a number of economic and political reasons for the partial failure of
CARICOM, but that would require another thesis just to explain. However, I believe
that a perspective from the man on the streets of the CARICOM countries would
perhaps summarize the perception for the failure. We spoke to manufacturers, shop
owners and importers in the various states of the region. Most people felt that the
CARICOM principle and objective was a good one; but the complaints are numerous.
Consumers complained that the quality of goods produced are inferior to those from the
Metropole, that locally produced goods cost more than those imported from foreign
countries. The store owners complained that CARICOM represented a monopoly
market for producers of goods and limited the variety of goods that they were able to
offer the consumers, thus resulting in slow turnover and reduced profits. Some small
manufacturers were unhappy, because their products were being bypassed for products
from larger territories, while others were elated at the marketing opportunities provided
by the arrangements. In Dominica for instance, a local producer of tomato ketchup had
to fold, because the stores were able to import ketchup from Trinidad, and sell it
cheaper than it was costing the local farmer to produce.
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There may be no conclusive lessons that can be drawn from the various economic
initiatives attempted by Eastern Caribbean leaders. The fact remains that the region has
attempted to, and continues to seek alternatives to their economic dependency on
foreign interest. But in the meantime they have taken the safe road of dealing with the
economic known quantities; namely, the United Kingdom, United States and Canada. In
addition, the Reagan administration creation of the (1984) Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) which allows selective Caribbean goods duty free entry into the United States was
a significant boost to area politicians who were under attack by left of center opposition
groups, and further reinforced the Eastern Caribbean economic links to the west.
When we consider the minute size and limited resources of the Eastern Caribbean
states, we have to seriously think about whether there are any other realistic economic
alternatives open to these small nations. Among the factors that impact on the decisions
to maintain the status quo are the following: most are underpopulated and cannot meet
the labor needs of large industries, and for the same reason cannot provide large
markets for consumer goods.
.
Because of the similarities in climate, terrain and geographical location, they all
produce similar agricultural crops and therefore negate the intra-market for those
products.
• The lack of technology in the region have not prepared the worker with the
mentality and skills needed to maintain large industries.
• The countries themselves are too poor to develop the infrastructure necessary to
control the means of production in the major industries. For instance, the tourist
trade does not yield a very high level of foreign exchange reserves for the Eastern
Caribbean because the Foreign countries where the tourists originate, own and
control the entire infrastructure of the industry. They own the various airlines that
take the tourist to the region (Air Canada, BEA, American Airlines). They own
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the hotels (Hilton, Radisson, etc.) where the visitors live. They own the car rental
agencies (Hertz, Budget and Avis). They own the gift stores - Little Switzerland
They own the banks which provide the loans to local restaurants and tour operators
(Bank of Nova Scotia, Barclays Bank) and most of the food and beverages
(Hemeken and Budweiser beer, Jack Daniels Whiskey and Johnny Walker Scotch)
consumed by the tourist are imported from the Western countries. The result of
this one-sided monopolistic economic arrangement is mutual but not equal The
Western based multinational corporations are able to extract the bulk of dollars
spent by the tourist in the Caribbean, while the local governments benefit by
increased employment of their people and a small percentage on the dollar to meet
the cost of low level industry personnel. In spite of these unequal relationships
countries like Antigua are benefiting immensely, according to government officials.
In 1989, Antigua had the lowest rate of unemployment in the region and enjoyed a
per capita income of $3,057 U.S., the highest among OECS'. Based on that kind
of result, it seemed logical to conclude that tourism will remain the major industry
of most of the small states. (Table 4)
The economic structure of the Eastern Caribbean cannot be separated from the
social and political structure. They are intrinsically interwoven into the peculiar model
that we have identified as the Eastern Caribbean model. Consequently, any analysis of
the economic condition must be done against a background which recognizes the
inherent linkages between those systems. In summary, the structure of the Eastern
Caribbean economy is one dominated by the following characteristics. The major
resource of the region is agriculture, and this is organized and developed based on the
interests of multinational corporations. The second major resource is the warm climate
and beaches of the region. These together help support the tourist industry, which is
also organized and developed based on the interest of the metropolitan centers of the
western world. The other sources of revenue come from local and import taxes, and the
TABLE 4
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Economic Indicators - 1987
Unit = % Agriculture Mfg. Construction
Hotels &
Restaurants
C Tour Ism) Gov "t
.
Other
Per capita
S U.S.
Antigua/ Barbuda 4.69 3. 69 11.71 15. 38 15. 54 49. 3057.
Domi n ica 29 91 6. 60 5.33 1.38 20. 63 36. 15 1286
Grenada 18.85 5. 37 9.39 6. 54 18. 58 41.27 1208.
Montserrat 4.31 5. 97 11.97 3.95 8. 72 65.08 3598.
St. Kitts/Nevis 9.44 14. 38 7.75 9. 35 19. 20 39.88 1994.
St Lucia 14 59 7. 86 8.10 7. 18 22.9 40.38 1181.
St. Vincent &
Grenadines
20. 83 15. 58 8.29 2.08 10.47 42. 75 1015.
* Other includes grants and funds sent hone by Eastern Caribbean citizens vho
migrated to tne West.
SOURCE: 0ECS Statistical PocXet Digest 1987
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bulk of the region, revenue comes in the form of economic grams and aid packages
from the governments of the powerful western nations, these include the United States,
Franee, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The Eastern Caribhean have no raw
materials, the population is extremely small, and the land mass has limited Percentage of
arable land. Those characteristics are the hard economic reality within which the new
ruling elite must operate.
D« Socioeconomic Expectations
Against the background of limited economic resources the ruling elites are required
to develop structures and systems that can effectively meet the expectations of the
citizens of the state. Their method of interest aggregation as they attempt to formulate
policies based on the demands of the various interest groups within the society, is
perhaps one of the more interesting aspects of the Eastern Caribbean model. In the
first place, in order to maintain any kind of economic stability, it becomes necessary that
the ruling parties develop policies of close cooperation with foreign capitalist interests;
secondly, that they maintain good relations with those donor countries, and equally
important that they develop strategies to maintain a broad based support among the
various local interest groups, in order to guarantee re-election. How they accomplish
those tasks and meet those demands have been the subject of discussion among scholars
and Caribbean citizens for some time.
We quoted Gordon K. Lewis (page 23) and Courtney Blackman (page 4), two
prominent scholars in the Eastern Caribbean commenting on the authoritative and
abusive nature of Caribbean governments. These criticisms are not isolated. The
consensus among Caribbean intellectuals is that the ruling parties are basically
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authoritarian, repressive a„d paternalistic and ^^„ Qf^
_
nherently unfai, ^ lem „corrup(„ , a tamffiar adjcc(iv£^ tQ descr;bc
political parties. Dr. CUve Thomas, a professor at the University of Guya„a, describes
ruhng parties in the Caribbean in the following context:
"Having se, its sigh, only on forma, poiitica, independence, the pontine, party
lTzrrm\ a: e,ectora ' °rganization^ «™«^content an elecon and after it has won or iost, merely acts as an agency for
exclndtng, rather than involving, the people in the decisions of Government
As th,s has continued, inevitably the electoral system has been transformed
"
into a dev.ee for suppressing not expressing the will of the people In
adddton the eruption of corrupt voting practices and other irregularities has
reduced the whole process to simply a means of keeping the party in office.-'
Another scholar Paget Henry states that in Antigua the ruling elites have
manipulated and abridged the practice of democracy." Caribbean political elites,
however, do not accept these categorizations. They maintain that their governments are
legitimate and fair, and that the demands and expectations of the citizens of the region
are well met based on the limited resources available to them.
We discussed the corruption issue with ruling party officials in every island of the
Eastern Caribbean. The general consensus among them was that partisan politics was
inevitable in a two party or multiparty system. They all felt that under normal
circumstances, the nature of partisan politics would necessarily demand that party
supporters interest be addressed favorably in order to maintain continued support.
"CUve Y. Thomas, •Meaningful Participation the Fraud of It; in Lowenthal and Comitas
(Editors), The Aftermath of Sovereimtv. (New York: Anchor Press, NY 1973) Page 352.
''Paget Henry, The Newer Caribbean. Page 299.
However, they felt (hat h most instances^ ^ _ ^
among the citizens irre,eva„ t of their party afflUation. The oppositio„ parties of course
disagreed with that evaluation.
There is no doubt cha, the Eastern Caribbean political mode, described so far
provides significant areas for abuse by ruling parties and that abuse of power occur
frequently within the region. On the other hand, the socia, and economic demands
made on government are certainly beyond the capacity of ruling parties to meet.
Consequently, ruling parties tend to take care of those interests that can guarantee
support for re-election. The demands are typical of those associated with developing
countries, ye. the economic resources of these small states are well below that of other
larger developing states. Car, Stone notes that the decline of agriculture production and
the limited labor-absorptive capacity of the new service and manufacturing industries
have meant upwardly spiraling unemployment levels, continued nutritional problems,
poor housing and overcrowded and overtaxed public and social services amenities. He
concludes that the physical infraction of modernity has been established in the Caribbean
amidst a background of social demands and pressures on government for qualitative
improvement in the standard of living for the people. These pressures seem to be
generated in a situation where public and private resources fall short of the fulfillment
of these demands. 18
Unable to meet and fulfill the many demands on their governments, Party officials
have opted to concentrate on the development of interest aggregation policies that
maintain them in power. These governments are continually engaged in making
"Carol Stone, "Decolonization and the Caribbean State System", in Stone & Henry (Editors),
The New Caribbean. (1SH1 Publication, PA 1983) Page 46.
po.i.ically influenced expenditures, which resul[ „
_^ ^
Eastern Caribbean state except perhaps St. Vincent which spends ,4% of the nationa,
budge, on education. Most governments consider those three areas as liabilities and in
are in piace for instance were a„ started by the coionists and consist of one major public
hospital in the capita,, with a few understaffed and ill-eouipped clinics in the rural areas.
Educational resources are not any better. In Dominica for instance, over the las. ,0
years the state has been unable to build and staff one additional secondary school to
absorb the children who graduate from the primary school system. In St. Lucia only
32% of children eligible to attend high school are admitted. (See Table 5. These
numbers represent children who are in school only). Out of the 38,000 children in the
primary education system only 12,000 will ever attend high school.-' The Ministers of
Education simply claim that there are no funds to build schools or hire teachers.
Meanwhile in Dominica, every year over 1800 students graduate from primary schools
and only 500 are able to attend secondary schools because of the lack of space in those
schools. One need not be a social scientist to determine what the long term result of
this neglect will be on the society.
Yet the government in power in Dominica is a popular government. The party is
enjoying its second term in office and is likely to win a third term in 1990. Why are
people so willing to let government off the hook?
'The Manifesto", of the St. Lucia Labor Party, Page 10.
One basic reason is that Caribbean pcopie have continual* demanded service bu,
have never depended on governmen, to improve the quality of hfe. People grew up in
•he coionia, system where government was o„ly responsible for the social or economic
welfare of the European colonist. Governments never seriously addressed the problems
of its black population. As a result, the masses of people became extremely resourceful
in developing nongovernmental subsystems to he,p themselves. For instance when one
considers that Eastern Caribbean Governments can only fund between one and three
scholarships a year for local students to attend institutes of higher learning. These are
called
-Hand Scholarship. I. seems incomprehensible to determine how any serious
development can take place in a society if the citizens are no, adequately educated. Bu,
the people do not depend on government for services like higher education. Dominica
has one of the highest ratios of college graduates to people among the Caribbean
islands, in spite of the fact that governmen, can only fund one (1) Island Scholarship per
year. People succeed because they are extremely resourceful.
Migration is perhaps the most important factor in Caribbean economics and is
responsible for the high level of college graduates that emerge out of small states like
Dominica. In most of those instances, Caribbean people migrate mainly to the United
Kingdom and the U.S.A. to seek employment leaving their kids and family behind.
When they have settled and found jobs, they subsequently send for their brother,
cousins, etc. and the educational process continues without any support from the
government.
As a result the people do not give serious consideration to any political party.
Although voter turnout in the Caribbean has been consistently high, expectations are
low. When I spoke to people on the streets of the Eastern Caribbean states about
TABLE 5
Education
- 1987 / 1988
Category
SCHXX ENROLLMENT STAFF
STAFF
PUPIL RATIO
Priaary Secondary
15
Primary Secondary Triiary Secondary Primary Secondary
Antigua/ Barbuda 43 9,097 4,413 446 207 20 14
Dominica 66 9 16, IDS 3,264 646 171 25 19
Grenada 58 18 19,963 6,437 761 297 26 22
Montserrat 14 1 1,403 984 67 71 21 14
St. Kltts/Nevls 27 6 6.457 4.115 263 273 24 16
St. Lucia 81 12 32.8D9 6,264 1,060 351 31 IB
St. Vincent &
Grenadl nes 61 21 24,541 6,447 1,261 371 19 17
SOURCE: OECS Statistical Pocxet Digest 1987
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peoP,e pardon m government, the„_
_
among die hard parry supporters.
Among the questions I asked peopie on the street was "What party do you
hto health, empioyment, and education?" I have included a few responses:
St. Kitts
.The party m power ,s the Peoples Action Movement (PAM)
•The prime minister is Kennedy Simmonds
K
>
•
rhe opposition party is St. Kitts Labor Party (SKLP)
Response from a 20 year-old bartender:
"I don't take any interest in politics and I don't vote because all
promises"'
^^ « °f
---^^^Sl" *
Antigua
•The party in power is Antigua Labor Party (ALP)
•The prime minister is V.C. Bird
•The opposition party is Antigua's United National Democratic Party (UNDP)
Response from an ALP Supporter:
"I support Mr. Bird's party. He has been taking care of us since 1951. He is aman of the people, I can go talk to him anytime I want to."
A non-ALP supporter:
"I voted for UNDP."
Why?
"The Bird people are too corrupt."
Are the UNDP a better party?
T don't know yet, but they deserve a chance.
Grenada
Two employees of a public social agency:
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Right now we are not supporting anv nartv .
Maunce" (Maurice Bishop^ dj&ffi
Pere"n
~ ~
are elected, theyS fenL«d h"^T' gi"nS ' * S°™ as
change my mind I will vote for NDC/'
"g hUgC mansions
-
But * >
St. Lucia
.The party in power is the United Workers Party (UWP)
•The Prime Minister is John Compton
1 }
•The opposition party is St. Lucia Labor Party
A 21 year-old unemployed woman:
"All the politicians are the same. I voted UWP th™ v™
they have been promising me a inh ? t •,, Y
rS aga Since that time
voting 'Labor' • (When f sn h'J ^
UnemPloyed - Next time I'm
Youtl Communily^ ^ * « * Minister for
These four examples represent a random sample of the kind of response I was able
to get from the voters in the various states. The responses in all the states were
basically the same. People seem to resign themselves to the fact that Government has
limited resources, they seem to have little expectation of their elected officials. But
what was significant is that Government was very much personalized. People related
more to individuals than to the party per se or the party's ideology, and rated the party
by the benefits they received personally from Government members.
Party supporters on the other hand, have high expectations. They appear to expect
to benefit socioeconomic^ from their support. Consequently they arc normally
extremely vocal, maintain a high profile and represent the party with all the emotion
that they can muster. The supporters also operate under a narrow Darwinist philosophy
which suggests "a survival of the fittest attitude". Therefore, the members of a winning
political party will generally expect to get jobs, and improve their socioeconomic
conditio, They believe and expect that supporters of the losing party should be
excluded. This narrow perspective of the democratic responsibilities of governments by
the citizens is a clear manifestation of the lack of knowledge that exists within the
society regarding the principles of democracy. We have continually emphasized
throughout this study that the Caribbean people experience with the authoritative system
of British colonialism have allowed the new elites to manipulate the system, to allow
only for the freedom of election, The Caribbean people appear to have accepted the
authoritative nature of Caribbean democracy without any challenge. This acceptance has
led to the development of behavior patterns which though not peculiar only to that
region does paradoxically contribute significantly to the maintenance of political stability.
Within the Caribbean model, citizens who are members of the opposition or losing
parties, will generally not attempt to seek jobs when the winning party is in power.
They refrain from seeking services in public institutions managed by winning party
supporters and maintain a low profile until the next election when hopefully their party
may win, at which time they would expect to benefit from the victory.
The politicians and other institutional managers have never attempted to modify
those behavior patterns. They have never sought to educate the people on their rights
as citizens in a democracy. In effect, they seem to rely strongly on this absence of
knowledge and limited expectations of the masses in order to continue their political
dominance. Under those conditions mass response and support are generated by
symbolic politics, rhetorical oratory, mud slinging (referred to as "Mepuis" locally) and
empty promises. Mass political meetings usually take on the atmosphere of a religious
revival meeting than that of a forum for constructive, political debate and information.
Against this background, the peoples' expectations of their government are minimal,
201
which would also account for th^ c ,• • ,l the ability of political parties to remain in office for long
periods of time.
This minima, expectation shouid not be construed as ,ow demand for services. On
•he contrary, there are significant demands for services a, all levels of the society.
Certainly, in small nations where there are low levels of materia, resources, an
undiversified structure of production, an excessive* high rate of unemp,oyment and a
persistent state of eeonomtc dependency, one can expect the socia, and economic needs
of the people to be staggering and they are. But the response of the ruling elites to the
demands of the people has been minimal.
E
- The Social Condition
How can government consistently fail to meet the majority needs of the people and
still remain in power in a society that practices free and open democratic elections? A
close analysis of the sociological picture of the region will reveal that the governments
have been able to successfully reduce the social cleavages that existed within the society,
thus eliminating social conflict. They have been able to do this largely through their
charismatic and personalistic approach to government which they use effectively to
soothe the pain and anger that normally exist among the poor in developing countries.
The criticism leveled at the entire Caribbean as a unit has been well documented, the
characterization of "Banana Republic" for instance denotes a system in which there is a
high level of high handed authoritarianism and a social dichotomy of extremely wealthy
ruling elites and a large mass of poor and underprivileged citizens. These systems
normally maintained through the use of a well paid and well equipped military.
are
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Pre-Sandanista Nicaragua, E, Saivador, and Haiti are three examp.es of ,he kind of
oppressive regimes that have dominated other deveioping countries in the region.
TTte Sociopoiiticai system in the Eastern Caribbean differs markedly from those
larger oligarchies in the region, but seem to achieve the same results, namely the
patronizing and contro! of the masses; yet, except in Grenada, Eastern Caribbean citizens
have not reacted with anger nor have they revohed or brought about any iasting
revolutionary change in their respective states.
The reasons for this seemingly passive state of the masses of the Caribbean are
precisely what contributes to the peculiar aspects of the Eastern Caribbean political
models which we have argued is different from that of the other countries in the region.
The reasons include the belief in the legitimacy of Government, the low expectations in
governments' ability to solve the socioeconomic problems, massive movement of people
out of the country through liberal emigration policies and the apparent freedom to elect
the government of their choice. On the other side of this equation are the actions of
the elected ruling elites. There is no doubt that the political system is authoritarian
which means that the governments maintain absolute power and have the ability and
option to be as ruthless as the Somoza regime in Nicaragua or the military elites in
Haiti. However, except for Grenada (1954-79) where Eric Gairy had established his own
constitutional dictatorship supported by his hand-picked security forces, the Eastern
Caribbean ruling elites have been more subtle and their strategies certainly more
humane and effective.
The ruling political elites in the Eastern Caribbean do not maintain a military.
They are careful not to demonstrate any symbols of affluence and try exceedingly hard
to maintain a low socioeconomic profile. As a result the masses seem willing to accept
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Government limited economic programs tha. they present to the nation. Lack of
schools in Dontinica, high u„emp loyment and lack of teacher, in St. Lucia, poor health
services in Antigua, are symptomatic of the socioeconomic problems tha, exist in the
region, but the voting public appear to accept those shortcomings. Re-election of those
elites year after year can be interpreted as endorsement and acceptance of their
socioeconomic policies.
To understand this seemingly paradoxical situation, it is necessary that we consider
the social dynamics of the society as a whole, and more importantly the philosophy and
attitude of the Eastern Caribbean citizen. The Caribbean social structure have always
been characterized by distinct class lines which we have commented on in Chapter Two.
There were always different groups at the top, the white colonialists, the Creole
mulatto," and the local economic elite, while the large mass of Africans were always at
the bottom of the socioeconomic structure. In the colonial period class and
the major variable in determining one's status in the society. "Race and color
shorthanded designations of class, but they often overwhelm all other connotations,
color, visibility may transcend other elements of class".*) ln maintaining status in the
Caribbean, education and income are now the major determinants in acquiring status in
the current social hierarchy of the Eastern Caribbean.
This change in the social values of the Caribbean people which began in the 1960s
have significantly reduced the tension and anger that existed in these communities when
the white colonialist and mulattos dominated the social scene. The all white class are
gone, as are the mulatto clubs. The multi national banks, Barclays, Royal Bank of
race were
are
^David Lowenthal, West Indian Societies (London: Oxford University Press, England 1972)
Page 134.
Canada, Chase and Bank of Nova Scotia, now employ loca, Mack management and the
staff are comprised primarily of local professionals. In addition, the ruling elites have
eliminated all the trappings that was symbolic of white social and economic domination.
lHe lavish cocktail parties at Government houses, the European dresses complete with
white gloves, the chauffeurs have all been eliminated. Government officials still host
parties of course, but these are less formal and are attended by a cross section of party
supporters instead of an exclusive elite group. These practices of encouraging social
interaction among the various socioeconomic groups in the society has been a major
strategy of modern political elites in the region. Members of parliament public relations
departments are adept at creating the environment for the poor and wealthy supporters
of the party to mingle.
The effect of this governmental strategy on the masses has to be measured against
a background of historical alienation, humiliation and abandonment of the lower classes
of the society by the colonial ruling classes. Since the achievement of self government
status, the lower classes have had a psychological weight lifted off their back. The fact
that they are no longer treated as second class citizens in their own country is to them a
historical milestone. They expect that with their own people in control of the country,
the opportunities for social and economic advancement are more attainable. People we
spoke to made it clear that while their system was not ideal, and while their per capita
was not as high as other western countries, the fact remained that they were being ruled
by their own people. This factor was reiterated over and over in every island I visited.
In St. Lucia a junior civil service employee told me "down here we are the majority and
we decide our own destiny. In America you are a minority and the white man
determines your fate."
ThiS reSP°nSe
'
a 'lhOUgh SimP' is'^
-y -plain some of the reasons for the high
tolerance ieve, of Eastern Carihhean citizen, of their pohtica, mode, which to wes.ern
schoiars may appear passive. I, appears that Caribbean citizens have decided that i, is
better to be sera iexP,oi ted by their own ieaders than ,o be totally re-enslaved by the
white imperialist.
,t does no, seen, to matter to then, that they are in effect stil,
controiled externa,* by foreign capita,. The physica, absence of coloniahsts frora the
region appears to have satisfied their need for sociopolitical freedom if no, economic
freedom. What is even more significant is that they credit the politico! leaders for the
attainment of this new fonnd freedom and their strong loyalty is oftentimes
incomprehensible by more rational and scholarly individuals. At the height of his reign,
Eric Gairy no, only abnsed his power, bn, had literally set up a virtual dictatorship in
Grenada, yet he continued to generate support from the masses until his demise in 1979
Most Caribbean leaders have not taken the Gairy approach. We have indicated
earlier that political leaders in the Caribbean have one overriding goal in their quest for
political power and that is the economic incentive that accompanies political
appointments. Therefore, they are literally always consumed with the need to remain in
power to the same extent that the average person would relish job security. As a result
most of the abuse of power activity by political elites in the Eastern Caribbean are
predominantly associated with getting re-elected and maintaining their party in power.
To achieve those objectives, they have utilized a two pronged strategy. The first is to
discredit and destabilize any opposition that may attempt to challenge them. Their
strategies will normally include character assassination of political opponents, the passage
of legislation to shut down opposition newspapers and denial of permits to hold public
meetings or political demonstrations. They will also deny employment to non-party
206
arc
support an, deny govern™, contracts to oppositionamm ^^
characteristically ru.hlcss and manifest a phflosophy of "win elections by any means
necessary".
On .he other hand the ruling parties arc careful no, to alienate the majority or ,hc
broad masse, They are well aware of the freedom demon, as perhaps ,hc most
important aspect of the Caribbean people', life. They riKh,ly perceive, based on
experience, that the masses won', care ,00 much if a wealthy opposition contractor is
denied a lucrative contract or whether .some "party" pamphlet is shu, down. They
calculate that the majority of their supporters are concerned with issues that affect their
daily lives and which guarantees «hcm Ihe freedom ,0 live wha, ever
-existence" ,hey
choose. This emotional attachment ,0 freedom is meticulously exploited by the political
leaders.
National elections are held on lime and according to the constitution. Minor
details of lair elections are not important, thus incumbency normally maintains a major
advantage. In addition, the social and legal intrusions into people's lives are maintained
at a minimum. For instance, we found little evidence of laws relating to closing time of
bars on the islands. Some bars and rum shops have licenses which authorize them to
remain open 'til 9:00 p.m. (these are cheaper than the all night licenses). But at 9:00
p.m. the proprietors simply close the front doors and open the back doors for business
as usual. Particularly, if the proprietor is a parly supporter no action will ever be taken
against them. In fact, occasionally Parly officials and the police will stop by after hours
to drink and socialize. This pattern of loose enforcement of community laws are the
norm in the region. Ruling political parties try as much as possible to avoid unnecessary
regulation of the lives of the poor masses.
Relative 1'r.vpr.y
This policy of „ot unnecessarily antagonizing the poor has proved to be
exceptional* effective for retaining stability in the society and for guaranteeing the
rejection of ruling parties.
,„ Dominica in ,978, poor supporters of the Labor Party
squatted on government land and built some shacks to house their families. When the
Freedom party won the election in ,98.1, they never attempted to move the squatter*, on
the contrary they have supported and partially funded the community known as
-Gutter-.
By
,985, the party had succeeded in convincing those squatters to support them in the
national election and eventually won the constituent seat for that district.
Western scholars and writers have presented the Caribbean as an area plagued by
poverty and dominated by repressive political regimes. Ted Szulc described the region's
leadership:
"Poverty and lack of opportunity deprive the islands of the best leadership. In
their absence, the leadership often rests in the hands of the second rater, the
corrupt, the politically ambitious and ideologies. Given the combination of
corruption and poverty, explosions become almost unavoidable". 21
The scholar David Lowenthal saw the creation of police states in the Caribbean as
inevitable.
"Beleaguered by their own supporters, West Indian leaders confront economic
and social problems that they are powerless to cope with. Their dawning
awareness of this, coupled with a fear that the populace may reach the same
2, Ted Szulc, "Radical Winds in the Caribbean", New York Times Magazine (May 25, 1980) Page
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conclusion, impels them to seek stability at a„ cost, Only a police statehowever, can secure a stability that benefits so few".*
These observations and description of life in the Caribbean by western scholars are
speculative and may apply to the larger states in the hemisphere. Bu, some of those
categorizafions are made based on superficial knowledge of the region and in most cases
are totally inapplicable to the smaller Eastern Caribbean states. Certainly, any political
analysis of the existing infrastructure of the region may lead one to conclude that social
explosions are unavoidable and that the creation of police states are the only way to
maintain stability in such unequal societies. But closer analysis of the social structure
will reveal that the cleavages and economic gaps that exist between the various groups
are not as pronounced as one would speculate. Nor is Government as overly oppressive
as is the impression gleamed from literature written about the Caribbean.
It is difficult to measure the extent of poverty or to identify a distinct affluent class.
The members of the political elites, mainly the ministers of Government generate
salaries ranging between $50,000 E.C. a year for junior ministers ($18,500 U.S.) to an
average of $80,000 E.C. for Prime Ministers which amounts to approximately $30,000
U.S. With salaries as modest as this, ministers are either unable or unwilling to flaunt
extravagance among their constituents. Neither can we categorize that group as an
affluent class. The economic elite may be the only group that can be identified as being
wealthy and while they have some influence on government, they have no political
power.
^David Lowenihal, West Indian Societies. Page 317.
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Poverty in ehe reg,on ,s reiative; the per capita income „ expected* ,ow, but other
poverty indicator, such as infant mortality (24, per^ „.^ ^ |jfc ^
generally comparabie with the modern western advanced industrial nations (Table 6). ,„
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TABLE 6
Population Statistics - 1997
Category
Antigua/ Barbuda
Dom i nlca
Grenada
Montserrat
St. Kitts/ Nevis
St. Lucia
St
.
V i ncent &
GrenadI nes
Population
77.093
81,185
94.118
11,900
44.000
142,342
113.000
Population
Density
175.
1
108.3
273.2
116. 3
163.4
230.9
290. 9
Crude Birtn
Rate
14. 3
19. 1
32. 1
16. 5
23. 2
26. 9
25. 0
Crude Deatn
Rate
5.
1
5. 6
10. 5
10. 3
6. 6
6. 0
Infant
Mortality
Sate
21.2
15.9
28.2
35.0
20.4
25. 0
SOUKCE: OECS Statistical Pocket Digest 1987
fact, the Hfc expectancy for the region is signiflcantIy highcr^ ,hc ,. fc J
black males in the United States.
In the Eastern Caribbean people are poor and famine* have to live on low wage,
There is not enough decent housing for the masses. The transportation is inadequate,
and major improvement is needed in the health and education systems. Bu, people are
no. dying of mainutrition. Homelessncss is almost non-existent and crime is at an
absoiute minimum. (In ,979, during the hurricane Gi.bert onslaught, prisoners in
Dominica were sent home and returned to prison after the hurricane). Poiice officers
are no. armed in the Eastern Caribbean and the average crime normally involves petty
burglary, shoplifting, and domestic altercation, etc.
The notion that the Eastern Caribbean is on the brink of socioeconomic disaster is
inconsistent with the actual situation that prevails as it relates to the lifestyle and
character of the people. This factor cannot be overemphasized, because it is the central
argument of the thesis. (Wc further believe that it is imperative that any analysis of the
Eastern Caribbean region be evaluated based on the data available, specifically, from the
Eastern Caribbean slates.) To lump the Eastern Caribbean states with the entire
Caribbean and assume that they have the same socioeconomic problems is inherently
misleading.
The picture of a depressed Caribbean region is relatively accurate but the "gloom
and doom" analysis that is published in the international press is predominantly found in
the larger independent territories. This is evident from the following excerpt typical of
outside observations, from the New York Times on life in the Caribbean.
"Translated into human terms, these figures represent malnutrition, disease,
high infant mortality, some of the Western Hemisphere's most wretched slums
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(electricity, running water and sewers are often non-existent) rampant crime
and worst of a„, littie or no hope for a better future. AH this is ohvious
enough
,„ the siums of Kingston, Jamaica or Port-au-Prince, Haiti or in
Georgetown, Guyana".23
On the surface this description seemed to be written about the entire Caribbean
but on closer analysis Szulc was describing the condition that he had seen in Guyana,
Jamaica, and Haiti, three of the most economically depressed countries in the world.
T*e tendency to group all the countries of the Caribbean in the same socioeconomic
framework is based on a number of common denominations, such as geographical
location which does not adequately compensate for other social characteristics, values
and variables that are unique to the smaller countries. Size, in terms of population and
land mass, is certainly one of the major variables that differentiates the Eastern
Caribbean from other Caribbean countries like Jamaica and Haiti.
Because of the small size of the Eastern Caribbean states, the effect of poverty is
significantly reduced and minimized. Communities in the region are smaller and less
populated. As a result, people are aware of the pockets of poverty that emerge in their
communities and are quick to take a common approach to solving some of the
immediate needs of the poorer people. Elderly people in Eastern Caribbean societies are
normally maintained by their offsprings. Orphaned kids are cared for by a network of
relatives, while public health care and dental services are provided free to those who
cannot afford private physicians.
Ted Szulc, "Radical Wings in the Caribbean", New York Times Magazine (May 23, 1980) Page
There is an abundance of fruits in the country and people require no license to
fish. Besides, part of Caribbean people's culture is one of good hospitality.
Consequently, families who are better off will normally help ,eed neighbors who need
food. This communal spirit is predominant in the small communities and with the help
Of church organizations, they provide an informa. social network for meeting some of the
socioeconomic problems that inevitably confront poor people. Within that environment,
Governments are able to prevent the potential explosions that seem to be imminent in
societies where there is mass poverty. The absence of explosion may lead us to
conclude that either people are not poor or that Government has tight control on public
expression. The history of the region indicates that people are poor, not destitute.
There are no civil explosions because the communities have learned how to take care of
their own social problems and do not blame the government for their poverty.
Government intervention in social crisis represents supplemental assistance. There
are no structured funding processes lor the maintenance or development of social
programs. In Dominica, for instance, the Catholic Church educates more children at the
post primary level than the Government. The church also provides the only facility in
the country for mentally and physically disabled students. The World Health
Organization, Planned Parenthood, Oxfam are international agencies that provide
funding in the islands for social programs. Cumulatively these community and
international organizations contribute to the socioeconomic survival of the poor people
of the region. The fact the countries are small allow the resources available to be
spread among more people than they would be in larger countries. As a consequence,
the abject poverty that is synonymous with the region is significantly diluted.
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After 23 years of sett government and an average of ,0 years of independence, the
region has experienced one major political uprising. That was in Grenada in ,979. The
Oairy regime after a quarter century in power, had begun to deviate from the proven
strategies of modesty and rhetoric and was eventually brought down by the New Jewel
Movement (NJM). Four years later the NJM, itself, deviated from the Eastern
Caribbean mode, and was destabilized from within, allowing the United States to crush
the revolution.
The people and governments of the Eastern Caribbean have over the past forty
years developed a system in which the political, economic and social values are shaped
by a number of historical experiences including religion, slavery, and colonization. These
historical experiences have combined to produce a people characterized by pride,
honesty, a love of freedom and a desire to maintain legitimate governments. Above all,
they do not have great expectations from their government. They are extremely
resourceful which means that the Government of the region function more like managers
rather than leaders of the nation. It is interesting to note that United Nations AID
agencies such as UNESCO do not consider the Eastern Caribbean as poor countries.
The Eastern Caribbean socioeconomic standards are considered well above the criteria
used to determine poverty. In fact, states like Antigua, St. Kitts, and Montserrat, have
per capita income in the same category with Argentina and Brazil, which have been
recognized as the more successful new modernizing countries.
CHAPTER V
POLITICAL STRUCTURE
A- A Paradoxical Modi i
Our study of the political structure of the Eastern Caribbean suggests strongly that
the system is unique to these small nation states. The entire model is like a colossal
paradox and manifests characteristics that are indigenously peculiar. The mode, seems to
be very informal and flexible; yet at the same time it can be formal and rigid. It
encourages popular participation in the political process but also limits participation after
national elections. There are extremely liberal laws which respects the freedom of the
individual and there are also restrictive conservative laws enacted to censor newspapers
and intimidate political opposition. The system manifests the principles of democracy
but the decision making process of the state is highly authoritative.
Among both the leadership and masses of the region exists a strong commitment to
institutional legitimacy. This commitment is manifested by the people s consistent
reliance on democratic elections as the preferred means for changing government.
There is, however, a distinct personal element in the political participation process of the
region. People are encouraged to vote personalities rather than issues establishing
popular but oftentimes lame governments. There are no military regimes in the region.
Yet some political parties are still able to maintain a monopoly on political power.
These factors in part constitute the structural characteristics of the Eastern Caribbean
political model. A model which we believe is so extraordinary as to render it difficult to
analyze within the structure of existing scholarly models. In the remainder of the
chapter we will attempt to analyze some of these and other aspects of the political
structure. We will begin with the issue of Caribbean nationalism or its absence.
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B. Nationalism
Tne seven Eastern Caribbean countries discussed in this study share a number of
similarities which sometimes makes it difficult for foreigners to differentiate one from the
other. The common denominators includes limited economic resources, a communal
social structure, similar weather patterns and a number of visible political, physical, and
cultural similarities. Based on those similarities, and a common history of British
colonization, one would logically expect a strong sense and spirit of Caribbean
nationalism among the people of the region. But this has not been the case. There is a
profound absence of a Caribbean nationalism spirit in the region. The people identify
strongly with their own island. Their allegiance is expressed with pride when they refer
to themselves as Antiguans, Dominicans, St. Lucians, etc. Lowenthal observed that:
"Each West Indian island has its special features, a unique self image, and particular
view of the others. Large and small islands are equally conscious of individuality".! This
insularity among the islands has a dynamic affect on the political structure of the region,
but impacts negatively for future economic development, since most economists believe
that political and economic integration in the region are prerequisites for the
development of a strong Caribbean economy. In spite of the implied merit, and benefit,
of political and economic integration, the small states continue to maintain their
insularity. How can countries with so much in common, in such close proximity, and
with a common history have failed to develop a spirit of regional nationalism?
Hans Kohn, one of the leading theorists on nationalism, describes nationalism
primarily as a state of mind or ideology. This concept more than any other accurately
lDavid Lowenthal, West Indian Societies. (Oxford University Press, 1972) Page 8.
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defines nationalism because i, identifies and emphasizes theW of nationalism as
perhaps the most critical factor necessary to bring about the process of nationalism.
Factor such as common descent, language, territory, customs and traditions are all
important and perhaps essentia, characteristics for buiiding national However, it is
conceivab,e that in some states even with the existence of all those characteristics and
prerequisites, nationalism may fai, to develop without the mass participation and the
accompanying necessary state of mind. Kohn alludes to this when he states that
"nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of people and claiming to
permeate all its members. It recognizes the nation state as the idea, form of political
organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of
economic well being".2
From Kohn's definition it is easy to conclude that nationalism cannot be achieved
in the abstract nor can factors such as race, language, and tradition by themselves bring
about nationalism among a people. The state of mind concept is integral to
understanding nationalism. It seems that for a national movement to be successful, the
masses must not only espouse a common goal, they must experience a feeling of
togetherness. This feeling or state of mind must come from a process of political and
historical development and education. This process is critical because, according to
Kohn, "nationalism is not a national phenomenon, not a product of eternal or national
laws; it is a product of the growth of social and intellectual factors at a certain stage of
history".3
2Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism
. (New York:
3Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism
. (New York:
The Macmillan Co. 1956) Page 16.
The Macmillan Co. 1956) Page 6.
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If we examine the historical development of nationalism among Third World
nations, we will identify and recognize the forces and factors that contribute to
nationalism and to which Kohn refers to in his analysis and definition of the theory. For
him nationalism is not natural, it is a state of mind and it must include the mass
participation of the people. Fundamentally, he uses nationalism as a feeling that "gains
the emotional warmth of concreteness only through the effects of an historical
development which by means of education, economic interdependence, and
corresponding political and social institutions, brings about the integration of the
masses...* These broad theoretical definitions and analyses of nationalism which
center around the achievement of popular sovereignty are founded on a historical study
of nationalist movements beginning with the French Revolution. In evaluating the
criterion for nationalism put forward by Kohn in particular, it becomes clear that a
serious absence of the factors which he identifies as crucial to the development of
nationalism, such as mass integration, economic independence, education, and more
important, the right state of mind, will not bring about nationalism within a state.
Nowhere is the theoretical concept more vivid than in the former British colonies
of the Caribbean, where in spite of a common language, common descent, customs,
tradition, and territory, a movement for Caribbean nationalism has failed to emerge or
develop. The total land mass area of the entire seven countries of the English speaking
Eastern Caribbean is only 1084 square miles and has a population of just over half a
million (563,638).5 These statistics tell very little except that the population is small
4Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism
. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1956) Page 8.
Compiledfrom OECS' Statistical Pocket Digest, 1987.
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relative to that of other develop nation, This factor in particular, perhaps would
lead us to conclude that nationalism as an ideology would be a relatively popular
movement among the peoples of the Eastern Caribbean. The global struggle against
imperialism and colonialism which followed the end of World War II, and which
manifested itself so strikingly in the form of nationalism among the states of the Third
World did not appear to influence the Eastern Caribbean as a group.
The emergence of a strong movement for nationalism among the former colonial
territories of Europe in the post 1957 era* has been greatly influenced by the prolonged
period of colonial domination. Emerson argues that in Africa, for instance,
"...the
character of the nation now coming into the world has been greatly influenced by the
type of colonial regime to which they have been subjected". 7
The "type" of colonial regime as a factor in the development of nationalism in
various states of Africa, including Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, Chad and the Congo is a
well-founded observation. In the Caribbean, the type of colonialism that existed on the
islands differed from that of Africa. After emancipation and throughout the Crown
Colony System, the British maintained a small presence in the region. As soon as the
sugar cane industry declined, most of the land owners left; leaving their colonial
bureaucrats to manage the territories. But in Africa, a country rich in raw materials, the
Europeans were determined to deny the Africans the opportunity for independence and
self-determination. This denial, coupled with the exploitation of the states resources led
to the development of a collective nationalist character amongst the people. The central
6Ghana was thefirst African colony to be granted independence by the British in 1957.
nRupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation
. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) Page 61.
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unifying ,heme and spirit of this movcmc„, was the hberation of the states from the
control of the Europeans. There was no such movement in the Eastern Caribbean.
Emerson further describes nationalism in Africa as "the responses of pcopics to the
impact of the west".' In the case of the Eastern Caribbean, it was difficult for the
community of African descendants to develop a national character. They were no, the
indigenous inhabitants of the region, therefore, the impact of the west was minimal.
Like the British, they also had arrived in the Caribbean from outside the region. On
one hand, their traditional ties to Africa were broken and on the other hand they had
no Caribbean culture which the Europeans could impact.
The absence of a social and environmental heritage amongst the Africans in the
Caribbean represented a severe drawback to the development of a Caribbean culture.
During colonialism, most of the social and cultural values that emerged amongst the
Africans were predominantly British.
When emancipation was finally achieved by the Africans in 1834, the chains were
eliminated but the process of domination continued. Every island became a mini-
republic with the British firmly in control. During that period, Creoles, Mulattocs and
Africans on the island became cultured in the British values. M.G. Smith described this
plural society as one in which "European and African elements predominate in fairly
standard combinations and relationships. The ideal forms of institutional life, such as
government, religion, family and kinship, law, property, education, economy and language
are of European deviation".9 In addition to the British cultural domination, the class
^Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation . Page 62.
9M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the B. W.I. . (University of Colorado Press, CA 1965) Page 5.
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factor was contribute to the derailment of any movement towards Caribbean
nationalism. Kohn has argued that nationalism requires the participation of all the
people, and the existence of an initial common goal among the various classes. During
.he postemancipation history of the region, there were distinct class divisions in the
society which made it impossible to assimilate, integrate, or mobilize towards a common
goal. By the time the region achieved independence, the insular values of the islands
had been well established. The new political elites who took control were in no great
hurry to integrate the islands because to them it meant that their political and economic
power would have to be shared with the neighboring states, a proposition that seemed
unacceptable to them at the time.
Without the leadership support and without a common regional goal the islands
chose to remain independent of each other. In the modern Eastern Caribbean, there is
an absence of any political consciousness relating to integration among the masses.
Insularity continues to prevail in the Caribbean region. But in the late 1980s it
appeared that the leaders had begun paying some lip service to the concept of political
and economic integration.
C. Attempts at Integration
The concept of Caribbean integration has been an illusive quest for policy makers
in the region. What is even more intriguing about Caribbean integration is that the
major historical efforts for political unity have not come from the Caribbean people, but
from the British colonizer. Up until the 1980s when the Caribbean political elites
decided to give some consideration to integration, all other previous movement towards
political and economic unity of the region had been initiated, and encouraged by the
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been written both by private colonial land owners and government officials,
recommending federation of the .slands. The historian Gordon K. Lewis points out that
West Indian (Caribbean) Federation "goes back to the appendix written in 1860 to the
'lectures on colonization and colonies' delivered at Oxford University by Herman
Merivale of the Colonial Office between 1839 and 1841. Many of the authors who
wrote on the West Indies
- Merk.e, Darnel. Davis, Salmon, deVerteuil, Lamont, Murray,
Rippon
-
advocated federation and drew up their own private constitutional model"."
The Colonial Office did not respond favorably to these proposals. During that period
slavery was still in force and the Caribbean plantations were still profitable to the
colonialists, under these economic conditions, political integration was not a priority for
the Colonial Office.
After emancipation, the Colonial Office began to be more attentive to the idea of
federation for the region and eventually proposed the ill-fated federation of 1958. But
before 1958, a number of federal structures had been proposed, most of them by the
British.
In 1876, when the British Government attempted the first federation which was
to integrate Barbados and the Windward islands under the leadership of the
Governor, Sir John Pope Hennessy, when the colonialists on the islands rioted,
the federation was aborted.
In 1897, a Royal Commission proposed a federation which would be limited to
Barbados and the Windward Islands (at that time the Windward Islands
comprised the islands of Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent). Dominica was
part of the Leewards. This proposal was also rejected by the Colonial Office.
^Gordon Lewis, Growth of the Modern West Indies
. Page 343.
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•
In October
,932, at ,he West Indian Conference held in Dominica, legislators
from the Windward and Ueward Isiands, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago me,
to formulate a proposal for federation of the region for presentation to the
Colonial Office. The federation was to include Barbados, Trinidad and
Tobago, the Windward and Inward Islands. The British responded by
appointing a commission.
•
In 1932-33, the Closer Union Commission headed by two British officials - Sir
Charles Orr and Sir Charles Ferguson - presented yet another proposal which
would unite only the Windward and Leeward Islands.
.
In 1938, the Caribbean Labor Congress proposed a federation which would
include all of the Eastern Caribbean, the larger territories of Guyana, Jamaica,
Trinidad and Tobago, and even the Bahamas. (Incidentally, this plan - as
farfetched as it was
- marked the first time that the workers of the Caribbean
had ever proposed some form of Caribbean integration.) The British
responded by asking the Moyne Commission to include Federation in their
study.
•
In 1939, another Royal Commission, the Moyne Commission, appointed to
investigate social and economic conditions in the region, also studied the
possibilities of a federation. The report on federation, closed the door on all
further colonial attempts to integrate the islands. Based on their investigation
they determined that the Caribbean people were not prepared to accept the
principles of economic and political unity.
British attempts at federation was temporarily halted during World War II. But by
1945, they had resumed their strong advocacy for Caribbean federation. This time
around, the British were supported by a few middle class intellectual Caribbean citizens
like T.A. Marryshaw, a moderate islander, who essentially romanticized about the idea of
a unified Caribbean. The trade union groups also became superficially interested in the
concept. Led by Cipriani, a Labor leader from Trinidad, the unions were not
or more
as a
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particuiariy interested in a poUfc,, union
,
but federation ^ ^^
expedient means to independence. The British Government's main reason for
advocating federation for the Caribbean was to find the most efficient poiitica, system
for the political management of the region. To them, i, was a great deal more efficient
to deal with one unitary government representing the region, than with thirteen
small governments. Gordon Uwis notes that the British
-viewed federation not
vehicle for West Indian self Government, bnt overwhelming,, as a problem of colonial
administrative convenience" 11 Ipft n„t nf
.
Let out of the entire movement for Caribbean federation
were the people.
In 1947, the British finally got the Caribbean leaders together to negotiate a
federation. At the 1947 Montego Bay Conference, Caribbean Government
representatives adopted the principle of a "West Indian Federation" and agreed to
develop proposals that would form the basis of a federation. It took eleven years for
the British Colonial Office and the Caribbean political leaders to finally work out the
terms and constitution of a federation. (It must be noted also that during those eleven
years, the Caribbean people were granted universal adult suffrage). Consequently, when
the first federation was inaugurated in January 1958, the political players on the
federation band wagon had changed. It was no surprise therefore, that the federation
was dissolved four years later in 1962.
Regional scholars and political pundits have advanced a number of structured
analysis for the failure of the first Caribbean federation. Gordon K. Lewis, Hugh W.
Springer, Sir Arthur Lewis, Sr. Eric Williams and W.A. Domingo have all written
11 Gordon Lewis, Growth of the Modern West Indies
. Page 343.
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extend on the subject, and have been anaiytical and accurate in documenting the
failure. 12
But for purpose, of this study, it certainly suffices to say that the federation of
1958-62 failed because the idea of nationalism and political unity have never appealed to
he people. Each small island considers itself different from the olhcr and slrives (()
maintain this singular identify, irrelevant of the cos, of this insularity. Writing about the
failure W.A. Domingo remarked that:
"It is beyond successful contradiction that in the islands the inhabitants as a
general rule, regard themselves as Trinidadians, Barbadians, Jamaicans
Annguans, etc., not as West Indians. This is particularly true of Jamaicans
Separated from the other colonies under the Union Jack by relatively large
stretches of water, as are Jamaica and British Honduras; development of a
genuine regional feeling was next to impossible. At best the term 'West
Indian', even when restricted to the British insular possessions, is geographical,
not national." 13
Federation, as a concept, has not been a popular option for Caribbean people.
The local political elites never considered federation as a desirable political model.
The history of the various attempts at Federation are filled with events initiated by
Eastern Caribbean leaders which all seemed geared to derail attempts at federation
rather than to support it. Sir Arthur Lewis has chronicled the attempts by the Colonial
Office with the ministers of the Eastern Caribbean Governments to form a Federation
of the "Little Eight." This "Little Eight" proposal was initiated after 1962, and was to
12See Lowenthal and Comitas (Editors), The Aftermath of Sovereignty. (New York: Anchor
Press, NY 1973) Pages 162-235.
"W.A. Domingo, "BWI Federation", a critique in Lowenthal and Comitas (Editors), The Aftermath
of Sovereignty
.
(New York: Anchor Press, NY 1973) Page 173.
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include ,he seven sta.es of the Eastern Caribbean (Antigua. Grenada, Dominica
Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and tbe Grenadines) and the state of
Barbados. Tbe idea seemed to be well received by the ministers and the Colonia! Office
was very optimistic. However, Lewis has indicated that the ioca, political elites made the
process as difficult as possible. The following excerpt from his publication summarizes
the kind of behavior which seemed typical of the Caribbean leaders during that period
taking, and thus prepare for an easy transition to fiX^Zu^. * °'
3* S?22 ^ bfaCL At fiFSt mCeting S6Veral Chief ministers turned upwith other ministers to funct.on as their advisers. Instead of becoming a cabinet
instead
°
f— memb
- -
-
Against that background, the Colonial Office worked hard with the leaders and
compromised as was necessary to get the them to take a more rational approach to
developing a Caribbean federation of the little eight. But the British were unable to get
the leaders to agree on the issues. This Little Eights proposal represented the last
British attempt at Caribbean integration.
The last meeting took place in Barbados in May 1963. From all reports, it was not
an amicable gathering. The ministers dismantled the very constitution that they had
initially proposed, and the eventual ugly head of individualism was again raised, as
Antigua made a bid to house the regional post office. Other ministers objected. The
meeting deteriorated quickly after that. The British Under Secretary of State for the
Colonies, Nigel Fisher, hoped that he could get the ministers to London for a final
"Arthur W. Lewis, The Agony, of the Eisht . (Barbados: Advocate Printery 1965) Page 21.
meeting that would have tied up all loose end, The meeting never took place.
Another attempt at federation had failed. Ucwis described the final epitaph: "Their
tempers flared, names were called, and the conference broke up without issue. The
proposed visit to London was postponed until 'some time in the autumn', from which it
was again postponed till April 1964. It has not yet taken place.""
Given this documented chronology of the attempts at federation and the
corresponding history of failures, brought about by the political leaders themselves, one
would have thought that the concept of federation would have been abandoned by the
regions political elites. But just when the idea seemed forgotten, it emerged again in
the 1980s.
!)
-
The New Elites and Integration
The new leaders of the region, encouraged this time around by the United States,
started discussing regional integration as a viable political and economic alternative to
the current individual state model. Other than the United States, the leading advocate
for the unification project has been the Prime Minister of St. Vincent, J.F. Mitchel.
Educated at the University of British Colombia in Canada, Mitchel had been vocal on
the need for unification and has proposed that each state hold a referendum to let the
people determine whether their states should integrate. The response to this proposal
has been mixed, varying from enthusiastic verbal support from Prime Minister Charles of
Dominica, Prime Minister Compton of St. Lucia and senior officials of the NDC and
NNP of Grenada, to a lukewarm wait and see attitude from the rest of the small states.
^Arthur W. Lewis, Asony of the "Little Eieht" . Page 23.
It is difficult to get a consensus on the question of fedcralion or any olher (Qm of
limited ana,ysis of responses, it seems fair to conclude that the success of a federation in
the 1990s looks extremely dismal.
The normal political rhetoric is apparent. For instance, Prime Minister Compton,
who now strong supports the idea of integration, is the very same Compton who was
so opposed to federation that his delegation to the regional council of ministers, set up
to develop a constitution for the "Little Eight" Federation in 1964, tore up a copy of the
draft at a meeting in Barbados. It is possible that Compton has changed his mind on
this issue, but that was not very apparent in St. Lucia.
In my conversation with Prime Minister Charles, she seemed sincere about the need
for integration and appeared to have given some thought to the economic benefits. The
Grenada politicians were rather noncommittal although they expressed strong belief in
the concept of regional integration. I met with Nicholas Brathwaite, Political Leader of
the NDCP; Keith Mitchell, leader of the NNP and former Minister of Communications
and Work; and Norman De Souza, political representative of the GULP; all expressed
cautious optimism on the subject. 16
In Antigua and St. Kitts, members of Parliament were generally lukewarm to the
idea. Prime Minister Bird indicated to me that there were major differences in the
developmental stages of each island, which he thought could adversely affect any serious
^Interviewed Grenada Political Leaders in St. Georges, Grenada (November 24 & 25, 1989).
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movement for integration."
,„ summary it wou|d s£em^ ^ iea(jers
have recognized the need to develop some ,eve. of economic integration or cooperation.
However, I did not ge, the sense that the Government of Antigua, for instance, was
going to cooperate with any model that would erode the political power of the state
government. Caribbean pohtica, ieaders ho,d a great deal of power in their small states
and history has shown that their current system of independence is the most desirable
model of government. To get these political parties to change their philosophy would
require a miracle.
E. The Caribbean Politician
Who are these Caribbean leaders? What kind of political ideology dominate their
thinking, and how do they perceive their role in society? The leaders have been and
continue to be a group of colorful and charismatic individuals. Party leaders, in
particular, must be charismatic, personal, and be able to work a crowd. These appear
sometimes to be the only qualifications necessary to be a politician. Political leaders
have ranged from the psychologically unstable Eric Gairy of Grenada, on the one hand,
to the conservative and intellectual Eugenia Charles of Dominica.
Regardless of one's level of education, in order to be a successful Caribbean
political personality, one must be schooled in the art of symbolic politics. Formal
education is not a prerequisite. On the contrary, voters have tended to be distrustful of
intellectuals. In recent years however, some intellectuals have been able to gain variou
'Interviewed Prime Minister Bird in Antigua (November 10, 1989).
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parties support and havc succeedcd h^ ^ ^ ^
the parties.
However, elected educated politicians wil, no, survive if they manifest any
established ideological and objective approach to government. To survive, they must be
able to take a personalis approach to problem solving, they must be prepared to make
decisions not on the basis of rational analysis of a case, bu, what is most expedient for
the party supporters. Above all, they must always appear to be hostile to the
opposition. I, is considered politic! suicide to be seen socializing with members of an
opposition party. In countries with high levels of illiteracy, symbolic action is an
important influencing mechanism for maintaining the workers support. The success
formula seems to be patronize your supporters and punish or victimize the opposition.
F
-
Political Victimization and Civil Rights
The ability to remain antagonistic towards the opposition and victimize them
whenever possible appears to be one of the politicians main activity in their governing.
Sally Shelton-Colby, former U.S. Attache in Barbados, quickly assessed this peculiar
Caribbean political custom. She writes that "the term 'victimization' is a West Indian
invention which describes revenge politicians take on civil servants suspected of
harboring sympathies for the opposition party". 18 Paget Henry considers some of the
principles of democracy to have been abridged by Caribbean governments through legal
and illegal practices. "These practices have taken the form of 'victimization' with the
'Sally Colby-Shelton, An Introduction to the Eastern Caribbean . Page 11.
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-UU that job discrimination agai„st members of the opposition has become a
widespread practice". 19
« is difficult for rational people to conceptualize tha , educated rationa, men and
women in ieadership win stoop to a ,eve, where ,hey win persona.,, humiliate or deny
s.a.e benefits to a citizen, so,e,y because they support another
.egaHy constituted pohtica,
party. Bu, i, happens with recurring regularity in the Eastern Caribbean.
In Dominica we were informed by high level administrative officers that the Prime
Minister would personally determine whether scholarship applicants for post secondary
education and training should be approved. Sons and daughters of party supporters
would be routinely approved for training over more qualified applicants who were
non-party supporters. Although young Eastern Caribbeans can use advanced training
and education in every field of study, the government is known not to take advantage of
fully funded scholarships offered by international agencies and western Countries,
because the applicants most qualified were opposition party members. These denials of
training are normally foenssed against junior members of the civil service who are more
radical. Officials in the Prime Ministers office of St. Lucia, indicated to me that the
practice was similar to Dominica and that Ministers approval on issues like scholarships
was, in effect, standard routine practice.
In the Eastern Caribbean, there is no limit to the triviality in which high level
government leaders will be involved. As U.S. Attache, Colby had to deal with these
governments on a regular basis. She had the opportunity to observe the kind of minute
issues in which high level ministers would immerse themselves.
,9Henry Paget, Democracy in Amisua . Page 299.
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"It is at the cabinet level moreover where most decisions, no matter how
trivia are made. For example, cabinets normally decide whether civil servants
travelling abroad will fly first class or coach!'™
Not only are the politicians involved in decision making at the lowest level, the
decisions are normally made to satisfy personal vendettas of ministers or their supporters.
In an attempt to provide original material to support this analysis, we tried to solicit
written examples from administrative officials we spoke with, but for fear of their jobs,
they were reluctant to provide it. But we were given numerous oral examples. Below
we have included two examples of Caribbean style victimization. The first example
(Appendix A) was written by Novelle H. Richards, a citizen of Antigua and former
commissioner to Canada for the Eastern Caribbean states. Richards comments on the
treatment he and former ministers of the Antigua Labor Party received from the New
Progressive Labor Movement (PLM) which had won the Antigua National election in
February 1971. The second example (Appendix B) is typical of the normal victimization
methods used by ruling parties against opposition party supporters.
In the Grenada case, the letter writer is a supporter of the opposition Party's
leader Dr. Keith Mitchell and the New National Party (NNP). The ruling party in
power was The New Party (TNP). According to the text of the letter, a TNP official,
Ben Andrew, who was never elected to government but was appointed by the Party, had
the worker fired from her job because she supported the opposition party. What is even
more interesting about this case is that Mitchell was four months earlier a member of
xSally Shelton-Colby, "An Introduction to the Eastern Caribbean " in McDonald, Sandstrom &
Godwin (Editors) The Caribbean After Grenada
.
(Praeger Press, NY) Page 11.
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ruling party (NNP). Following this party's convention, L989, Mitchell, who was also
minister of Communication, was elected by the party as political leader. Herbert Blaize,
who was then Prime Minister and political leader, felt that he should have been
re-elected to the position. Upset at being bypassed lor the leadership, he fired two of
his cabinet ministers including Dr. Mitchell and formed a new party called "The New
Party" (TNP). He further abridged the democratic process by appointing non-elected
Officials to parliament in positions of government ministers. This action by Blaize
reduced his party's majority in the House of Representatives. Consequently, for almost
a year in 1989, the government of Grenada was run by a non-elected minority party.
Under the Grenada constitution in order to declare a vote of no confidence in the
Government and dissolve parliament, parliament must be in session. Blaize avoided the
dissolution of his minority government by refusing to call a session of parliament. New
elections were scheduled to be held in March of 1990. Blaize felt he could have hung
on to power until the elections. However, he died in December 1989. The National
Democratic Congress (NDC), a third parly, went on to win the elections. The letter
(Appendix B) which was written during that period of political chaos in Grenada, typifies
the kind of personal and intimidating approach to government that is practiced
throughout the region by the various ruling parties.
It is difficult to find a clear motive for the level of petty victimization that occurs
within the society and which is perpetuated by democratic governments who in theory,
are required to be the government to all citizens. But conversations with various leaders
and administrators in the region, indicate that a significant percentage of cases of
victimization are the result of personal political vendettas. However, not all politicians
are inherently vindictive. Yet, personalities seem to change when individuals become
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members of a ruling party, and soon even the most rational and .eve, headed individuals
seem to get involved in the "punish the enemy" syndrome.
I asked the leader of the Dominica Labor Party and Former Deputy Prime Minister
what he felt was the reason for the seemingly high level of government high handedness,
and punitive characteristics. He explained that in Caribbean politics, the voters are
polarized, and party supporters do not expect their leaders to socialize or interact at any
level with the opposition. As a result of this perpetual antagonism, the party leaders
must always appear to be angry with the other party. This is symbolism at its highest
level. Party supporters believe that there can be no compromise between parties.
Kenneth John of St. Vincent comments on the party division in the Eastern Caribbean.
"The most frightening thing about the artificial division of the followers of the
two parties is that people living in squalor, suffering the same stark hunger
and economic distress, will tear each other to pieces and sacrifice each other
on the alter of an ephemeral party difference."21
While John's observation may be slightly exaggerated, the fact remains that party
differences represent the catalyst that move the voters, and the politicians are able to
exploit their party loyalty and enthusiasm to the maximum. Within that general context,
ruling party leaders find it easy to victimize opposition party supporters. In the first
place, it appears that the society seems to expect the victimization as a normal hazard
for supporting the losing party and further, there are no objective legal or community
organization available to which acts of victimization can be appealed. Political
™Kenneth John, "St. Vincent: A Political Kaleidoscope"
,
Page 9.
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victimization is an inherent factor of the Caribbean political system and members of
parliament use it whenever necessary to intimidate the opposition.
G
'
-
Da? in the Tdfeof^Member of Pnrlinmpnt
The typical day in the life of a Caribbean political leader, particularly a member of
parliament is hectic. Not much is ever accomplished in a day, but the ministers are
always busy. I found, for instance, that it was much easier to arrange to meet with the
senior senator from the State of Minnesota, who represents four million people in the
United States Senate, than it is to meet with the Prime Minister of St. Kitts who
manages an island of 69 square miles and 44,000 people.
In theory, Government ministers ought to be responsible for policy development
and decision making at the national level. To assist in the implementation of policies,
the politicians are supported by a cadre of administrative staff who operate within a tight
bureaucratic institution. This vast administrative institution in effect, carries out most of
the day-to-day implementation of the ministers decisions, which are normally highly
personalized, politicized and centralized. All decisions are made by the minister in
charge. If, for instance, the Department of Health has to hire a physician, the Chief
Medical Officer and staff will interview and evaluate the candidates but will be unable to
offer a position until the Minister of Health personally approves. Thus, government
ministers are involved at all levels of the operation. The highly trained senior
administrative staff, which includes directors, commissioners, and permanent secretaries,
function as virtual clerical aides to the ministers. These senior staff spend the average
day responding to specific personnel and constituent issues rather than national issues.
Ministers of government tend not to seek the advice of senior staff even on technical
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i-e, Most government ministers will rely on high placed party supporters in the
Private sector to advise them on issues relating to economic and technical development.
Therefore, a significant percentage of their time is spent with the party's economic elite
discussing national development issue, The remainder of their time and by far the
largest portion, is spent responding to their supporters needs and request,
These requests and needs are normally very persona, and varied. On a typical day
the minister will arrive very late at Government headquarters. Government ministers
appear to make tardiness a psychological symbol of power, and as a result are
persistently late for work, for functions, and for appointments. On that morning the
minister will either work his way through a waiting crowd of supporters waiting to see
him, or will come through the back door if there is one. After his arrival, either the
personal secretary who is a clerical officer, or the Permanent secretary for that ministry,
who is a high level professional, will brief the minister on the number of people waiting
to see him. Most of these people will have no appointments. They have simply turned
up to see their elected official and expect to meet with him.
The situation for the various administrative officers working with that minister is
complex and frustrating. They are unable to manage the flow of people waiting to see
the minister, nor are they allowed to intervene between the people and the ministers.
No matter how simple the issue may be, the administrative system, like the political
system is highly authoritative. Every decision comes from the minister. Consequently,
the whole apparatus of government functions around the spontaneous decision making
activity of the ministers. This authoritarian management system has resulted in a public
service which is characterized by poor work attitude, high attrition, cynicism and general
incompetence.
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On that day, therefore
,
the minisler win bc infomcd^ (hcrc ^^^
«» see him and tha, he also has some scheduled appointment with other senior
government official
.nvariably,
,he mi„,s,er win review the lis. of peopie wai,i„g to see
h.m and wi„ begin ,o see them, regardless of a„y other activity on his schedule. It must
be understood tha, for a government official, the need to stay in touch with his
constituent is of paramount importance.
Every minister of Government I visited with informed me that they had a
designated day each week when the public was invited to meet with them to discuss
issues affecting their communities. But this designated day did not preclude supporters
from visiting whenever they wish. In St. Lucia, I spent a day at the Government
Ministers Office responsible for community development, social affairs, sports and local
government, monitoring one of the labor party's "constituent" or community days.
First I found out that all of the people waiting to see the minister, Stephenson
King, were supporters of the UWP which was the ruling party; and secondly, every
person waiting had a personal issue (not community) to discuss with the minister:
.
The majority of people I spoke to were seeking his help in finding jobs within
the government service.
.
There was one woman who needed a letter of reference for a visa application
to the United Kingdom.
• Another wanted to complain to the minister that a restaurant owner was
requiring her to work long hours for a small wage and she needed him to
rectify the inequity.
I asked most of the people, whether some other administrator or agency could help
them resolve some of their problems. They all indicated that the minister was the one
individual, who they felt could help them with their particular problem. This notion, of
are
tion on
convey they are able t0 demomlrate an effident rf kcep|ng hQpes ^
the nex, election. This daily interaction with the party supporters seeking help
represents the most effective and highly sophisticated method of consistent campaigning
This interaction between poiitica, ieader and eonstitnen, represents a powerfu, symbolic
action in the election process. Throngh this daily interaction, poiitica. leaders are able
to get feedback on how governmental services are affecting the population. They
kept abreast of the prevailing mood of the population. They receive informati
officials who may be nonsupportive of their programs and most importantly, they find
ou, how the opposition is doing. Somewhere in between this information gathering, the
supporter will mention that their child was not among the 500 students selected to
attend high school. This request to get the child accepted would represent a problem
that the minister can actually fix. He will talk with his chief education officer, and the
child will be added to the list. The supporter will leave the office in a state of euphoria.
Their vote has finally yielded a benefit. They will go back to their neighborhood and
sing the praises of the minister. In the long run the supporter will be able to convince
the entire neighborhood how sensitive and helpful the minister can be. At the next
election that minister will again win the majority of votes in the district.
The request for favors from supporters are not always as easily resolved as getting a
child in a government controlled high school. But ministers and other members of
parliament are resourceful, and with unlimited authority available to them, they are able
to find solutions to most of the trivial and complex issues that come before them.
In cases where they are not able to resolve a problem for a supporter, they will still
manage to maintain that support. Voters relish the sense of empowerment that they
experience when they meel wilh lhdr^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^
leaders appear to make in addressing their particular problem. The loyalty cha, is
derived from these interactions is sometimes unshakable. The ability to generate voter
loyalty through this
-meet the people" program represents a major politica, strategy of
any ruling party in the region. The effectiveness of this process to make the daily
meeting with supporters is an integral and perhaps the most important responsibility and
function of every political leader.
As a result of this open door policy and frequent meetings with supporters, political
leaders accomplish little in terms of long term policy development and technical
planning, a factor which eventually contributes to their political misfortunes. Political
leaders normally spend such a disproportionate percentage of their time campaigning and
improving their image, that they neglect major national issues, such as lack of teachers in
St. Lucia. More schools in Dominica, high unemployment in Grenada which needs
attention, are ignored or given vague promises, while the leaders continue to be
occupied in their narrow political objective of maintaining power. This objective is
accomplished by the populist action of the daily meetings and through other popular
legislative actions initiated by government.
It must also be recognized however, that the practice of daily meetings with
supporters actually has potential for positive results, and in effect represents, the first
stage of a process, that leads to the development of popular national legislation.
H. Government and People
What is popular legislation? Within the Caribbean context popular legislation, are
these which have the support of a large working class majority, and represents another
240
strategy which government win seize. „ such ins(ances govemmen(^^^
legislation or take steps that wil, address the issues in a manner that meet with the
approval of the majority. In taking such actions, the position of the minority
nonsupporters is not considered, nor is the equity or ethical factor of the action.
Generally the actions are popular and manifest one of the few occasions in which
government wiU implement the principles of democracy even though the motives for
implementation are not ideological. Government resources are very limited and as a
result, they tend to avoid popular decisions that require funding, but are willing to
support strong emotional issues.
In 1989, the St. Vincent government amended that country's criminal code in order
to decriminalize certain forms of petty theft, which were committed by young
unemployed people who picked fruits from area farms for consumption. The new code
of 1988 section 212 (3) states that - A person who picks anything growing wild on any
land, or who picks flowers, fruits or foliage from a plant growing on any land, does not
(although not in possession of the land) steal what he picks unless he does it for reward
or sale or other commercial purposes."22
In that situation, government recognized that a small number of young men, who
were unemployed and who practiced the Jamaican Rastafarian faith, which requires a
diet of no meat, were involved in taking fruits from private farm land in order to feed
themselves. In most cases the men had been arrested for taking a fruit. Some citizens
and parents complained to their member of Parliament that the arrest and imprisonment
Pamphlet distributed by the opposition - St. Vincent Labor Party, (1989) Page 5.
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men
of the country's young mcn for stea,.ng a rmii jus(
.
cc part
.
cuiariy^ ^
were simply allcmpling l( , rccd ihcmsclvcs.
The Si. Vinceni government, led by ,he National Democratic Party (NOP), reacted
by decriminalizing the offense, an action which was met with popular support hy the
masses. As could be expected the farmers and the opposition party objected to the
action. But the new code was popular and the (NOP ) National Democratic Party of St.
Vincent, the firs, party to win every sea, in a national election, did no, suffer any
political backlash from the decision.
In Dominica, in 1988, the ministry of legal affairs appointed a magistrate to preside
over its lower courts, which deal primarily with traffic violations, petty thefts, minor
assaults, etc. The attorney appointed to that position was a Dominican who was trained
and practiced in London. When he arrived in Dominica, he turned out to be
conservative and mildly eccentric. His behavior in the court was noticeably different
from the norm. He intimidated and verbally abused the people who appeared before his
bench. In addition, he began to levy exorbitant fines and long jail terms on the poor
people who came before him. These fines were disproportionate to the extent of the
crime and brought about economic hardships on families and individuals who
had cases in his court. People were angered by the magistrate's arrogant and high
handed mannerisms. They complained to the political leaders and requested that he be
removed from the bench. During the national carnival celebration, a local artist
composed a satirical calypso about the magistrate which quickly became the most popular
song of the festival. Also during the festival Freedom Party officials were able to
measure the level of the magistrate's unpopularity. They realized that the anger ran
deep even among their own die-hard supporters. Based on this perception and the
*e masses and was respecling^^ (o ^ ^ ^^^
The Prime M,n,s,efs willingness to break
.„^ ,^ ^^
power, irrespective of any im^ed separation of powers in the constitution
, ,he primc
Minister Has tremendous influe„ce over the Judicia,. She appoints, terminates and has
*e authority to affect their empioymen. status. Second,, the mode, provides an
informa, mechanism for initiating and imp.emen.ing popuiar democratic action hy the
peopie.
,„
the Eastern Caribbean, Government wil, generally enact legislation or take
re-e,ec,io„. This factor may seem counter to the argument that the Caribbean model is
authoritative. The system is indeed authoritative. Every day, national decisions are
made by the Prime Ministers with or without advice from the people or from party
officials. These occasional popular actions are the only period when people's demands
are acted upon. Governments are authoritative in matters that relate to economic and
political decision making. However, they are astute at reading the public mood and win
seize every opportunity to increase their party's popularity by championing the cause of
those few issues that are important to the people, and for which there is overwhelming
support.
The political model of the Eastern Caribbean works, not because it is repressive or
liberal, but because the political leaders and the people seem to have reached this
mu.ua, understanding of whal ,hc |imi[aiions rf ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
much of their governments. On the „lher hand
,
lhey do nol^ ^ ^
hands of the government either. The people have historically demonslra,ed a high
capacity for the toleration of mediocre governments, hut have reacted with expediency to
The peopie of the region win move decisively to bring down a government, particularly
when that government becomes arrogant and ,oses touch with them. This represents
perhaps an unique combination of authoritarianism and populism within the same mode,.
Current leaders are aware of thc power and sensitivity of the people, and have
eliminated the high handed and arrogant behavior that was the trademark of former
colonial and mulatto leaders. Today the governments have established effective
networks and mechanisms for slaying close to the pulse of thc people.
Patrick John of Dominica (1978) and Eric Gairy of Grenada (1979) were two of
the leaders who made the mistake of attempting to use force to repress the freedom of
their people. In 1979, Patrick John was ousted as Prime Minister of Dominica in a
bloodless coup after he ordered his rag tag military defense force to shoot into a crowd
of demonstrators who were demonstrating against his government. In the case of
Grenada, Eric Gairy was ousted by the New Jewel Movement (NJM) in 1979.
Because the political and ideological direction of the NJM differed drastically from
the Caribbean model of democracy, we think it is important to look briefly at Grenada
under Gairy to understand why he was replaced with the NJM. The prevailing argument
amongst liberal scholars of thc region is that Gairy had brought Grenada to such a
dismal stage of socioeconomic ruin, and that people had suffered so intensely under his
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rule, that they were prepared to try any other system. Grenadians felt that no mode/
could be as bad as the "Gairy model".
L Gairy and the Grenada Rgyghitjon
Eric Gairy attempted to move Grenada from the loose democratic model that
emerged after adult suffrage to a near totalitarian system in which he and a tiny Cass of
petty Bourgeoisie dominated the country politically and economically. Based on the
characteristics of the Eastern Caribbean people described so far, especially their love of
freedom, it seemed inevitable that Gairy would fail in his quest to dominate and repress
the Grenadians. On March 13, 1979, he was ousted from power. Fitzroy Amburs.ey
claims that "the objective conditions that gave rise to the March 13th insurrection can to
a large extent be explained by the singularity of Gairyism, the most despotic and wanton
form of class rule to have emerged in the English speaking
Caribbean".* While Gairy's rule can be more accurately described as "dictatorial"
rather than "class" there can be no argument that Gairyism was despotic and repressive.
Eric Gairy became chief minister in Grenada in 1952 after a period of labor
advocacy as leader of the Grenada Manual and Mental Workers Union (GMMWU) and
remained in power until 1962, when his party lost the national election. He remained a
member of Parliament and leader of the party during the period 1962-67, and in the
1967 elections, was again elected Prime Minister, until his ouster in 1979 by the New
Jewel Movement.
^Fitzroy Ambursley, "The New Jewel Revolution" in Ambursley and Cohen (Editors), Crisis in the
Caribbean
. (New York: MRP 1984) Page 191.
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his own peon, reprcssive [ouch to ,hc ^^ ^^^ ^
EPICA Task Force, a group of Caribbean scholars in Washington D.C., sia.es that
"Gairy's next twelve years in office turned Grenada into an oppressive dictatorship: the
giorification of one man a, the expense of a whoie society. The period is distinguished
by three continuing themes: economic deterioration, domestic repression, and Gairy's
personal corruption".24
Gairy's concentration on maintaining power a, all cos. was achieved at the expense
of the economy which was devasta.ed by his flamboyant s.andard of living and his well
documented patronage system.
Wages for agricultural workers which had stood at $2.00 per day for men and $1.70
per day for women in 1954, were only $4.00 and $3.00 per day respectively twenty years
later. Yet in just ten years (1964-1975), food prices rose by 200%, clothing by 164%
and housing by 135%. Gairy raised taxes on imported staples like rice and flour while
giving import monopolies to his friends, allowing them to charge scalper's prices.*
In addition, by 1974 employment stood at a permanent "50%"26 and the total
Grenadian economy went into a nose dive "which resulted in a catastrophic 33% fall in
GNP between 1972 and 1974".27
^EPICA Task Force Report, Grenada - 77?^ Peaceful Revolution (Washington, D.C. 1982) Page
^EPICA Task Force Report, Page 44.
^Fitzroy Ambursley, "Grenada: The New Jewel Movement, " Page 198.
21Fitzroy Amhursely, Page 193.
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Gair/s bra„d of economic underdevelopment led to neglect of basic municipal and
social services.
-The island road systera fc„ into dangerous disrepair. Mcdica! care was
inferior and expensive; doctors were scarce and Che few medical clinics unsanitary and ill
equipPed...Gre„ada became Gair/s private estate. Tbe administrative bureaucracy was
so centralized that Gair/s persona, approval was required for every single decision no
matter how small.™ When we consider that social and municipal services are so dismal
in the region, we can well imagine the condition that prevailed when the entire system
was left to deteriorate.
Gairy's authoritarian approach to government was alien to the inhabitants of the
island who were accustomed to, and felt strongly about the maintenance of a democratic
political system in Grenada. In earlier years, he had commanded the support of the
masses of workers and peasants. But he later abandoned those groups, an extremely
fatal mistake in Caribbean politics. In addition, the deteriorating socioeconomic
conditions of the country caused a significant erosion of that support, thus alienating the
working class base.
The middle class, on the other hand, who were mainly the only people actually
employed in the country, primarily as Civil Service employees (i.e. administrators,
teachers, police and other career bureaucrats), were also alienated because of Gairy's
autocratic system of decision making and policy implementations. In Grenada, like all
other Caribbean states, the government is the largest employer of workers, thus the Civil
Service represents the bulk of the countries' middle class. It is clear that from 1974 till
1979, there was progressive polarization between Prime Minister Gairy and the majority
lEPlCA Task Force Report, Page 44.
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of the peop,e. Gairy, o„ly support came from , capiia|isi^ ^ ^
merchants who vir,ua„y controlled lhe economy Qf^ .^ ^ ^^ ^^
^guards and enforcers known as the "Mongoose." He had risen to power with the
support, enthusiasm and loyalty of the workers and peasants, but in the ,970s he had
irrevocably shifted his poiitica, allegiance to a smaU group of power brokers, whose on,y
goal was the accumulation of capital at the expense of the working class. EPICA
reinforces this analysis by stating:
Gatrys real goal was not to empower the working classes but to keep himselfm power. To do so he had to undermine the strength of his traditional
opposition, the landed elite and the commercial bourgeoisie. This he did not
by strengthening the working class, but by creating a new class of capitalists
dependent on his Patronage Machine."29
History has manifested and Huntington has theorized, that for a revolution to occur
and be successful, the middle class must lead. The Cuban Revolution clearly supports
that theory; led by attorneys, physicians and elements of the Cuban middle class, the
revolution grew until it toppled the United States backed autocratic regime of President
Fulgencio Batista.
In Grenada, Gairy had not only succeeded in losing the peasant and working classes
which formed the base of his political support, but he singlehandedly managed to
alienate the mercantile and professional community which wielded a great deal of
influence among the majority of Grenada voters. Concerned that parliamentary
democracy (which provided the mechanism for changing governments in Grenada) might
prove futile in a national election since:
'EPICA Task Force Report, Page 42.
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7 WCr7arkCd "y nUmCr°US CharSCS 'ha' °ai^ s™« stuffeda lot boxes and rem<,ved the names of opponent fron, the baUots whiic
.henotonous pro-Gahv thugs, known „ , hc MongoOM ^ qj-
eliminated outspoken opponents of Gaily...".™
prerogative and certainly a viable option, ,„c Orenadian peopie began to organize
political opposition to Gairy's reign of terror.
Although the next national election was constitutionally scheduled lor 1981, the
people appeared determined to ensure that Gairy and his Grenada's United Labor Party
(GULP) would be swept out of power by then. Thus by 1978, all the political and social
institutions in Grenada had began to mobilize their movements towards strikes and
demonstrations carefully planned to weaken Gairy's hold on the masses.
A number of coalitions were formed comprising unions, opposition parties, the
churches and professional groups. These coalitions were an extension of the People's
Alliance Parly which was formed in 1976 to contest the national elections which Gairy
had won.
Led by the New Jewel Movement (which carried out an extensive program of
political education throughout the country) the various groups began to rally their forces
in unified opposition to Gairyism. As the clamor for reform escalated, (me group, the
New Jewel Movement (NJM), seemed to command the greater following of the masses.
Under the charismatic leadership of Maurice Bishop, a young Grenadian attorney, NJM
support significantly among the unions, the churches and the Civil Service. Although the
International Policy Report, Centerfor International Policy (Washington, D.C. January 1984)
Page I.
NJM had been around sin.-,- I07n ia ce I no, and was one of (he panics comprising the 1976
Peoples Alliance, ihev did noi r;„.,y t at Erst appear to enjoy great popular support. Their
basic support came from among the youth and the unemployed
But hy
,978, they appeared
,„ he the only grouP capahlc of organising the various
opposition groups into a national movement for political change. During 1977-78 the
-
protest the administration's refusal to authorize a salar, increase. These disruptions
created significant management prohlems for the Gairy regime, and provided the
opportunity for the NJM to offer viable ahernatives to Gaittfsr, ,„ addition, and for
-he first time, new conservative groups were joining the anti-Gairy movement. Those
included the Lion, Rotary Cluhs and the Chamber of Commerce, which represented
.he
professional and mercantile community; and the Roman Catholic, Anglican and
Presbyterian Churches, which maintained a low profile hut encouraged their
congregations to support NJM sponsored activities.
The support of the church, professional and commercial groups together with the
union workers, youth and peasants, gave the NJM a broad base of support. That factor
is significant and will he analyzed later when we examine United Stales policy towards
the subsequent Grenada Government. But by
.079, i. was clear lhai the NJM had
.succeeded in forming a broad hase opposi.ion lowards .he Gairy regime. Their po.i.ica.
platform was addressing issues such as equitable income dislrihution, land reform,
reduction of unemployment, repeal of unjust consumer taxes, and the development of
education, welfare and health programs.
Grcnadians responded positively to the NJM's leadership and, in spile of some
skepticism by a minority who considered Bishop and the NJM a pro-left movement,
•Opposition to Gairy had drawn the muMry^ [( ^^^^ J°
pcop,c, and a c„„Se„sus emerged
.ha, Gairy and evening he stood to, had to go".3,
Wc think lhal this analysis made bv the EPICA TW, cny nc fcPIC Task Force accurately summarizes the
mood of the people on the eve of the .979 ouster of the Gairy Regime. To
Carihhean populous seem to have set, for maintaining their pohtical leaders in power
Peopie respond effective* when they perceive tha, their freedom is threatened. For a
people brutalized and oppressed by slavery for over a century, bondage and repression
are no, taken lightly. Throughout the Caribbean the phrase "poor but free" is not an
idle cliche. People we spoke to, particularly the elderly, believe strongly in their
freedom to live their lives without unnecessary political repression. Gairy was very much
aware of the peoples' philosophy bu, fel, that he could take his power one step further.
He failed.
The failure of Patrick John of Dominica who toyed with the idea of establishing a
Labor Party dictatorship in Dominica; the failure of Eric Gairy s attempt to bring about
a political system similar to that of the Duvalier dictatorship of Haiti; and most recently,
the failure of the New Jewel Movement of Grenada to maintain a stable quasi-socialist
model in Grenada, seem to indicate that the Eastern Caribbean political model is
extremely rigid, and is able to withstand and oppose any imposition of foreign ideology
into their current model.
MEPICA Task Force Report, Page 50.
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J- Political Chnn^
proportion, except in tbe 1979.83 Grenada ^^
significant political change within the last decade.
-
the size and culture of the states themselves. Caribbean scholars in particular have
been critica, of the political mode, and the ,eve, of political development of the region.
Many of their criticisms relating to the political system are well founded. However, our
research and in depth conversations with a cross section of the Eastern Caribbean
community suggests that some of the criticism may be bordering on intellectual
abstraction and is no, applicable to the actua, sociopo.itica, dynamics that prevail in the
region.
Trevor Farrell, for instance, suggests that decolonization "should mean the
restructuring of social relationships, the abrogation of the grossest forms of class
differentiation and the opening up of the economic and political systems to genuine
popular participation and shared control by all the people".3* While Mr. Farrell's
statement may still be applicable to the larger states of Jamaica and Trinidad, the
experiences in the Eastern Caribbean are different. Class differentiation in the Eastern
Caribbean is a relic of the past. The political leaders and members of the parliament of
the region come from the ranks of poor and middle income citizens. The most powerful
administrative positions in the governments are held by the sons and daughters of
Trevor Farrel, Decolonization in the English Speaking Caribbean . Page 6.
peasants and workers and ovcr thc |ast ,wQ^
_^ ^
emerged to share active,y and, b some cases
, con[ro| ^^ ^^
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states.
means in
ace.
more
Political participation is a major point of discussion for Caribbcan
They talk about "genuine popular participation."
, an, no, sure what that term
^ context of the Eastern Caribbean, specifically after an eiection has taken p,
Caribbean people throughout the region have not expressed a need for
involvement in the governmental process. The people appear to have established a
method of preferred participation in the governance of their country. They seem to
have chosen to participate in the decision making process through the informal
mechanism of personal interaction with their leaders. In the two cases of popular
participation detailed earlier, the people wanted the magistrate out of office in
Dominica. He was eventually removed. In St. Vincent the people felt it was unfair to
prosecute the youth for stealing mangoes. The government decriminalized the offense.
During the later period of crown colony and self government, both these decisions
would have been made against the wishes of the masses. Today governments are more
able to identify with the issues that matter to the people and although their responses to
economic issues are politically inadequate, they have been able to move their countries
into a level where the class factor is very much de-emphasized.
This change has come about because of the heightening of consciousness that
emerged during the period of the Black Power movement in the region, and is a result
of the restructuring of the political representative process. In every Caribbean state
today, for a parly to win the national election, they must be broad based and must
include rural farmers, peasants, workers and mid-level professionals. This structure has
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ehminated eo„trol of gover„menl hy
. coalilion of urban ^
_ ^
system that prevaiied in the 1950s and 1960s . ^^ ^ fc^
urban and rae(ro areas, which means that a, least 50% of eaeh party contesting an
eiection mus, have rura
, represen,a,ion. After a party has won the^ ^^
parhamentary structure a„ows for every subgroup of the society to have representation
in parhament. and hased on the governments open door pohcy to their constituents, the
representatives.
This open door policy and "meet the people day" is a major change from the way
political parties operated in the past. Before 1970, following national elections, elected
officials would spend the next five years socializing with the economic and social elites,
and would begin holding meetings a few months before the next election.
Today political participation has improved through the establishment of formal and
informal networks. Another major change in the region is the elimination of the various
government military organizations (defense forces) that emerged after independence.
Immediately after independence most of the states established defense forces to go along
with the national anthem and the flag. Disastrous experiences and escalating costs for
maintaining these para military bodies, forced governments to re-evaluate their need
within the context of security. In most of the states the defense forces have been
dissolved. This change was instrumental in decreasing political anxiety among the
people.
Some states like Dominica and St. Vincent have instituted village councils. These
are local councils elected by the citizens of rural villages and towns, whose
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respond include viHage sanitati, „d o,her mino cip, ^
80 C<>UnCi 'S lhC
"^ W6re «« » -chanism Eor decentralfcin* some of
he government functions which wc,
.ocated primarily in the capita, cities. They wee
abo deveioped as a forum for people participation in the management of their
communities. The concept has heen relatively successful in tern, of meeting those two
objectives. But more important some ruling parties have used these local ge councils
as a training ground for new potential rural party leaders. The Labor Parties of
Dominica and St. Vincent used the councils as an effective network for maintaining
popular support in the rural areas.
In spite of the ulterior motives of the political parties for establishing these village
councils it appears that the councils have developed into a farm system for training new
politicians, but more importantly they have provided an arena for more people
participation in Government. Prior to the development of the political parties which
began in the late ,9.* and l960s, rural, peasants, farmers, and workers, were excluded
from the political process.
.„ modern day government, rural areas are proportionately
represented in Parliament.
K. The Political Left
So much has been written about the political threat of communism in the
Caribbean that this study would not be complete if we did not look briefly at the
political left in the region.
In this thesis I have argued that democratic values and systems are deeply rooted
among the Eastern Caribbean people. The influence of colonialism on the political
model has been profound. The people have withstood severe economic hardships, they
have endured polilica| oppres,on ^ hands ^^ ^^
—.ion frora local politicians
, bu( have re|emlcssiy cmbraccj insttaionai^
of democracy. The concep, of freedom is a slrong cala|yst md^ for ^
bondage.
Agai„s
,
this background, we are ab,e to put the political left of the Eastern
Caribbean within a conceptua, framework. Begin„i„g i„ ,he late sixlics and throughou(
•he early ,970s, the region wen, through major social and political change. The Black
Power movement (which was started in tbe United States) bad its impact on tbe black
youth of the region. African Liberation Movements and Black Power organiZa,ions were
present in every state of the Eastern Caribbean. The initial demands of those
movements were essentially class based and nationalistic. They demanded that the
prevailing "white" values and customs lef, by the British be disbanded. Cocktail parties,
afternoon tea at government houses, suits and neckties were the targets of those adacks.
The governments at the time, recognized how popular the movements were, acquiesced
,o those demands and most of the whi,e symbols were eliminated. The social values of
the society also underwent revolutionary changes. For ,he firs, time, the society began
to take pride in ,he darkness of their skin. It became vogue to be black. The various
political parties jumped on the bandwagon and declared themselves Black Power
Advocate! Prime Minister John of Dominica, for instance, always categorized himself as
a "Black Power Advocate".
Following the success of those movemenls in bringing about social changes, most of
the groups did not disband, they began to advocate political change along Marxist and
socialist principles. Their method of operation included the education of the youlh wilh
marxist literature Provided by sludems aHending UnUcd s(a(es universi(jes hojding ^
poHUca, forums
, and the dissemina[ion Qf varjous^ pamph|c(s ^ soQn^
Mack power movements had formcd lhemse
,ves^^^^
•Hose groups, thc MtKm Q,ribbcan Ubera(ion Movcmem ^^ ^
.ewe, Movement of Grenada (NJM), the Movcmcn[ „ Ncw Dominica (MND) ^ ^
Progressive Labor Party of St Lucia CPT p\, .u ,Y c, (PLP) were the largest and more organized of the
progressive groups.
These groups con (i„ued .heir politica! work among the working dass and^
Domi„ ica national elections. They were only ab,e lo capture less than 2% of the votes
cast. They were soundly defeated by the Dominic, Freedom Party. The group is no
longer in existence.
The adventures and poh.ica | fortunes of the NJM are well documented in this work
.nd need no further comment. The ACLM of Antigua is still in existence
, the group
has changed its name to the Antigua Carihbean Liberation Movement but is too weak to
run for national election. The group has become , kind of government watchdog that
publishes a small pamphlet and continues to advocate political change. Another left of
center group in St. Lucia, the Progressive Labor Parly (PLP) led by former deputy
Prime Minister George Odium (which is a splinter group of the larger St. Lucia Labor
Party) represents (he sum total of the political left in the Eastern Caribbean.
On most major university campuses of the United States, the left of center
organizations are larger and better funded than were the various socialist organizations
of the Eastern Caribbean when they existed. However, ruling governments were severe
•o note that the groups folded not sole ,y because Qf governmem repress^ tousc
ironicany, the same kind of heightened paranoia and propaga„da that prevai ,ed jn ^
Uni,ed States abon t comraunism and the Soviet Union was paralle,ed in the Eastern
Cariboo., The people of the Caribbean, idea of communism was the "second coming
in Grenada
,
because they go, the temporary support of the peop|e to perform ,^
.ask, namely, to oust the despot Gairy. Bu, ,oday the entire Eastern Caribbean has
moved to right of center, and i, is safe t0 conc!ude m ,he chances q( a ^^
organization taking power in the Eastern Caribbean is remote, if not impossib,e.
The current left in the Eastern Caribbean ,oday consists of the Manrice Bishop
Patriotic Movement (MBPM) of Grenada. The ACLM of Antigua, the St. Vincent
United Peoples Movement (SUPM), the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) of St. Lucia and
the United Dominica Labor Party (UDLP) can all be described as moderate. Their
rhetoric is one of anti-imperialism and social reform. They are essentially fringe
organizations led by college educated locals who consider those organizations a forum
for intellectual stimulation. Among these groups only the United Dominica Labor Party
is a viable and recognized political party.
In the 1990s these groups are gradually fading into oblivion. The Grenada invasion
by the United States, the advent of cable TV into homes of Caribbean people and
finally the dismantling of communism in Europe have virtually destroyed any hope these
movements harbored of becoming viable parties. This political change to the right,
represents perhaps the most significant change in the Eastern Caribbean in the last
decade. TOs change has brought back to the forefront of Caribbean socicly the
conservative and s tah,e political mode, which had heen ehaHenged in the ,980s As a
resuh, the states have p.oceeded to e,ec, moderate pohtica, panics, and have given then,
mandates to address issnes such as the eco„omy and unemployment.
,„ the 1990s
,
people seem to be demanding more accountabihty from their governments.
,n
Dominica, the people have given the Freedom Party the responsibility to secure a new
international airport. St. Lucia wants more teachers, whiie Grenada's new government
has a mandate to reduce unemployment Should they fail to meet these challenges, they
will probably still be re-elected, bu, for the time being governments appear to he looking
ahead rather than engaging perpetually in day-to-day campaigns. Governments are also
convinced that there is no threat from any left wing movement, and with the Reagan
administration out of office, "the Russians are coming" philosophy no longer dominates
their political activity.
Change in the Caribbean is extremely slow, but stable. People are cautious in
adapting new ideas. They seem to cherish the Westminster model which they adopted
from the British and modified to suit their culture. As a rule, people will modify or
reject any system with which they are not comfortable. Franklin Knight observes that
"no ideology imported to the Caribbean will thrive without modification. This was true
of capitalism, mercantilism, Black Power and Communism".33 The irony is that all the
relevant systems except communism have been modified and have been incorporated
within the Caribbean Political model. This collective characteristic of the model
^Kennedy Simmonds "OECS in Perspective"from report on OECS (1987) Page 4.
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ParadOXiCa"y de~S b°lh **— - static nalure of the sys(em whjch
render it so peculiar and unique.
No. o„Iy „ the Eastern Caribbean po|iijca|^ ^ ^ ^^
governments are equa„y unpredictable. To that extent, (he Governments in IS» agreed
to form a cooperate economic association of the seven micro states of ,he Eastern
Caribbean.
Against a history of consistent failure for integration in the region, the
estahhshmen, of the Organi2atio„ of Eastern Car.hhean States (OECS) represented a
welcome change in the poHtical and economic direction of the states. This latest
movement towards integration marks a new willingness on the part of the leaders to
re-examine the concept of politica, integration. However, the OECS is still a long way
from political integration.
The chairman of the OECS - Kennedy Simmonds, Prime Minister of St.
Kitts/Nevis in his message at the organization's fifth anniversary described the OECS as
an organization
"established to promote the social, economic and political development
of the peoples and countries of the Eastern Caribbean through join, action and the
pooling of our limited resources for protecting and advancing our common interest".*
This description of the OECS is certainly not a ringing endorsement for regional political
integration, but whatever "joint action" means within the OECS context, above all it
represents a conscious effort by the leaders to recognize the inherent advantages that
"Kennedy Simmonds in OECS Annual Report (1987) Page 4.
„ i . 260can derive from integration The ofpq u r „n. OECS hopefully represents a first step to eventual
political integration. On the other hanH ud it may very well represent the maximum extent
to which the leaders will agree to integrate Th. h - «8 i te. e history of integration in the region
- social integration but W1,_ agrc£ (o surrender (hdr sovcrei8nty^
and lhcir own persona,« power for . colleciive ^ ^
rcg,on. My own analysis of the integration movement suppo„s the hislorical evidcnce
current structure and objective of the ofpq -
j t OECS represents the ultimate extent to which the
countries will participate.
What ,hen is the purpose of the organization? Government ministers and officials
are vague in deseribing the organization's objectives with any distinct and dear
perspective. The Director Genera, of OECS describes the goals and objectives as
"wide-ranging and aim in effect a, utilizing the vehicie of regional cooperation for the
economic, social and political advancement of the OECS region-' This description of
.he organization's goals and objectives is broad and noncommittal, which summarizes the
general impression one gets regarding the commitment to OECS integration.
Article 3.1 of the OECS treaty signed by the leaders of each micro state defines
the purpose of the organization as follows:
a. the promotion of cooperation among OECS member states at the regional and
international levels;
b. the promotion of unity and solidarity among OECS members slates and
defense of their sovereignly, territorial integrily and independence;
35Lewis Vaughn in OECS Report (1987) Page 6.
*
-o see, th fullest possMe harmonjzatjon Qf
adop t,o„ where possible of coramon positions on international issue and
-ngements formm representmion and/or -
^
Pr0m
°:°
n
^
eCOn°miC integra,i°n «"""* "» E
— Caribbean'Common Market (ECCM) and;
f. to PUrsue the above through di;cussions on matters of common
^ these broad guidelines [he organization ^^ fe^ ^^
_
decade. Bu, the region Has no
, experienced a„y major movement Eor establishing a
.he estab,,hme„ t of . po!illca
, uniQn „ ,he prime Mmis(er ^ ^ vincMt j p^
He has taken his message throughout the Caribbean. He argues that the region's lack
of resources, the smallness of size and the restriction of economic, of scaie retire th,
the Eastern Caribbea
„ become one poii.ica, unit. He, however, senses from his
colleagues, that the integration they seek is one which is a,ready represented in the
loose DECS organ iza tion. Bu, Mitchell wants to go the whole "nine yard," Wha « he
envisions is a single political unit, with one constitution and a representative federal
government. He has stated to his colleagues:
"If we are not talking about a single ministry of Finance we are joking If the
umon does not speak with a single voice to the international financial
community, we will not attract the kind of finances we are talking about to fix
the roads and houses and hospitals and to organize the social and physical
infrastructure that will launch us into the twenty first century.""
OECS Document: 'OECS in Perspective-, (St. Lucia: May 1987) Page 6.
31J.F. Mitchell, Caribbean Crusoe (Concepts Publishing, VT 1989) Page 107.
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™at fed of vision is pcrhaps lhe_ en| . h(cncd poh.Ucai pos(urc Mming ^
come aboul for lhe 0ECS wi(h|n (he imcrna(ionai^ ^^^ (o^ ^
«- as a unil
, rather lhan seven underpopu
,med^^^^^
But as I mentioned earlier the lnr»l «jw •local pohuc^ns are nm prepared [o^^^
educated on the virtues of politic totegration
. ^ Mi(chc,$^ ^ ^^
On the contra^, the other heads of states do no, share Mitchclfs enthusiasm.
,„
fact, in
,987, the chairman of the DECS Kennedy Simmonds warned that "undue haste
is to be avoided" in establishing any form of regional political integration. Prime
Minister Bird of Antigua has ako registered his opposition to politic., union
. The chicf
minister of Montserrat has also expressed his unwi„i„gness lo enter any^^
without Antigua.
Even the opposition parties of the region seem to be lukewarm towards the
development of the OECS into a political union. Ron Sanders, a Caribbean scholar,
quotes the leader of a small political party in St. Vincent as he describes regional
opposition parties response to the concept of a political union.
"Three relatively small opposition parties are unequivocally for political union:
Ralph Gonsalves' Movement for National Unity (St. Vincent), George
Odium's Progressive Labor Party (St. Lucia), and Tim Hector's
Antigua-Caribbean Liberation Movement (Antigua). However, Julian Hunte's
St. Lucia Labor Party, Lee Moore's St. Kitts-Nevis Labor Party, and Vincent
Beache's St. Vincent Labor Party are more concerned with their national
o mca pa„,eS
,
in and on, of government, favors the <J
the halting of the unity train."38
"
I. appears evident that the "Unity train" has stopped, and that the cnrren, OECS
structure and operation will remain the sum total of Caribbean integration.
,„ the
region. In spite of the vagueness of its stated purpose, the organization does perform a
strategic and vita, roie in the socioeconomic activity of the region. Among their
activities, they have been instrument
,n deveioping an inter-isiand sports program and
have established a lega. unit whtch functions as a legai resource center for regional
governments in the development of legislation. On the economic front, they have
established a regional franchise cooperative in response to the perceived needs for more
scientific fishing activity among member countries. They have also established a regional
Pharmaceutical bulk purchase project which is aimed a. providing pharmaceutical to
member states a, significantly reduced cost. Funding for these projects are provided by
external funding agencies including the USAID and the International Center for Ocean
Development (ICOD) of Canada. The funding for staffing and operation of the OECS
offices are provided by contributions of member states, with assistance from external
MRon Sanders, "Political Union in the OECS', Caribbean Affair! Vol. 2, No. 2 (April-June
i) Pnpp 177 '1989) age 122.
years indicates some commitment to the OECS.
It is my conclusion that this level ™of cooperat.on among the OECS political leaders
represents the extent to which they will aeree toy n g unite on a regional basis. Any
movement towards political union will be resisted tk ir-. The history of failure that has been
- a key ingredient for unity in the regio„ ^ tQ ^ particjpaiion ^ ^^
*e intention proccs, My interviews w„h peop|£ throughoui carjbbean^
that Governments have nol made lhe effor( tQ^ regjonai poiaicai unuy a nationa)M no, have lhcy attempled „^ ^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^
-on. As a result, the people are ma„ ifesting the same level of lg„ora„ce that
accompa„ied the 1958 -62 Nation which failed.
, found skepticism, fear and apathy
among the people, factors which cumulatively wil, eventually derail any movement
towards political unity.
It would be safe to conclude, based on historical precedents, that the Eastern
Caribbean wil, no, undergo any major or radical political change to either its systemic or
governance structure. While moderate reforms will take place grad ually, the
fundamental structure of the political model will remain constant.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
- preceediDg chapters,
, have^ ^ §^ ^^
of the democratic EaStera Caribbean« mode,. This a„a,ysis is imporlan|
mainly because „r the developmenta
, achievcmcn( Qf ^ ^ ^
Canbbean when measured again,, that of o,her pose colonialist territories of the
.n.emato„a, system. Throughout nislory
, ^^ ^^^
succeed to subversion, m N ilary aggrcssion
,
in, ^^^
corruption. These modern!^ „ations have alx)ve a „, manifatcd hjg
h
^ ^^
mslabrhly, holh systemic and govcrnmcnia |.
The Eastern Caribbean state, a collection of seven small states with a total
maintain democratic governments in a region of the world c„ns la „, ly embroiied in
politic., unrcs, and instability. The democratic system of the Eas,er„ Caribbean have
unique and peculiar characteristics, and like other developing countries of the Third
World, seemed to have developed what Apter would refer to as an accommodated
political system which lies somewhere between familiar extreme categories of political
forms.' Bu, above
.11 the system is democratic. Some scholars, particularly Caribbean
intellectuals, may argue that the Eastern Caribbean model is amhoritative, that it is
dependent on foreign powers for survival and tha, political participation in Government
is limited. Those factors are legitimate criticism and appear to he inherent in the model,
lDavid Apia; Politics of Modernization. Pages 2-3.
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but any comparative analysis of ,he syslem wj|| condudc [hat fa^
democratic.
Numerous scholarly essays and ideological po.emics have been written on ,he
subject of democracy, but h spi(e of those vo ,um£s ^^
«o its exact meaning. Austin and WiUmore, for instance, suggests ,ha« the principa,
factors in a democracy are popular sovereignty, politic, equa,ity, popuiar consuitation,
and majority rule.^ The Eastern Caribbean democratic system features all of these
minimum characteristics and an in-depth study of the foremost writings on democracy
have led me to conclude tha, in spite of its pecularity, i, must be considered a
democracy.
Throughout this thesis, I have tried to establish four basic characteristics of the
Eastern Caribbeans political model, which can be measured against any other existing
democratic system, and which I believe legitimizes the model as a true democracy. The
four are: (1) The established procedural democratic election of government. (2) The
high level of electoral participation by the people. (3) The absence of systematic
political repression and (4) The existence of multiparties within the states. The presence
of these characteristics guarantees systemic and governmental stability.
In Chapter II the factors that led to the development of the model were
documented in detail, because I felt a review of the process was important, in light of
the failures of other democracies within the Caribbean region. Historians have listed
countless factors to explain why particular countries became democratic, but few
attempts have been made to isolate those factors that have led to democracy in the
2Ranney Austin & Kendall WiUmore, Democracy and the American Party System
Brace & World 1956) Page 28.
'
"reSPOnS
'b,e de
-'~
-—* tried to show
, however
historical development of democracy^_ ^^^
6uara„teed the maintenance of^^^ ^ ^
_
Pace. such as the me(hod Qf coloniza[jon dass^
_^^ ^^
values, have a„ contribuled to lhe kjnd Qf democraijc system tha( £merged ^ ^
of the world.
I a.So feh it was imporlam to emphas . e (he nature and struciure ^
that dectora, participation is the major indicalor of . democracy 3^ ^^
suggest that average wealth, degree of industria li2a,i0n a„d unionization and the ievel of
education is higher in democratic countries. Wealth, he thinks is needed in order to
maintain high levels of education and mass communication. Education and wealth are
the tools by which the population is made competent < The socioeconomic structure of
the Eastern Caribbean manifests an absence of wea|th among the inhabitants and
education and communication are a, a minimum level. Ye. democracy continues to
flourish in the region. Once again my analysis of the scholarly literature indicates clearly
that while the theories are provocative and applicable to some systems, they have failed
to include or address the development of democracy in small states.
'David Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Sorien, (New York: Glencoe Free Press, NY 1958)
Re^TZ^Z Seience
Harrington Moore has^ a ^ broad iheori£s to^^
-elopmen, But his theories a|so dQ no( expbin fte emergence ^ n^
revolution through which
.^ go£s ^ innuemia| ^ determjnjng ^ ^
^ a bourgeois reTO ,ution
,eads to . ^ ^^^^ ^
I have, (herefore
, lried lo put the Eas[ern^ ^ <^ ^^
.hose variab.es which have „o t been addressed by the Uterature on moderation and
democracy bu« which impacts on ,he region are explained. I„ that respect, I have
argued that the various poiittcal theories reiating to political development in the Tbird
World are not easily applied to the Eastern Caribbean.
Tbeories on dependency and the radical political and economic solutions put forth
by dependency theorists for instance are totally inapplicable to the region. Dependency
theory seeks to explain underdevelopment as a consequence of foreign economic and
political influence. While this theory may be accurate in defining ,he political condition
in Latin America and explains the Caribbean Economic relationship with major powers,
it does not present an option for the dependency in the Eastern Caribbean. The
limitations inherent in small economies with limited or no raw material, dependent on
tourism and agriculture, does not allow Caribbean governments an option to successfully
break out of their dependent position. Any critical analysis of the region must recognize
that the economies of the region are totally dependent on foreign countries. The
1966)
'Barringon Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship A r>,„,nrr^, (Bos,0„ : Beacon m
popu,atio„ increase
, and the deveIopment of a sup£r s(ruc(ure (o suppw(
» *™on has bee„ a descriptrve insight and inqui,^ ^^
Eastern Caribbean political model. The central nm v «in proportion of the study has been to
— - anaiyse the various characterisfa rf (he regjon ,s democra(ic^ modd
.hose within the geographjca
, ,ocat
.
on rf ^ .bbean Basm^
Thus, i, was necessaiy t0 examine
,he Caribbean system^ ^^
•heor.es on moder„i ty
, insli[utlona!ism and j found ^^^
because, first
, (he Eastern Caribbean po|itica| deve|opmem proc£ss^ diffcren( &ora
most other post co,o„ ia , stales and secondly mos , Qf^ ^ ^
^
deve,opme„ta
,
process of the region. Thus, theories on the ro,e of peasa„ts a„d
modernizing ehtes in developing counlries were „„, app|icab ,e ^ ^
apathy amongst urban poor in modernizing states were also found to be flawed when
applied to the Caribbean model. Generally, I was ab,e to show why those broad
theories fell short in their application to the Caribbean model.
What is different about the Extern Caribbean as a region that has resulted in a
prolonged history of political stability and the continued adherence to the principles of
democracy in states where switching to other structures of government would on the
surface seem so easy? If we were to list the variables that are different from other
Third World neocolonialist states we would necessa rily start with (1) size. These new
~™
S
-e s,, allowspoli,calpar,esandPeep, to take a persona, approach t0 ^^^ ^
Peop,e identi* wilh lheir parliuc
,ar s(al£ ^ wjth ^ caribton ^ a ^
pnde in thcir m.crostates wilh jb „.mi(ed resource ^ at(itude ^ effec( ^
—g social) economic and pomical dcveiopmem ^ ^ ^ a^ ^ ^
— in maintaining stabmty ,.n lhe indjvidua| s[a(es ^_
attempts at political intcgralion .„ ^^^ ^^ ^ ^^ ^
eco„omieS and undeve,oped systems lhan to ta par , Qf , more
development mode, of a federation. (3) Peopie p,aCe strong va,ue on the electoral
process and believe fervently in the legitimacy of their politic*. institutions
. Since
receiving the franchise of one person one vote front Britain in ,951, the pcopie have
gone to the polls apProxima,ely sixty (60) times to elect their representatives in national
elections. Elections are hotly contested, participation in the process is high and
represents one of the areas of the TTtird World with a high level of voter participation.
Both government and people manifest strong commitments to the constitution of their
particular states.
These three characteristics, plus a unique history of colonizations have been
responsible for the kind of political model that exists among those states and
Irr
:
pondinsly for ,hc high ,cvd <>f
—
-
-—
-
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the Eastern Caribbean.
~* These include unique socia
, ^^^^
^«n« contponen, or the Eas(ern Caribbean modc, Emigrali()n „^ .
of Caribbean peep, an, one which determines ana ensures thal . democratic s, t,m
-r curtail their political or persona, freedom. This particular characteristic is
psychology reiatea to the proved history „r slavcry and tol()nial dominali„n
All of these secondary factors which politic., scientists may describe as
"traditions values, when combine, with the morc progressive and modcrn,ing va|ues
relating to politic., inslilulion
, kgl,m^ an(J^^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^
paradoxical system which is essentially Eastern Caribbean.
The paradoxes within the system are intriguing because there has not been an
indiginous traditional society in the Eastern Caribbean. Tradition., hierachical or
pyramcdial societies as were prevalent in Africa was absent in the Eastern Caribbean.
To identify any form of traditionalism in the region we will have to begin with the
society that existed when the British brought slaves to the Caribbean to work on the
plantation. This historical event created Caribbean society. The major question that
remains unanswered is whether we can consider the political and social relationship that
existed between the African and British colonialist during slavery as a genuine
"traditional society".
Whether the region can be consid£red a lraditjonai socie(y ^ ^^^^
or cultural perspective is debatable, but the power relationship that cxisted in thm
society during the 17lh
, lgth^^^_ iraditioMi ^ ^
one can begi
„
to understand the complexities of the emergen, Caribbean mode,.
The Governmenta, decision making process is highly authoritatian. Bu,
speeding laws, no zoning laws, but there are strong ,aws relating to morality.
Antiabortion laws and capita, punishment are still the law of the land. The ultimate
paradox re,ated to Caribbean democracy is that every citi.cn has the freedom to vote for
the party of their choice but if that party ,oses, the citizen also loses. Supporting the
losing party in the Eastern Caribbean represents a guaranteed method for personal
disaster. The minute size of the states makes it possible for government to victimize
people who have voted against them. We have shown this to be a distinct trait of the
Caribbean model. Victimization, however, is limited to minor acts of vindinc.iveness on
the part of Government officials and does not represent the kind of political repression
with which we are familiar in Central America and other Third World states.
The authoritarian aspect of Eastern Caribbean government is a factor which I
identified as a distinct characteristic of the political model. Although this system has its
drawbacks and is occasionally abused by political leaders, the society as a whole does not
seem to suffer disproportionately by this level of authoritarianism. Decision making is
authoritative, the prime minister makes all decisions and normally will seek no input
from advisors. But on closer analysis, it becomes apparent that governments make only
273deC'Si0nS lhat S6em 10
-
— <*- of voters. Most are -popula,
'
oecstons, „ necessarily the r . h , dedsionSi w ^ ^
P-cess of decision making „ hierachica
, a„d authoritarjan ^ struc[ure ^ process^The majori,y of citi2e„s i„ the region are able lo US£ ^^ (q^^
dem°CraliC
°" ^^^ - P*. is neve, appropriale,y
represented. This is another major paradoxical characteris(ic Qf^^
The
.ode, appears to have serious potential for poUtica. abuse by corrupled
of the region consider their systen, to he the most appropria te for their s,a,e. This
acceP , a„ce of the au,hori,a,ive structure, however, may not be such a unique
Phenomenon. Apter suggests that in tradition., societies the norm is authoritative. In
such societies, the mdividua, seems to deveiop a fatalistic outlook on ,ife and appears to
a.wavs aequiecse to those in power.' I„ the Eastern Carjbbean ^ peopIe^^
to those in power as iong as they continue to meet the needs of the majority. Bu, as
soon as the power structure becomes repressive, the citizens will remove the
government. Even in Grenada which represents the onfy deviation from the Eastern
Caribbean norm, the New Jewel Movement was elected to replace the abusive and
repressive regime of Prime Minister Gairy thus confirming a historical consistency in the
peoples' resolve not to surrender their political freedom to dictatorship.
The Eastern Caribbean has never been seen on its own terms. It has been seen
through the sometimes distorted perspective of metropolitcan scholars and politicians and
more recently, critically through the eyes of Western educated Caribbean scholars.
AP'er
-
The Politics of Modemimlinn (University of Chicago Press 1965).
Anxious to utilize their comparmive ana|y(ica| skn|s ihese m (o
of efficiency and effectiveness.
To evaluate pofafaa, developmem „ fc^ fc^^ ^ ^ ^
studied wi[hi„ lhe context of its ow„ parameters Howard warda ^ o(ter^
•neons, have written extensively on the iMppropriatene5s of (he^_^
used ,o eva,uate poHUca, development in Lalin„
, be|ieve ^_^
underdeve,oPed modernizing states> but „^^^^ ^
they have take„ their own path to polifica, deve,opme„ t and have heen successful fa
developing a mode, that is functional and stable
. The mode , does ^^^ ^
estahhshed sociological a„d poKtica, modes b„t the h.storica, experiences of the peopies
are different from that of Western democracies. Therefore we have to necessity
conclude that the democratic politic.! model that emerged from that society is the
aPPropriate model for the region, particular, in light of its proven stability.
The model, of course, is subject to a number of political and sociological
interpreters, but to develop an accura,e comprehension of the model, it is imperative
that the ana|ySt be cognitive of the unique variables which exist within the region.
Variables, such as size, ethnicity and a history of enslavement are significant and have
been highlighted throughout this study.
Before the onset of the Grenada revolution, most United States administrations and
scholars had virtually ignored the Estern Caribbean as sovereign nation states. The
'Howard J. Warda (Edilor), Politics & Social Chang in Latin Africa (University ofMassachusetts Press 1982). ' '
area
no
remains true
to
»* was generally viewed as ,he^ backyard „ where wes(cm (ourists mM
a soci^, politica% and ^ ^^
threat WhateVCr
'°
lh£ inte™a ' i0"al 1—
•
Whilc i, was true then and
—
ft. the states were politically or socially undeve ,opc, 0n [he^ ,^
in the history of newly independent territories.
The Grenada revolution changed both the United States administration, and
scholars view of the Eastern Caribbean. They responded to the revointion in typical
administration in particular then considered the Eastern Caribbean as a hotbed of
communis.. It was proclaimed that the Cubans were going to spread communism
throughout the islands. They had begun with Grenada, and i, was therefore inevitable
that the res, of the states of the region would all become satellites of Moscow through
their surrogate Cuba.
It is amazing to note that the United States had responded in the same manner
once before. Wiarda reminds us that the Cuban revolution led Congress to appoint task
forces to study the problem and fellowships were provided for scholars to study Latin
America. A new image that of the guerilla revolutionary replaced the older sterotype of
the sleepy peasant. New aid programs and cooperative endeavors were made available
by the United States government and other private agencies.8
WowardJ. Wiarda (Editor), Politics & Social Change in Latin Anorirn Pages 3.4
_
After the Grenada revolution the same process occurred in lhc United Siates
"Conserves from bolh partics hailed the^ as .^^ ^^ ^ ^
Un '0n
'
hat UnitCd
—-™ <° oppose communist
.pansionism in
*e Western Hemisphere, President Reaga„ reared to (he Grenadan political ieaders
as a "group of leftist ,hugs,, and ^^ ^^^ ^
Caribbean region was seen as a cauldron of simmering sociaiism which would soon
the Heritage Foundation, described the Caribbean situation in the Mowing terms:
"What would have been unthinkable to Americans a generation ago has become a
reality. The Soviet Union, a rival superpower unprecedented in aggressiveness and
strategic capability has established a major military espionage, political and cuhura,
presence in the United States "back yard.- Other "scholarly" work from the right were
all written in the same paranoic perspective, proclaiming that 'the Russians are coming'
to the Caribbean.
The truth, however, is that USSR involvement in the Eastern Caribbean was
minimal and relevant only to Grenada. There has been no evidence to indicate that the
Soviets had any geostrategic designs on the region. I talked at length with new and
Page All,
"Capital Hill Split over Wisdom of Invading Grenada", (New York Times, October 16, Edition)
"Edwin J Feulner Foreword in Timothy Ashby's The Bear in the Backyard (Lexington-
Lexington Books MA 1987) — 5
lve.
were not even
former Eas tern Caribbean leaders and asked lhem spccinca|ly^^^^
any bod of assignee from the Soviets
. ^ respo„se h^^^^
PoUticaj ,eaders (hroughou( (he region
_^ ( ^
wi.Hng to enter inl0 diplomatic relaljonship whh [he Sovie(s _ consHcr^
-h the Soviets on any issue would be political suicide for any Caribbean leader" said
Senator Ossie Waisb, a member of pariiamen, in tbe Cbaries Government in Dominica
Jeremiah Scott, Minister of Communication and Works in the St. Vincent Government
emphasized tha, in the Eastern Caribbean peopie perceive communism as a threat to
their freedom and are strongly opposed to any contact with the Soviets."
I have focused on this critical aspect of Western scholars' understanding of the
Caribbean because i, is perhaps one of the areas in which they have demonstrated a lack
of knowledge of the social and political situation. The tendency to group all of the
islands of the Caribbean and Centra, America together as a geopolitical unit is inherently
flawed. This thesis has attempted to point out that the states possess characteristics and
systems that are very different from that of the larger states of the former British
colonies, and are further extremely different from states of the Central American region.
Because of those existing differences, their social, economic and political needs are
correspondingly extremely varied. To develop an accurate analysis of the Eastern
Caribbean from a scholarly and geopolitical perspective, it is important that each country
or subgroup of countries be studied independently.
"Discussion with Government Officials in the Eastern Caribbean, October-November 1989.
*W Government, f„r inslancc
, has lake„ a regiona
, appmach tQ ana^
m be the only immediate optjon av,|ab|e [o jt ^ ^ fur(her^ ^
*om a scholar, perspective, it does nm_ (he rc ^ (o iump s(a[cs ^
'
Nations that are of chief„ here ^^^^^ ^ ^
und iffere„ ti a, category. Each country requir(;s separa|e^^
and separate policy initiatives."12
This diSseration has sough, to establish the Rework for separa,e analysis of the
smaller states of the Caribbean Basin region, known geographical as the Eastern
Caribbean. It would, of course, be considerably more methodologically acceptabie if this
analysis was reduced more closely to existing theories on political development.
However, it is precisely because of the current limitations of political science theory on
development in small states that make such approach limited. Instead, I have sough, to
use some of the existing theories to show why small states like the Eastern Caribbean
cannot conform to the broad existing political theories. In the process, I have also
attempted to establish the major characteristics of the Eastern Caribbean's unique
political development model. I have relied upon descriptive and historical materials for
"Howard Warda, 'Changing Realities and U.S. Policy- in Greene & Snowcmft (Editors)
hcTMAWsT) Page "of. <B°SI°" ; °° &
- « .his sludy
, bm ,vc also d()ne corapara[jvc anaiysis ^ Kindji^
wh,ch governed the emergence of that particular mode,.
» * ^ Hope that , his work wiI| eslab|ish a cQnccpiuai framcwork ^
-de. can begin to undcrs[and
,he^^ ^^^^^
within those new small states.
The existing hterature on ,he region can He grouped into ,wo basic categories The
«* Sroup represents work in whtch the Eastern Caribbean is ,umped with the other
Caribbean territories. These pubheations do not identify the Eastern Caribbean as a
region but tend to focus on historic, development from a broader regiona, perspective
wh,ch tncludes Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad, and Barbados. The other group of
pubheations are the newer analysis of Caribbean systems, written by Caribbean scholars
he reality of the Eastern Caribbean situation; that is, none has analyzed the Eastern
Caribbean on its own terms. I have attempted in this dissertation to examine the
negative aspects of the current democratic mode,, bu, have also focused on the positive
aspects.
Perhaps the major conclusion suggested by this work is that the Eastern Caribbean
democratic model is not the perfect democratic system, but in light of the failures of
other democratic models across the globe, the model emerges as a strong system which is
stable and functional, and above all it meets the political needs of the people.
I do not claim that the model is not without serious inconsistencies, but on the
basis of a substantial number of lengthy interviews with leaders and people of the region,
I offer this analysis of the model as a significant piece on the study of political
development in the Eastern Caribbean.
I » a,SO encourage, by those inlerviews lQ think ^ ^^^ ^
systen, and appear to work within
.hose Nations to generate growth
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
A CARIBBEAN COMMISSIONER'S EXPERIENCE
Examples of Victimization
Following the pattern adopted by aJ! Payments and textures In *• a
world and in the West Indies, the Antigua Parliament hadJ'tT^J™°
for members who had served for a certain number of ve^s to T^T-« from ParKamen, either by resignation or defeat at *e poll, J
In the majority of Parliaments or assemblies in the democratic world ~tb~i . •
,
»> also receive sobsUntial pensions dependent on their period of service and si of part'mentary remuneration. OT P 37"3 "
With the defeat of the Antigua Labour Party in the elections*, February 1977 c ,
of the defeated Ministers and M.P s. some of whom who had given over 20^^and were eligible for the.r gratutity applied to the Government for same The Gov.l
took no notice of their application. It was reported that the Government decided that thevhad no mtention. of paying these gratuities. At any rate - during the entire life of the P L MGovernment no payment of gratuity was made to these former legislators.
It was not a matter that by paying these gratuities the Government would have created
a precedent The former Government had aire^y paid gratuities to certain nominalTmbers and at feast one former Minister who had retired and was efTcfhr, f TT The re*, of the Government to hon.r*
Further to this, it was ailejed that the Government had threatened cerain f„, •
mvestors with withdraw, of their permits to operate in the State if^
to any of the former Ministers and parliamentarians. So far aJI the former members
Government and parliament had to eke out a livelihood on their own -T
°f
i . ,. . , . .
resources withoutfven being able to find employment in some of the indust/ier that they had hef ed to
tablish in the State.
6 p
**
The former Commissioner to Canada for the Associated States, the author of thisbook, was approached and requested by the Council of Ministers to take the position inCanada. He eventually agreed to do so feeling that it would be a means of assisting to brin,the States together into a federation, or some closer association of which he was a staunch
advocate.
^Reprinted from Novel le H. Richards publication, The St-ruqqle
& The Conquest
, Antigua.
The Commissioner served out one three yea.r term and was re-appointed for another
term of three years by the Council of Ministers. All the Associated States honoured their
financial commitments to the Commission until the change of Government in Antigua when
the P.L.M. Government immediately upon taking office sought after the removal of the
Commissioner despite his contracted agreement, and for a full year that the Commissioner
served during the P.L.M. regime paid not a single cent of contribution to the Commission.
The Antigua Premier and his Ministers made it clear that the Commissioner, an Antiguan,
would receive no money from Antigua so long as he remained in office. At the request of
the Antigua Government, the Commissioner was eventually recalled midway between his
term of appointment without compensation or other financial settlement being made.
APPENDIX B
LETTER FROM THE GRENADIAN VOICE
GRENADIAN VOICE Saturday, November 25,1989 Page 5
- Letters
PLEASE allow me
some space in your
paper to point outhow
wicked this so-called
TNPgovemmentis. I
wasaCo-ordinatorfor
the NNP in St. Pat-
rick's West sin eel 9S4
having worked for
K>nny Lalsingh when
was an NNP. Dur-
ing those years, I
worked as a Supervi-
sor in the Roads Divi-
sion in St. Patrick's.
As soon as Dr. Mitch-
ell was fired by Mr.
was fired twice
Blaize, the new Min-
ister, Ben Andrew,
better known as the
Minister ofFire, came
and asked roe to work
for his new party
TNP. I told him that
Icouldnotdothatand
that I will always
remain an NNP. One
week afterwards, Ben
Andrew instructed
the Ministry to fire me
immediately. I have
been home now for
three months with my
children andcouldnot
findanotherjob. Last
week when the Xmas
Road Programme
started, I sought some
work and was given
one of the jobs. One
week later, my name
w-as reported to Mr.
Andrew andhe imme-
diately instructed the
people to fire me once
again, which they
carried out
Mr. Editor, I will
like to find out if the
Government is Ben
Andrew's own. No one
voted for this man, but
Mr. Blaize put him
there to destroy all of
us. I will like to know
if I am not supposed
to work in Grenada
because I support
NNP and Dr. Mitch-
ell- Dr. Mitchell
showed care and love
to all poor people like
me and we will never
give him up. We can-
not wait to vote that
vindictive group out
ofoffice. We are pray-
ing and with God's
love everything will
work. Poor people are
J^b-ngfo7~ardt
—
^ Mitchell back in
office to help them.
p .
Loi
;
is
« Frame,
t-nanbmelle, St. Pat-
rick's
*Reprinted from the Grenadian Voice newspaper.
Apter,
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